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colonial rule (1910–1945) fundamentally altered the relationship between the Korean state, the
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nineteenth century. Chapter Two uses the diary of a single farmer to explore in-depth his economic
worldview and the factors he considered important in his everyday life. Chapter Three traces colonial
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organizations to implement its major policies. Chapter Four examines the activities of the new
associations in the context of existing agricultural organizations, and Chapter Five questions the ideas of
development that underpinned both Korean and colonial efforts to reform the rural economy. Overall, this
dissertation places the semi-governmental organizations at the heart of a new rural economic order.
Though established under colonial rule, the activities of the associations fit within a broader history of
rural economic organization which shaped farmers’ interactions with the associations beyond their
immediate political objectives.
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ABSTRACT
AGRICULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF EMPIRE: INSTITUTIONS,
ASSOCIATIONS, AND MARKET NETWORKS IN KOREA, 1876–1945
Holly Stephens
Eugene Y. Park

From the late nineteenth century, successive periods of domestic reform (1860s–1910)
and Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945) fundamentally altered the relationship between
the Korean state, the population, and the economy. Through a focus on agriculture—the
largest industry at the time—this dissertation examines multiple efforts to reorient
agricultural production to meet new expectations of the rural economy. In particular, this
dissertation focuses on the expansion of the state through a series of semi-governmental
organizations—known as associations (Ko. chohap; Ja. kumiai)—which mediated
interaction between farmers, government officials, and local and international markets. In
the process, the associations not only introduced new agricultural technologies and
reordered trading relationships but also influenced the ways in which farmers produced
for the market, be it through the enforcement of quality standards on farmers’ crops or the
issuing of loans against future production. This dissertation uses a wide range of primary
sources written in Korean, Japanese, and Classical Chinese—from official government
publications to local organizational records and previously unexamined farmers diaries—
to detail the varied ways in which government officials and rural residents alike projected
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onto the work of the new associations their own visions of what constituted development
within the rural economy.
Chapter One examines the changing significance of the economy to the Korean
government in the late nineteenth century. Chapter Two uses the diary of a single farmer
to explore in-depth his economic worldview and the factors he considered important in
his everyday life. Chapter Three traces colonial agricultural policies toward rice and
cotton, and the government’s reliance upon semi-governmental organizations to
implement its major policies. Chapter Four examines the activities of the new
associations in the context of existing agricultural organizations, and Chapter Five
questions the ideas of development that underpinned both Korean and colonial efforts to
reform the rural economy. Overall, this dissertation places the semi-governmental
organizations at the heart of a new rural economic order. Though established under
colonial rule, the activities of the associations fit within a broader history of rural
economic organization which shaped farmers’ interactions with the associations beyond
their immediate political objectives.
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WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
As this dissertation spans multiple political regimes, the primary sources used provide no
single standard for dates, names, weights, measures, and currencies. Discrepancies in
recording conventions arise between different Korean governments, as well as between
Korean and colonial regimes, as governments of all stripes periodically updated weights,
measurements, dates, and currencies. To minimize confusion, information on units of
weight and measurement is included in footnotes throughout the dissertation although the
following general principles have been followed wherever possible.
For the sake of consistency, where units are generally equivalent Korean terms have been
privileged (for example, chŏngbo over chōbu). In cases where the language of the
original term is significant (as with units of currency) this is recorded in the language of
the primary source. Korean has been romanized according to the McCune-Reischauer
system; Japanese according to the Revised Hepburn system; and Chinese according to
Pinyin. Exceptions have been made for well-known place names, such as Seoul or Tokyo.
Given the potential for multiple readings, original characters for Japanese personal names
have also been included where possible.
Dates
All dates appearing in the main text of the dissertation are given according to the solar
Gregorian calendar. Most dates appearing in the footnotes also follow this convention.
The only exceptions to this rule occur in bibliographic references to certain primary
sources—mainly citations from farmers’ diaries and the Veritable Records of the Chosŏn
Dynasty—which are catalogued in the original source according to the East Asian lunar
calendar and are therefore referenced as such in the footnotes. Intercalary months are
identified with the addition of the letter ‘a’, as in the following example: Yu Yŏnghŭi,
Kusillok, 1911.6a.8.
Conversions between lunar and solar calendars were made using the online tool
provided by the Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute at
https://astro.kasi.re.kr:444/life/pageView/8
Volume
The following values are calculated against the yŏngjo ch’ŏk—a base unit for Chosŏn-era
construction which is thought to hold one of the most stable values over time.
1 sŏm = 15-20 mal = approximately 90 to 120 liters
1 mal = 10 toe = approximately 5.96 liters
1 toe = approximately 0.596 liters
As a point of reference, in 1886 Sim Wŏn’gwŏn calculated that he needed one toe of
grain per day to feed his family of 4 to 5 people.
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In 1905, the sŏm was adjusted to match its equivalent Japanese measurement, the koku.
From this point, 1 sŏm = 10 mal = approximately 180 liters, 1 mal = 10 toe =
approximately 18 liters, and 1 toe = approximately 1.8 liters.
Weight
1 tam = approximately 50 kilograms
1 kŭn = 0.6 kilograms
Area
1 kyŏl = the area of land required to produce a given amount of grain, which varied
according to the land’s fertility. This measure was frequently used in the calculation of
taxes. No Yŏnggu calculates the area of 1 kyŏl as somewhere between 2,500 p’yŏng to
12,500 p’yŏng depending on the quality of the land.
1 chŏngbo = 10 tanbo = approximately one hectare
1 tanbo = 300 p’yŏng = approximately one-tenth of a hectare
1 p’yŏng = 3.3058 square meters
1 turak = the area of land on which 1 mal of seed could be spread. Again, this varied with
the quality of the land, however James Palais gives 1 turak an approximate area of 0.163
acres, or 659.64 square meters.
Currency
1 yang = 10 chŏn
1 chŏn = 10 pun
The exchange rate between the main Chosŏn-era unit of currency—the yang—and new
currencies varied widely depending on the time, country of issue, changes in the
exchange rate between metals (in coins issued against a gold or silver standard, for
example), and relative inflation rates. The following rates are given as a rough guide.
According to the rate set during the 1901 currency ordinance (“Hwap’ye chorye”) which
set the wŏn on a nominal gold standard, 1 wŏn = 100 chŏn.
The 1905 currency reforms established an approximate exchange rate of 1 yen = 2 wŏn,
although with many further specifications. For full discussion of the reforms, see Michael
Schiltz, The Money Doctors from Japan (2012).
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INTRODUCTION
I.

Overview

One late spring morning in 1919, Yu Yŏnghŭi (1890–1960), a farmer from Andong in
southeastern Korea, went to the local township (myŏn) office where he collected two
sheets of silkworm eggs before returning home.1 Yu had raised silkworms for several
years, since buying a packet of wild silkworm eggs from Pongjŏng, a nearby village, in
1911.2 Yu continued to raise silkworms in the years that followed, and the village
headman (tongjang) and township officials gradually became a regular presence in his
sericulture activities, holding educational meetings, distributing silkworm eggs, and even
visiting Yu to offer direct instruction on the cultivation of mulberries.3 Such interaction
with local officials would remain a routine part of Yu’s agriculture throughout the next
twenty years that he raised silkworms. As mundane as Yu’s experience with sericulture
may appear, however, it in fact raises several significant questions regarding the changes
to agricultural production in Korea in the early twentieth century. Why did Yu begin to
raise silkworms in the first place? How was it that the township office came to promote
sericulture over alternative activities? What did it mean for Yu to participate in the newly
commercializing rural economy? And, what did it mean to Yu that these changes took
place under colonial rule?

Yu Yŏnghŭi, Chingsŏngnok, 1919.4.8.
Yu Yŏnghŭi, Kusillok, 1911.4.11; 1911.4.18; 1911.4.27.
3
Ibid, 1911.9.22; 1911.9.23; Yu Yŏnghŭi, Chŏngmaerok, 1917.2a. 23; 1917.4.14; Yu Yŏnghŭi, Tŭksillok,
1920.4.10.
1
2

2

This dissertation seeks to answer these questions through an examination of the
changing role of the state in the rural economy during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. During this time, successive periods of domestic reform (1860–1910)
and colonization (1910–1945) fundamentally altered the relationship between the state
and the economy, and the state and the population, as Korean and colonial governments
alike sought a new role for the state in the promotion of national wealth. This
transformation of the state has received little attention in existing research into the
Korean economy, with most studies focusing instead on the politics surrounding the
emergence of new forms of capitalism and industry. 4 Nonetheless, as Korea’s largest
industry, agriculture was a major target of government projects and the colonial
government established a wide range of government and semi-governmental
organizations to manage the cultivation of new crops and market networks.5
The goal of this dissertation is therefore to make visible the hand of the state in
the rural economy. This is not just a question of compiling a timeline of economic and
agricultural policies. As this dissertation will make clear, to implement any new policies
required the government of the day to also build a bureaucratic and administrative
infrastructure appropriate to the desired policy goals, to gather sufficient information, and

4

While these studies by no means ignore the role of the colonial government, an emphasis on the questions
of nationalism, collaboration, and political cleavages between Koreans that accompanied the emergence of
capitalism under colonial rule have tended to overshadow dedicated analysis of the changing nature of the
state itself. See, for example, Carter J. Eckert, Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial
Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991); Gi-Wook Shin,
Peasant Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996);
Hyun Ok Park, Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean
Revolution in Manchuria (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005).
5
Upwards of two-thirds of the population were employed in agriculture throughout the colonial period.
Sang Chul Suh, Growth and Structural Changes in the Korean Economy, 1910–1940 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1978), 52.
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to establish organizational networks capable of influencing the behavior of the
population. It is in this process that I trace the changes to the Korean state and its
interaction with both the economy and individual farmers. When Yu Yŏnghŭi raised
cross-bred silkworms or planted upland cotton, he did so as a direct result of colonial
policies that aimed to bring new, more productive, breeds and cultivars into Korea. Yu
did not see the model industrial farm (Ko. kwŏnŏp mobŏmjang; Ja. kangyō mohanjō) that
bred the new seeds and eggs, however, nor was he privy to the policy discussions that
argued for the introduction of certain crops as a way to increase the export of raw
materials to Japan. Rather, Yu encountered colonial policy through the silkworm sheets
distributed at his local township office and in the advice given by a visiting agricultural
technician. To fully understand the transformation of the state in this period, then, this
dissertation will pay particular attention to the local organizations and networks which
the government relied upon to implement its policies. While the headline policies drafted
in the central government will not be ignored, the everyday life of farmers grants another
perspective into the significance of agricultural policies and the changes to the form and
function of the state at this time.
Although many of the changes explored in this dissertation took place during the
colonial period, this is not a history of colonial rule. For one thing, many of the changes
discussed were not specific to colonial Korea. In the nineteenth century, governments
around the world adopted new roles in promoting agricultural science and economic
growth. France, Germany, Japan, and the United States—to give just a few examples—
each established new institutions and organizations designed to improve agricultural

4

production in line with a set of new global norms.6 Indeed, as can be seen in the financial
associations (Ko. kŭmyung chohap; Ja. kin’yū kumiai), some of the organizations
introduced in Korea explicitly drew on examples from other countries (in this case, the
German Raiffeisen cooperatives). While sensitive to the specifics of colonial Korea, this
dissertation nonetheless views the transformation of the Korean state as part of a broader
shift in approaches to the rural economy that drew on international trends and norms as
much as it did colonial politics.
Moreover, the changes to the Korean state and its role in the economy neither
began nor ended with colonial rule. Before 1910, the Korean government had already
undergone an intense period of reform which aimed to restructure government offices in
line with new economic priorities. Not only did the colonial government inherit this
existing reform program, but it also inherited the same challenges faced by the previous
governments—namely, how to incorporate existing local organizations and networks
within any new economic and political system. This dissertation therefore begins with an
examination of the government reforms instituted under the rule of King Kojong (r.
1864–1907). As well as providing necessary context for colonial policies, including the
earlier history of reform projects allows this dissertation to take seriously the experience
of farmers for whom colonial agricultural policies fit within a longer pattern of change in
the rural economy.

George Grantham, “The Shifting Locus of Agricultural Innovation in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The
Case of Agricultural Experiment Stations,” in Gary Saxonhouse and Gavin Wright, eds., Technique, Spirit,
and Form in the Making of the Modern Economies: Essays in Honor of William N. Parker (Greenwich,
Conn.: JAI Press, 1984), 191-214; Adam D. Sheingate, The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State:
Institutions and Interest Group Power in the United States, France, and Japan (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001); Giovanni Federico, Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture,
1800–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
6
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II.

Historiography and Contributions
The significance of this research is threefold, and lies at the intersection of

historiographical debates over the economic role of the Korean state, agricultural
development, and the position of individual farmers within the rural economy. First, by
tracing the implementation of various policies, this dissertation adds to discussions of the
transformation of the Korean state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Despite significant attention paid to the state in accounts of South Korean economic
growth, attempts to examine the state in earlier periods have proven contentious. One
long-prevailing view traces the origins of the South Korean developmental state back into
the colonial period. As one proponent of this argument expounds:
Japan used a “mighty trio” of state organization, central banking, and zaibatsu
conglomerates to industrialize Korea…a highly articulated, disciplined, penetrating
colonial bureaucracy…replaced an old weak state, holding society at bay…this
experience goes a long way toward explaining the subsequent (post 1945)
pronounced centralization of Taiwan and both Koreas, and has provided a model for
state-directed development in all three.7

Yet, even while acknowledging the state’s influence upon the economy, this argument
casts the Chosŏn government (1392–1910) as “an old weak state,” apparently incapable
of intervening in the economy for itself. In this regard, this and similar narratives
unfortunately perpetuate the colonial rhetoric of Korean economic and social
“stagnation” which was initially put forward as a justification of annexation.8
Against arguments that would credit the legacies of the colonial state with
subsequent growth, other scholars have focused instead on the question of whether

Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial
Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences,” International Organization 38, no. 1 (1984): 10, 11.
8
On stagnation as a recurring theme in Korean historiography, see also Owen Miller, “The Idea of
Stagnation in Korean Historiography: From Fukuda Tokuzō to the New Right,” Korean Histories 2, no. 1
(2010): 3-12.
7

6

Koreans benefitted under colonial rule. Thus, Gi-Wook Shin and Hŏ Suyŏl have put
forward the notion of “growth without development” in order to highlight the uneven
distribution of the benefits of colonial economic growth.9 These and similar arguments
provide an important counterpoint to overly optimistic claims of colonial development,
but do little to further understanding of the state itself. On the contrary, in maintaining a
strict distinction between the interests of Koreans and the interests of the colonial
government, they perpetuate several oversimplifications regarding the colonial state. For
one thing, colonial “successes” are rarely explained, and a persistent trend within
research assumes the colonial government’s ability to unproblematically implement its
policies. In a similar vein, a preference among some scholars for the terms “ilche”
(Japanese empire) and “singmin kwŏllyŏk” (colonial authority) over the titles of
individual government offices occludes an understanding of the different branches of the
government and assumes an automatic coherence within the Government-General of
Korea and the wider Japanese empire. Where the limits of the government are discussed,
the primary limit of state power is taken to lie in the nationalist resistance of the Korean
population.10

Gi-Wook Shin, Peasant Protest and Social Change, 39-53; Hŏ Suyŏl, Kaebal ŏmnŭn kaebal: Ilche ha
Chosŏn kyŏngje kaebal ŭi hyŏnsang kwa ponjil (Seoul: Ŭnhaeng namu, 2005). For a detailed breakdown of
various economic indicators for colonial Korea, see also Mitsuhiko Kimura “Standards of Living in
Colonial Korea: Did the Masses Become Worse Off or Better Off Under Japanese Rule?” Journal of
Economic History 53, no. 3 (1993): 629-52.
10
See, for example, Chŏng Yŏnt’ae, Singmin kwŏllyŏk kwa Han'guk nongŏp: Ilche singmin nongjŏng ŭi
tongyŏkhak (Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ch'ulp'an munhwawŏn, 2014).
Taken together, these simplifications fuel the further assumption that collaboration stems from a simple
motivation and might be easily defined and identified. In this regard, Jun Uchida’s analysis of freight
industry workers provides an excellent counterexample to simplistic portrayals of collaboration and
national interest. Jun Uchida, “‘A Scramble for Freight’: The Politics of Collaboration along and across the
Railway Tracks of Korea under Japanese Rule,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 51, no. 1
(2009): 117-50.
9
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A handful of studies has attempted to complicate the view of the colonial state.
Chi Sugŏl, Hŏ Yŏngnan, and Yun Haedong have each examined the functions of the state
as implemented through local government and village-level organizations. Within such
research the colonial state no longer appears as an autonomous unit, sharply
differentiated from the Korean population, but as a system that actively sought to
incorporate local elites, village organizations, and the practices of everyday life as a
necessary aspect in the creation of colonial rule. The authors acknowledge the very real
limitations of colonial society and the uneven distribution of power between colonial
authorities and local residents (few Koreans were employed at the highest levels of the
colonial bureaucracy, although many took roles within the county (kun) and township
offices). Nonetheless, their research points toward several sites where colonial policies
intentionally invited a blurring of the lines between the “colonial” and the “national.”11 In
this regard, Chi, Yun and Hŏ’s research fits within a wider conversation that includes
diverse forms of governance and local practices, such as patrimonial networks or
customary legal traditions, within analysis of colonialism.12

Chi Sugŏl, “Ilcheha Ch’ungnam Sŏsan-gun ŭi ‘kwallyo-yuji chibae ch’eje’: ‘Sŏsan-gunji’ (1927) e
taehan punsŏk ŭl chungsim ŭro,” Yŏksa munje yŏn’gu 3 (1999): 13-75; Yun Haedong, Singminji ŭi hoesaek
chidae: Han’guk ŭi kŭndaesŏng kwa singminjuŭi pip’an (Seoul: Yŏksa pip’yŏngsa, 2003); Yun Haedong,
Chibae wa chach’i (Seoul: Yŏksa pip’yŏngsa, 2006); Chi Sugŏl, “Chibang yuji ŭi ‘singminjijŏk’ salm,”
Yŏksa pip’yŏng 90 (2010): 156-80; Hŏ Yŏngnan, “Ilche sigi chiyŏk sahoe wa singminji kongnonjang:
changsi kaldŭng ŭl chungsim ŭro,” Han’guksa yŏn’gu 161 (2013): 349-81; Hŏ Yŏngnan, “Ilche sigi ŭpmyŏn hyŏpŭihoe wa chiyŏk chŏngch’i,” Yŏksa munje yŏn’gu 31 (2014): 129-66.
12
Chulwoo Lee, “Modernity, Legality, and Power in Korea Under Japanese Rule,” in Gi-Wook Shin and
Michael Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center,
1999), 21-51; Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Mounira M. Charrad and Julia Adams, eds.,
Patrimonial Capitalism and Empire (Book Series: Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 28) (United
Kingdom: Emerald, 2015).
Jun Uchida’s study of settler colonialism in Korea also fits within this nuanced view of the colonial state,
highlighting as it does the importance of settlers’ informal roles in the creation of empire on the ground.
Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Asia Center, 2011).
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Most recently, and in one of the first publications to focus exclusively on the
development of the state itself, Kyung Moon Hwang has expanded analysis of the
colonial state to situate it within a longer arc of government reform. Stretching back to
the 1890s, Hwang draws on Foucault and Weber to highlight the state’s attempts to
“rationalize” or legitimate itself in a range of spheres, including the economy, public
health, education, and religion. In this way, Hwang emphasizes the continuities between
the activities of the colonial state and prior Korean government reforms, arguing that both
contributed to the creation of the modern state in Korea.13
This dissertation builds on the perspectives adopted by Chi, Hŏ, Hwang, and Yun
to seek the state not within a narrow political and administrative order, but as an effect to
be found in the constant interaction between a set of governing ideals and the wider
population.14 Based on this consideration, throughout this dissertation the “state” is not
taken to be synonymous with “the government,” which will be used narrowly to refer to a
system of administrative and bureaucratic offices. Rather, in emphasizing the state as
effect, the lines between the state and government are not always clear-cut. In particular,
local government and semi-governmental organizations, though situated at the lowest
level of government administrative hierarchy, will be an important topic of research
given their frequent position at the front line in implementing government policy, making
them an important locus of politics and negotiation in the enactment of the state’s
influence. In this way, the question of how local government offices implemented the

13

Kyung Moon Hwang, Rationalizing Korea: The Rise of the Modern State, 1894–1945 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2016).
14
This is in line with the framework developed within Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond
Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 77-96.
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economic policies drafted in the central government, and how, in turn, this process
legitimated a particular vision of economic development and empowered certain practices
over others will thus be an important contribution of this dissertation.
Second, this dissertation reexamines agriculture and the rural economy with an
emphasis on the structural changes introduced under colonial rule. Trends within the
historiography of colonial Korea have frequently downplayed the significant changes to
agricultural production that took place within the early twentieth century. On one side,
Marxist critiques of the colonial rural economy highlighted class divisions and a
landlord-tenant dominated social order as emblematic of the colonial government’s
attempt to artificially maintain a traditional, semi-feudal, agrarian order.15 Meanwhile,
studies of “colonial modernity” helped to fuel research into industrialization and the
development of an urban, consumer culture at the expense of perceived “traditional”
topics such as agriculture, religion, or changes to village life.16 In both lines of research,
changes to agricultural production are neglected as a major topic of research.
Instead, most existing research into the changes into colonial agriculture has been
based in quantitative economic analysis. With regard to rice production, numerous
studies have documented the gradual adoption of chemical fertilizers, irrigation, and
high-yielding seed varieties that resulted in increased productivity.17 Many scholars

See, for example, Kim Yong-sop, “The Landlord System and the Agricultural Economy during the
Japanese Occupation Period,” trans. Howard Kahm, in Pang Kie-chung and Micahel D. Shin, eds.,
Landlords, Peasants & Intellectuals in Modern Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program,
2005), 131-74.
16
Shin and Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea.
17
Masao Kikuchi and Yujiro Hayami, “Agricultural Growth against a Land Resource Constraint: A
Comparative History of Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines,” Journal of Economic History 38, no. 4
(1978): 839-64; Ramon H. Myers and Yamada Saburo, “Agricultural Development in the Empire,” in
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 420-52; Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural
15
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outside of the field of economic history continue to dispute the significance of such
results, however, arguing that even if some economic growth can be admitted to have
occurred the exploitative intentions of the colonial government and uneven distribution of
the benefits of growth must take precedence in any analysis.18 Meanwhile, the small
number of studies that do examine the changes to agricultural production have done so
within the limited framework of changes to landlord management. Thus, although
research by Hong Sŏngch’an and Dong-no Kim has pointed to the adoption of new
agricultural techniques among entrepreneurial landlords and the introduction of “modern”

Development: An International Perspective, revised and expanded edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1985), 191-214; Kenneth Henry Kang, “Essays on the Economic Development of Korea,”
Harvard University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1996.
Hŏ Suyŏl has disputed claims of increased agricultural productivity under colonial rule, arguing that much
of the increases in yield occurred during the late-Chosŏn period and first decade of colonial rule (19101919) rather than under the colonial government’s program to increase rice production in the 1920s and
1930s. Hŏ Suyŏl, Ilche ch’ogi Chosŏn ŭi nongŏp: singminji kŭndaehwaron ŭi nongŏp kaeballon ŭl pip’an
handa (Kyŏnggi-do, P’aju-si: Han’gilsa, 2011).
This argument is problematic on several grounds. First, while increases in rice productivity did stall during
the 1920s this does not suggest that colonial innovations in agricultural techniques were unrelated to
productivity increases. Rather, it demonstrates the interdependent nature of new agricultural technologies.
Although individually the application of chemical fertilizers, irrigation, and high-yielding seeds had some
impact on yield, full productivity increases were only realized when the three improved inputs were
combined. Thus, stalling productivity in the 1920s represents the slow adoption of fertilizers and irrigation
rather than their irrelevance to productivity. For this reason, most studies also note a decline in rice
productivity in the 1940s due to the reduced availability of chemical fertilizers under the wartime economy.
Second, Hŏ’s arguments against the reliability of colonial statistics are also questionable. Unfortunately,
the evidence for Hŏ’s alternative theory comes from the same colonial statistics he finds unreliable in the
1920s, despite the fact that the accuracy of colonial statistics only increased throughout the colonial period.
For a discussion (and defense) of colonial statistics, see Hyung Gu Lynn, “Industrial Surveys and Statistical
Systems in Colonial Korea,” in In-sang Hwang and Konosuke Odaka, eds., Long-term Economic Statistics
of Korea (Tokyo: Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Research, 2000), 267-86; U Taehyŏng,
“Ilcheha migok saengsansŏng ŭi ch’ui e kwanhan chaegŏmt’o,” Kyŏngjesahak 52 (2015): 53-93.
18
Tae-hern Jung, “Economic Features of Colonial Modernity in Modern Korea,” International Journal of
Korean History 1 (2000): 39-62; Horyong Lee, “The Current State of Studies on the Japanese Colonial Era
and Related Issues—with a special focus on the studies produced in the 21 st century—” International
Journal of Korean History 10 (2006): 157-90; Hong Yung Lee, “Introduction: A Critique of Colonial
Modernity,” in Yong-Chool Ha, Hong Yung Lee and Clark W. Sorenson, eds., Colonial Rule and Social
Change in Korea, 1910–1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013), 3-38.
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institutions of land ownership, these changes are only considered in relation to the class
position of landlords and tenants.19
This dissertation will expand discussion of the adoption of new agricultural crops
and techniques by considering the question of how the colonial government attempted to
induce farmers to change their behavior and practices. Colonial agricultural policies were
ambitious and wide-ranging, targeting cotton, tobacco, fruits, vegetables, silk, livestock,
and many other crops in addition to rice. What is more, the colonial government did not
simply aim to increase the volume of output but attempted to reorient agricultural
production for the market through the introduction of new species and grading
mechanisms to ensure the commercial value of the harvest. This required the creation of
new avenues for finance, transportation routes, and distribution networks for fertilizers,
seeds, and tools, as well as reliable channels to grade and market the resulting agricultural
products. Although it would be impossible to investigate every change to agriculture
within one dissertation, I pay particular attention to colonial policies toward rice and
cotton in order to demonstrate the depth of changing production practices and networks,
from sources of credit and seeds, to the sales routes that linked farmers to different
potential markets for their crops. While landlords were still important beneficiaries of
these new networks, this dissertation will show extent of institutional changes outside of
the landlord-tenant dynamic within the growth of a new state infrastructure to support
agricultural production.

Hong Sung-Chan, “The Emergence of New Types of Landlords in the Occupation Period,” trans. Kelly
Y. Jeong, in Pang and Shin, eds., Landlords, Peasants & Intellectuals, 175-205; Dong-no Kim, “National
Identity and Class Interest in the Peasant Movements of the Colonial Period,” in Ha, Lee and Sorenson,
eds., Colonial Rule and Social Change, 140-72.
19
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Local government and semi-governmental organizations will again be important
topics of research in this regard. Specifically, I examine a series of associations (Ko.
chohap; Ja. kumiai), established under the aegis of the colonial government, related to
rural finance, irrigation management, the promotion of agricultural technology, and
industry-specific trade associations. These associations blurred the line between the state
and the private economy. The colonial government often relied upon the associations to
implement its various agricultural policies, for which the appointment of local
government officials to leadership positions within the associations provided an easy
connection. Nonetheless, although acting within the general parameters set by the central
government, the associations retained an important characteristic as interest groups that
worked to further the interests of their members—at times even opposing the
Government-General of Korea, as happened in debates over rice price control policies in
the early 1930s.20 What is more, as major conduits of subsidies, finance, seeds, and other
resources, the branches of the semi-governmental organizations came to play an
important role within the economy and politics of each local area. Even though
membership was often concentrated among wealthier landowners, the associations served
as an important intermediary with and extension of the state, complicating the existing
view of landlord participation in the colonial economy as based solely on an expression
of their class interest.
Recognition of the colonial government’s active role in promoting changes to
agricultural production should not be read as a tacit commendation of colonial
agricultural policies. Indeed, a close reading of the changing productivity of different

20

Kobayakawa Kurō, Chōsen nōgyō hattatsushi, seisaku hen (Keijō: Chōsen nōkai, 1944), 554-60.
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crops shows just how limited the colonial government’s interest in increasing production
was. U Taehyŏng’s research into the productivity of non-rice, dry-field grains—such as
millet, barley, or soybeans—demonstrates that colonial policies produced neglect and
stagnation in some crops at the same time that they increased the yield for other favored
crops.21 Even those colonial policies that raised productivity among other crops should
not be misunderstood as benevolent developmentalism, directed as they were toward the
wider needs of empire. Nonetheless, where policies did induce changes in production or
sales routes, these must still be noted for their impact on the rural economy and for the
new challenges and opportunities that such policies posed for farmers. As Dong-no Kim
states:
We do not need to negate the possibility that [the modern economic system] was
introduced in the colonial period from outside, nor do we necessarily need to consider
the colonial period as a dark age. We instead must analyze the effects modernity
produced in the colonial social structure and the everyday lives of ordinary people.22

The third major contribution of this dissertation lies in its focus on the perspective
of individual farmers. Many studies have attempted to shed light on the Korean
experience of colonial rule, thanks to which a detailed picture has emerged of landlordtenant relations. Laws enacted by the colonial state re-classified the institutions of
landownership to privilege the rights of landlords. Subsequent policies concerning
taxation, irrigation and financial investment were implemented on terms that favored
landowners, as the colonial government attempted to work through groups it considered
strategically sympathetic to its policies.23 During the agricultural crisis of the early 1930s,
U Taehyŏng, “Ilche ha hanjŏn (旱田) changmul ŭi saengsansŏng chŏngch’e,” Taedong munhwa yŏn’gu
66 (2009): 393-415.
22
Dong-no Kim, “National Identity and Class Interest,” 145.
23
Ibid; Kim Yong-sop, “The Landlord System and the Agricultural Economy”; Dongno Kim, “Peasants,
State, and Landlords: Nationalist Crisis and the Transformation of Agrarian Society in Pre-Colonial
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widespread peasant unrest led the colonial government to widen the scope of its
conciliatory policies as tenant movements shifted from reformist demands aimed at
improving tenant conditions within the existing class system to increasingly ideological
protests organized through “red peasant unions.”24
However, insofar as such research has examined rural society on the basis of
landlord-tenant relations, the resulting impression is heavily abstracted and skewed
toward the two extremes of colonial society. Even in the most careful ethnographic and
anthropological studies the categorization of farmers as either tenants or landlords
becomes the defining characteristic when assessing events. Part of this problem lies in the
paucity of colonial era sources. Ham Hanhŭi’s anthropological study of Songje, a village
in Naju county, southwestern Korea, goes further than most accounts of colonial rural
society, tracing as she does numerous social groups within the village, including hired
laborers and estate managers alongside the familiar figures of tenants and (Korean and
Japanese) landlords. Still, in comparison to her nuanced and careful analysis of villagers’
actions after 1945, a lack of sources limits discussion of the earlier history of the village
to oft-repeated narratives of landlord-tenant protest. Although she includes a comment on
village organizations, such as a village cooperative (tonggye) established in 1914, with
little information on the day-to-day function of the cooperative Ham can only conclude

Korea,” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1994; Hong Sŏngch’an et al.,
Ilche ha Man’gyŏng-gang yuyŏk ŭi sahoesa: suri chohap, chijuje, chiyŏk chŏngch’i (Seoul: Hyean, 2006).
24
Chi Sugŏl, Ilcheha nongmin chohap undong yŏn’gu: 1930 nyŏndae hyŏngmyŏngjok nongmin chohap
undong (Seoul: Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 1993); Gi-Wook Shin, Peasant Protest and Social Change; Gi-Wook
Shin and Do-Hyun Han, “Colonial Corporatism: The Rural Revitalization Campaign, 1932-1940,” in Shin
and Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea, 70-96.
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its importance in relation to the development of class distinctions among villagers.25
Although landlords and tenants, and the emergence of class distinctions between the two,
was an important aspect of rural society, ultimately the overwhelming emphasis on such
abstract categories limits an understanding of other aspects of agricultural, social, and
economic change.
To overcome such problems, this dissertation relies upon three previously
unexamined farmers’ diaries as major primary sources.26 The diaries in question are: Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi (The diary of Sim Wŏn’gwŏn), written between 1870 and 1933; the
diaries of Yu Yŏnghŭi, written between 1910 and 1936; and Kwallanjae ilgi (The diary
of Kwallan), written by Chŏng Kwanhae (pen name Kwallan) between 1912 and 1947.27
The diaries were chosen for their comprehensiveness—with very few exceptions due to
illness or periods of mourning the authors regularly recorded their diaries over a
sustained period of time. Each diary is written from a different region: Sim Wŏn’gwŏn
lived in the Ulsan region, in the southeast of South Kyŏngsang province; Yu Yŏnghŭi
lived near Andong, in North Kyŏngsang Province; and Chŏng Kwanhae lived in Yongin,

In this case, Ham concludes that the tonggye worked to prevent extremes of class tension and “functioned
as a barrier to the development of class society.” Han Hee Hahm, “Songje’s Transformation: Social and
Economic History of a Korean Village, 1910-1987,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1989, 249.
26
Yi Uyŏn cites Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi in his contribution to Suryang kyŏngjesa ro tasi pon Chosŏn hugi,
although he only includes data related to the price of firewood. Hŏ Yŏngnan also briefly cites Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi in her study of markets as evidence of the corruption of local officials in late Chosŏn. To
date, there have been no full-length studies of the life of Sim Wŏn’gwŏn himself, nor does a search of
research databases return any hits for studies of Chŏng Kwanhae or Yu Yŏnghŭi. Yi Uyŏn, “18-19 segi
sallim hwangp’yehwa wa nongŏp saengsansŏng,” in Yi Yŏnghun, ed., Suryang kyŏngjesa ro tasi pon
Chosŏn hugi (Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ch’ulp’an munhwawŏn, 2004), 334-365; Hŏ Yŏngnan, Ilche sigi
changsi yŏn’gu (Seoul: Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 2009).
27
Kwallanjae ilgi (Kwach’ŏn: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 2001); Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi, vols. 1-3
(Kwach’ŏn: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 2004). Yu Yŏnghŭi’s diary is published online at
www.ugyo.net, by the Han’guk kukhak chinhŭngwŏn. After a gap in the late 1930s and early 1940s, Yu
Yŏnghŭi’s diary continues through the 1950s until 1960, although this portion of the diary is not considered
here.
25

16

in Kyŏnggi Province near the capital. The choice to include these three diaries is not to
make representative claims for each region, but to suggest some of the variations and
some of the similarities between each specific case. The diaries are used narrowly, with
particular attention being paid to the economic and agricultural activities of each author
and the types of local organizations that each author participated in.
The use of diaries in this dissertation follows two patterns among existing diarybased historical research: as a means to understand the author, and as a viewpoint into the
author’s wider world. As for the former, given the nature of the diary as a personal record
of events, much research has examined diaries as an ego-document in relation to the
cultivation and expression of the private individual. Although this line of research is
heavily associated with European historiography, a recent edited volume compares
several Korean, Japanese, and German diaries from the early twentieth century in similar
terms, posing the question “what does it mean to write a diary in the modern period?”28
In these studies, the act of writing the diary is not just an expression of the individual
author but an active element in the production of the author’s identity. Though diary
writing is often understood as an act toward the creation of the individual self, this need
not always be the case; in Jochen Hellbeck’s study of Soviet-era diaries, many of the
authors struggled to position themselves both as individuals and within a wider collective
and politicized identity.29 In either case, the diary itself is studied as an active part of the
formation of identity.

Rudolf Dekker, “Jacques Presser’s Heritage: Egodocuments in the Study of History,” Memoria y
Civilización 5 (2002): 13-37; Chŏng Pyŏnguk and Itagaki Ryūta, eds., Nikki ga kataru kindai: Kankoku,
Nihon, Doitsu no kyōdō kenkyū (Tokyo: Dōshisha Koria [Korea] kenkyū shoten, 2014).
29
Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2006).
28
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The diaries studied in this dissertation share in this aspect. To varying degrees,
each author followed a set of practices that identified themselves as yangban—the
hereditary elite group of Korean traditional society. Written in hanmun, or Classical
Chinese, even the act of diary-writing itself required the authors to have received a
certain degree of education, a distinction traditionally correlated with yangban status.
Beyond literacy, the diarists also marked themselves as social elites through such
activities as the observation of Confucian rituals for ancestors, demonstrating their
knowledge of Chinese classical texts and poetry, and participation in lineage
organizations. Property and wealth also played a role, although this was not always clear
cut. Despite owning a slave (another signifier of wealth), one of the authors, Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn (1850–1933), was also a tenant of state-owned lands. Chŏng Kwanhae
(1873–1949), another diarist who at one point taught a classical education at the local
school, found himself plunged into debt after his sons took on significant liabilities.
What significance should be attached to the authors’ social status? Clearly, as
self-identifying elites, the experience of each author cannot be read as equivalent to the
poorest members of society. That being said, the diaries reveal the authors and their
economic activities to be much more complex than might be assumed from the simple
label of “yangban” or “landlord.” Although coming from backgrounds of relative
privilege, the diary writers were by no means the wealthiest members of society. Indeed,
in early modern Korea the category of yangban as a status group was becoming less
synonymous with the highest economic class as increased competition for high-ranking
government positions, the division of estates among heirs, and increasing claims from
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formerly excluded groups such as northerners or illegitimate sons (sŏŏl) served to expand
the social and economic range of those claiming yangban status.30
Reflecting such diversity among even social elites, at different points in their lives
each of the authors participated in the physical labor of farming. Despite laying claim to
markers of elite status, the meaning of some of these markers changed throughout the
course of their lives as new forms of education replaced the old. Nor did the authors’ elite
status insulate them from the economic and social changes that occurred during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; when the price of rice fell and taxes were due,
none of the authors could entirely avoid financial pressures. While cognizant of the diary
writers’ elite(ish) status, it is nonetheless necessary to view this as a status in flux that the
authors struggled to maintain within a changing environment. Most importantly, as
landowners and members of the petty bourgeoisie, the diary writers were precisely the
social group targeted by many of the colonial government’s agricultural policies. This
makes the diaries a particularly important primary source in the task of understanding the
reception and implementation of colonial agricultural policies.
This introduces the latter contribution of diary-based research—as a unique
viewpoint into a wider world. Studies of this kind have found particular value in histories
of East Asia given some of the rigid narratives that have dominated conventional
historiographies. As Henrietta Harrison states in the preface to her diary-based study of
Liu Dapeng (1857–1952), a scholar from a village in Northern China:
Kim Kŏnt’ae, Chosŏn sidae yangbanga ŭi nongŏp kyŏngyŏng (Seoul: Yŏksa pipʻyŏngsa, 2004); Kyung
Moon Hwang, Beyond Birth: Social Status in the Emergence of Modern Korea (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard East Asian Monographs, 2004).
For a detailed study of a late-Chosŏn yangban household experiencing economic decline, see also, An
Pyŏngjik and Yi Yŏnghun, eds., Matjil ŭi nongmindŭl: Han’guk kŭnse ch’ollak saenghwalsa (Seoul:
Ilchogak, 2001).
30
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Part of my aim in this book is to question some of the classifications we apply to
Chinese society: gentry, merchant, peasant, elite. What do we mean when we use
these terms? Does any individual, let alone a family, fit neatly into one category? If
identities are multiple and shifting, then how does this affect the historical narratives
we relate?”31

Alongside such questions, Harrison uses her study of Liu’s diary to question the
importance of Confucianism in people’s lives and their responses to industrialization. In
this regard, Harrison’s research has much in common with Simon Partner’s use of diaries
to flesh out and question familiar narratives of modern Japanese history from the
perspective of the individuals who lived through grand events such as the growth of
Tokyo as a city or the Second World War.32
Two previous studies have demonstrated the potential significance of diaries as a
primary source within Korean history. The first, Matjil ŭi nongmindŭl (The Farmers of
Matjil), uses the diary of three generations of the Pak family to conduct a study of
everyday life and the rural economy in Yech’ŏn, in southeastern Korea, between 1834
and 1937. Using the detailed economic data recorded in the diary, historians were able to
reconstruct many aspects of the Pak family’s everyday life—from long-run price trends
to the Pak’s payment habits in cash and kind, from the interest rate of money-lending
circles (kye) to the social networks that linked status groups within the village.33 As well
as shedding new light on the institutions and networks that underpinned the late-Chosŏn

Henrietta Harrison, The Man Awakened from Dreams: One Man’s Life in a North China Village, 18571942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 3.
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1865-1925 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).
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rural economy, the diary itself provided statistical data of a kind rarely found in Chosŏn
primary sources.34
Itagaki Ryūta’s ethnographic study of colonial Sangju, another town in
southeastern Korea, similarly makes use of a personal diary, that of a Mr. S., to examine
the experience of colonialism from the perspective of a local resident. Written between
1931–32, and 1935–38, the diaries capture the reflections of the young author (born
1914) between the ages of 17 and 24 as he grew up in a small village some 17 kilometers
from the center of Sangju. Where the rest of his research focused on the modern changes
to Sangju under colonial rule, such as the growth of its urban center and the development
of new industries including alcohol and thread manufacturing, Itagaki used the diary to
show not only how Mr. S. perceived and participated in such changes, but also where Mr
S.’s intentions and interpretation of events diverged from the colonial state’s own
narrative about the same.35
The diaries used in this dissertation offer a similarly valuable contribution toward
understanding responses to and interpretations of the institutional and organizational
changes implemented under colonial rule. The overwhelming majority of primary sources
related to the colonial rural economy were produced under, if not directly authored by,
the colonial authorities. Materials produced by the colonial government carry obvious
limitations, requiring scholars to read against the grain to avoid reproducing colonial
judgement as fact. Though different in terms of degree, similar considerations must also
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extend to materials published by Koreans themselves, as, depending on the era, colonial
censorship effectively narrowed the potential range of expression.
Yet, even if the problems of colonial authorship and censorship could be
overlooked, a further issue arises in the question of representation. Quite simply, very
few publications record the mundane business of agriculture or the everyday life of
farmers. Even the few publications from the period that did concern agriculture were
rarely created by farmers themselves but were produced by outside observers with a
specific purpose in mind, be it the government surveys of household incomes compiled in
the 1930s to provide data for a floor in rice price controls, reports from missionaries on
the conditions in rural communities collected as a basis for future evangelism, or
arguments put forward by intellectuals in favor of a particular religious or political
movement.36 Although such publications may still reveal a mass of information regarding
rural conditions, rarely do such sources reveal more than a snapshot of one particular
aspect of rural life, be it the level of household indebtedness or a list of village
organizations. What remains unseen, however, and what the diaries used in this
dissertation can provide, is information on how households approached the problem of
debt or how farmers utilized village organizations in the context of their daily lives.
While diaries are, of course, unique to the experience of their authors, two
considerations facilitate the use of diaries as sources within this project. First, insofar as

Nōrinshō beikokukyku, Chōsen Taiwan beikoku seisanhi chōsa yōkō (Tokyo: 1934); Edmund
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this dissertation pays attention to the authors’ interaction with a set of state-sponsored
organizations established throughout the peninsula, it is reasonable to assume that the
situations encountered by each author were not entirely dissimilar to the experience of
other farmers who interacted with the same organizations. Although one cannot assume
that all other farmers responded similarly to the diary writers studied here, the types of
concerns that the authors noted in their dealings with the new organizations were
doubtless repeated elsewhere as well.
Second, given the scarcity of records on individual farmers’ activities during
colonial rule, the uniqueness of each farmers’ experience might actually be considered a
strength rather than a weakness. Where the majority of colonial-era primary sources
dealing with agriculture were recorded from the perspective of the colonial authorities,
the divergence of each diary author’s experience from familiar narratives should raise
important questions for future research. Where historiographical narratives emphasize the
export of Korean rice to Japan as part of a general phenomenon of exploitation (sut’al),
for example, if the farmers studied here interpreted the significance of their rice
transactions and their connection to flows of rice differently than might be expected from
the exploitation paradigm, then new questions need to be asked to more fully understand
the dynamics of change within the rural economy.37 If Sim Wŏn’gwŏn was ambivalent
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about the export of rice to Japan, why was this the case? If unconcerned about the
destination of traded rice, what other factors mattered to him instead? In emphasizing the
perspective of each diary writer, this dissertation will seek a new interpretation of the
rural economy and the impact of the state’s agricultural policies.
III.

Theoretical Considerations

This dissertation pays particular attention to questions of the state, and its role in
inducing agricultural development—two concepts which require further elaboration here.
The “state” defies easy definition. Despite a long history of political science theory that
places the state in dichotomous relation to society (an equally nebulous term), scholars
such as Timothy Mitchell have highlighted the difficulties of defining the state as a key to
its analysis.38 Thus, Mitchell argues that, rather than concentrating on narrow definitions
of the state that ignore “the porous edges where official practice mixes with the
semiofficial and the semiofficial with the unofficial,” such ambiguity should be
conceived as an essential characteristic of the state itself. In Mitchell’s view, the state
simultaneously encompasses both the formal structures and institutions of the political
arrangements that we call the state and the structural effects that create the impression of
the state as distinct entity. In this way, the state cannot be considered as separate to
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“society” but is instead a social process rooted in specific temporal and spatial
organizations. If the state appears distinct from society that is rather the result of a set of
practices that create the effect of the state’s own abstraction.39 Mitchell’s definition opens
the state up to a range of new interpretative frameworks. As far as the state can be
considered an ongoing project and social process, secondary questions emerge over how
and where the state creates its authority in the realm of daily life. This need not be found
in overt displays of state power but can also be traced through mundane examples of
everyday bureaucracy, in the requirement to register for a parking permit or in the
certification of hygiene and quality standards in the food industry, for example.
If state and society are interwoven in such a manner, then so too is the economy.
Writing elsewhere, Mitchell himself states that in the twentieth century, the creation of
parallel distinctions between state and economy are perhaps an even more significant
project to the articulation of the power of the state.40 Such a perspective is shared by
Pierre Bourdieu who, in his study of the formation of the French housing market, finds
that “the economic field is, more than any other, inhabited by the state, which contributes
at every moment to its existence and persistence, and also the structure of the relations of
force that characterize it.”41 Bourdieu’s examination of the housing market shows the
diverse and subtle influence of state decisions in the every layer of the market, from overt
policies to encourage home ownership, to the regulations that shaped the provision of
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mortgages and the homes themselves, to the insertion of particular phrases into agents’
sales pitches that reference the legal norms underpinning potential transactions.
This is the view of the state that underlies this project. Previous research into the
colonial period has tended to focus on the repressive aspects of the colonial state,
covering such topics as the use of military police during the first decade of colonial rule,
publishing limitations and media censorship, discrimination against Koreans in education
and employment opportunities, and intrusive attempts at cultural and linguistic
assimilation to name just a few well-documented examples. In terms of the economy,
restrictions on the registration of corporations, large-scale agricultural campaigns, and
patterns of industrialization that integrated northern Korea with the expanding frontier of
empire have also been studied in ways that highlight the strength of the colonial state and
its repressive nature.42 Yet it would be a mistake to only seek the legacies and reach of
colonial rule in such extreme measures. Such a black and white vision perpetuates a
crude view of colonialism, overlooking as it does the vast realm of the “colonial grey
zone” famously articulated by Yun Haedong.43 To reckon with the full impact of colonial
agricultural policies requires that attention be paid not just to the final goal of exporting
more rice to Japan, but also to the many mechanisms through which the colonial state set
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out to achieve its aims. Some may fit the stereotype of cruel colonial excess, while others
may appear more innocuous and overlapped more readily with the interests of farmers,
however both extremes were integral to the colonial project and will thus be examined
here.
The second concept in need of clarification is that of agricultural development.
Gi-Wook Shin and Hŏ Suyŏl have already outlined some of the contentious issues
surrounding colonial economic development more generally. Shin points to the Program
to Increase Rice Production (hereafter PIRP; Ko. Chosŏn sanmi chŭngsik kyehoek; Ja.
Chōsen sanmai zōshoku keikaku), a colonial project, highlighting the oft-cited fact that
increasing rice exports outpaced increasing agricultural yields, leading to decreases in per
capita rice consumption through the 1920s. Based on this information, Shin concludes
that “early colonial Korean agriculture, despite both increased production and
commercialization, did not show development. It typified growth without
development.”44 Hŏ makes a similar claim, distinguishing between the material
phenomenon (hyŏnsang) of development and the “essence” (ponjil) of development as
interpreted by Koreans. In this way, Hŏ acknowledges (some of) the statistical evidence
of colonial development while still emphasizing the growing inequalities that limited the
ability of most Koreans to appreciate such increases.45
While Shin and Hŏ’s arguments have helped to move past the old debates of
exploitation versus modernization, questions still remain over the notion of development
in the colonial context. For one thing, in their effort to qualify the meaning of colonial
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“development,” both Shin and Hŏ inadvertently share the assumption that “development”
might be universally interpreted as a good thing.46 Thus, they find alternative phrases
instead, concluding that there was “growth without development” or material, rather than
essential, development. But, at least when considered in relation to the economy, it is not
difficult to find examples where economic development, narrowly defined as an increase
in productivity or national wealth, manifestly fails to improve the lot of certain members
of society. Even the “miraculous” growth of the South Korean economy from the 1960s
provides numerous such examples in the sweatshop-like suffering of factory and textile
workers, the repression of labor rights, or the steady, slow decline of rural communities.
One way to avoid the value-laden assessments of the term development might be
to avoid it altogether and to speak of “economic change” instead. In some places, I do so.
But this dissertation will not avoid the term development altogether. The economic
change that happened under colonial rule was not neutral or random. The policies
implemented by the colonial government were intended to meet a specific set of priorities
that placed the Korean economy within the wider Japanese empire. At times, Korea
appeared as a source of resources that might be fruitfully used throughout the Japanese
empire. At other times, colonists perceived Korea as an example of economic
backwardness waiting for the civilizing influence of Japan’s own experience. Most often,
the two views existed simultaneously. But regardless of the underlying motivation, the
colonial government instigated its economic policies with a particular vision in mind to
make Korea “develop” according to some kind of plan. In using the term development
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throughout this dissertation, I wish to highlight this discursive aspect of colonial
economic and agricultural policies.
Colonial claims of a civilizing influence underpinned many an imperial project,
from ancient China to European empires (both within the boundaries of Europe and
abroad). Despite the veneer of universal scientific principles that surrounds the discipline
of economics, the promotion of economic development fits easily within this wider
discourse. Nonetheless, and just as claims to civilization could be contested and
appropriated by colonized peoples, the notion of economic development is
simultaneously greater and less than any imperial project. The logic of economic
development transcends the geographic and temporal boundaries of any individual
empire. Even after liberation, in Egypt technocrats and international bodies such as the
IMF perpetuated a view of development introduced as part of empire, for example, while
in Latin America foreign advisors advocated a similarly universalist view of liberalism
even within politically independent nations.47 At the same time, empire was no guarantee
for ideological unity. Within Korea, colonial officials disagreed among themselves, with
their counterparts in Japan, and with Japanese settlers to Korea (to say nothing of
conflicts with the Korean population) over a wide range of policy decisions, of which
disputes over an appropriate economic and agricultural strategy formed just one part.48
Although this dissertation cannot explore the full range of differing interpretations over
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the meaning of development, it is understood that the views examined here are part of a
much wider series of conversations and understandings.
Within this discursive view, agricultural development itself entails far more than
the achievement of numerical increases in production. Even from a strictly economic
perspective, scholars have long acknowledged the importance of transfers of scientific
and technical knowledge, as well as institutional reform, as fundamental elements within
agricultural development. Indeed, one influential theory of agricultural development
proposed by Yujiro Hayami and Vernon Ruttan places technical and institutional change
as endogenous to the development process and therefore some of the key areas that
governments may target in order to induce agricultural development. Hayami and Ruttan
draw on data from colonial Korea and Taiwan as evidence in support of their hypothesis,
detailing the efforts of the colonial governments in each country to encourage the
adoption of high-yielding rice varieties, fertilizers, and irrigation infrastructure.49
This dissertation accepts Hayami and Ruttan’s basic premise that technology
transfers and institutional change are key aspects within the process of agricultural
development. However, where Hayami and Ruttan make their argument on the basis of
statistics, this dissertation will highlight instead the different interpretations of
development that surrounded such changes within colonial Korea. Where the colonial
government saw the adoption of fertilizers or the promotion of new forms of lending and
sales practices as part and parcel of its agricultural policies, this dissertation will consider
the same elements from the perspective of the farmers confronted with such changes. In
highlighting the discursive aspects of development in this way, I seek to uncover not only
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what farmers considered important in their own lives, but also how and why their views
differed from the colonial government and even where farmers found points of common
interest with agricultural policies.
IV.

Outline

This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Two (Chapters One and Three) focus on
reforms to the state and government policies, respectively covering the period between
1876 and 1910, and from 1910 to 1945. The remaining three chapters rely heavily on
farmers’ diaries and local organizational records to provide a view of how such changes
appeared in the context of the daily life and economic activity of individual farmers.
Chapter One examines the changes to the organization and function of the Korean
state during a series of governmental reforms begun in the late nineteenth century, paying
particular attention to the impact of changing ideas about the state’s role in the economy.
I use the discourse of “enrich the country and strengthen the military” (puguk kangbyŏng)
to trace such changes, as well as the government’s subsequent attempt to live up to its
new responsibilities in the realm of state finance—a necessary prerequisite for
investments in the military and the economy. During this period, the Korean government
attempted to secure revenues through various means, including reforms to the tax system,
the reorganization of government offices and departments, and through the exploitation
of additional revenues through loans, maritime customs, and the printing of new
currencies. Overall, Chapter One highlights the importance of distinguishing between the
multiple offices that constituted both the government as a whole and the wider influence
of the state. Even though the central government may have adopted its new policies to fit
a particular rationale, the organizational and institutional reforms necessary to support the
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state’s new role in the economy introduced separate challenges at each level of
government. To reform tax collection required the central government to confront the
interests and practices of local politics as much as it did the arguments over the ideal type
of tax collection system that circulated within the central government and among
intellectuals.
Chapter Two switches perspective to present the economic worldview of Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn, a farmer from the Ulsan region. In order to fully understand the impact of the
changes implemented under colonial rule, it is first necessary to consider how farmers
themselves conducted their economic activities. Sim’s diary reveals a rich and complex
understanding of the rural economy based on a system of interconnected cyclical patterns
in which the weather, prices, and harvests were in constant flux. After first outlining
Sim’s understanding of such patterns, this chapter asks how the changes to the rural
economy following the opening of Korean ports to international trade affected such
patterns, and how Sim sought to mitigate such changes while hedging against the cycles
that he saw as governing the rural economy. Overall, Chapter Two stands as a challenge
to conventional accounts of the open ports and colonial periods, asking how Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn’s view of the economic and social changes of the period might differ from
existing accounts of the same, and introduces a new point of reference against which the
colonial policies discussed later in the dissertation might be judged.
Chapter Three returns to the perspective of the government, this time examining
the colonial government’s agricultural policies and its use of semi-governmental
organizations as a means to implement its policies. I trace the implementation of colonial
policies for rice and cotton through a series of associations, including financial
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associations, irrigation associations, trade associations, and agricultural associations.
Chapter Three explores the depth of colonial policies, showing how the colonial
government used the various associations to establish new sales routes and networks for
the diffusion of technology and knowledge as a fundamental part of its agricultural
policies for the two crops.
In general, the colonial agricultural policies discussed in Chapter Three fall into
two periods. During the first, which held sway until the collapse of global agricultural
prices in the late 1920s and the onset of the Great Depression, the colonial government
maintained a certain faith in the ability of markets to incentivize production among the
Korean population. From the 1930s, a combination of declining prices, rural unrest, and
the slide toward war led the colonial government to ever greater intervention within the
rural economy. Once more, the various associations proved a crucial mechanism through
which the government implemented price controls and rice storage programs. In both
periods, I argue that the associations were more than an expression of colonial
agricultural interests, but actively worked to build, shape and regulate colonial markets in
line with colonial policies.
After establishing the general outline of the colonial government’s intervention
into the rural economy, Chapter Four asks the questions: what did the state look like to
each diary writer, and how did this change with the government reforms of the late
nineteenth century and the advent of colonial rule? Depending on the activities of each
author, the answers to these questions could be quite different. Such differences will
become a key part of this chapter as I highlight the uneven nature of the state in each
author’s everyday life, and to balance the view of the colonial government provided
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through official sources. This chapter focuses on the economic networks of each author,
including organizations and personal relationships that were both connected and
unconnected to the state. In building a “bottom up” view of the state in this way, I
highlight not only the “fuzzy edges” of the colonial state but also the context in which
farmers encountered the colonial state, the existing agricultural organizations against
which the colonial government competed, and the extent of farmers’ capacity to direct
their own economic activity.
Chapter Five concludes the dissertation with a consideration of the question of
development and institutional change. Although the primary focus of many colonial
policies concerned numerical increases in production and export of particular crops, a
secondary element involved the promotion of institutional and behavioral change among
farmers. Regulations restricting the sale of particular breeds of cow were intended to
encourage greater cow ownership, for example, while the mandatory grading of crop
quality was introduced as a means to incentivize production among farmers. Chapter Five
examines the impact of such measures in the lives of the diary writers, often discovering
unintended consequences of the government’s efforts at inducing behavioral change.
Building on the discrepancies between the colonial government’s view of development
and the personal experiences of the diary writers, this chapter also looks at each author’s
understanding of the changes to the colonial rural economy and what development meant
in the context of their own lives.
This dissertation ends in 1945 with the dissolution of Japanese colonial rule in
Korea. Nonetheless, this study also raises questions that extend beyond the boundary of
liberation. Post-colonial South Korea has often been described as something of a
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successor to the colonial government, restoring a familiar alliance between state and
capital if not replicating inherited structures and practices outright. While numerous
qualifications have been made to this view, highlighting the impact of 1950s land reform
and the difference in the geopolitical situation of the 1950s and 1960s, for example,50 this
dissertation makes it possible to approach questions of continuity from perspective of
ordinary Koreans’ experience of colonial rule. The state came to play a new role in
supporting and directing the rural economy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. What farmers thought of these changes, the dependencies they developed on
networks of semi-governmental organizations, and their understanding of the undesirable
aspects of the colonial system could not help but shape farmers’ interpretation of the state
and state-led development in the years to come as well. By focusing on individual
farmers, this dissertation forces the reader to consider the twin questions of colonial rule
and colonial legacies not as the sole result of the external influence of Japan but as
something shaped by the hands of Koreans as well.
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CHAPTER 1:
TO BUILD A RICH NATION
The codes and regulations, laws and institutions of this country have been
passed down from the Son of Heaven. Alas, in the thirty-three years since I
ascended the throne we are facing a situation in which countries around the
world are strengthening alliances. We must go down the road of reforming
and strengthening our politics...In one go, cut your hair and your ties to the
old customs. Seek only the truth in all things, supporting my endeavor to
enrich the country and strengthen the military.
— decree of King Kojong, 18961

I.

Reform and Modernity in the Historiography of Korea

Reform abounds in the history of modern Korea. The nineteenth century was a politically
turbulent period, including multiple rebellions, wars, and disruptions to Korea’s
established political order. During the mid-nineteenth century, Korea transformed the
basis of its economic and international relations in just a few short decades. After
rebuffing French and American incursions in the 1860s and early 1870s, in 1876, under
shadow of gunboats, Korea signed a treaty with Japan to open its ports to new trade and
diplomatic relations.2 Subsequent treaties with the United States, China, Russia, and
several European countries followed throughout the 1880s, bringing Korea into fresh
contact with global trends. Amid such changes, and building on the domestic discontent
expressed in the Hong Kyŏngnae rebellion of 1812 and a string of popular rebellions in
the 1860s, numerous groups attempted to persuade Kojong and the central government to
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adopt their favored reform agenda, including among them representatives from Qing
China, Meiji Japan, rebellious peasants, and western-inspired “enlightenment” (kaehwa)
intellectuals.
That Japan annexed Korea in 1910 has only heightened the significance of reform
within the historiography as historians sought to answer the question, why did reform
attempts fail to secure Korean independence?3 Perhaps unsurprisingly, answers to this
question have been as varied as the late-nineteenth century proponents of reform
themselves, as differing opinions over the political and ideological sympathies of
reformers divided assessment of their activities. To some, Korea’s best attempt to
modernize as a sovereign nation lay with the radical, Western-inspired reform agenda of
so-called enlightenment thinkers—a group of elites who drew on their experiences
studying conditions abroad (mainly in Japan and the United States) to agitate for
democracy and nationalism.4 Others have pointed to the willingness of a few
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enlightenment supporters to work with Japanese politicians to push through reforms to
the government, opening a debate onto whether leaders such as Kim Okkyun (1851–
1894) and Pak Yŏnghyo (1861–1939) should be considered as collaborators or merely
pragmatic reformers.5 In a similar manner, multiple studies have evaluated and
reevaluated the contributions, both positive and negative, of Qing China, western
advisors to the government, the Tonghak peasant rebellion of 1894, moderate reformers,
and the monarch himself to the perceived successes (or failures) of nineteenth-century
reform attempts.6
In recent years, a further line of enquiry has emerged that places greater emphasis
on the content of reform projects themselves. Replacing concerns over the success or
failure of reforms, this scholarship has instead investigated the process and impact of
reform projects throughout wider Korean society in areas as varied as medicine, new
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styles of fiction and literature, changes to education, technology, the emergence of
modern nationalism, the redefinition of land rights, and the nature of the state itself.7 In
contrast to accounts that return to the “failure” of Korean reforms to secure national
independence, these studies search for the origin of modern society within the reform era,
forcing scholars to reevaluate pre-colonial Korea as more than just the passive target of
Japanese empire.
Nevertheless, owing to the historiographical trends that placed an emphasis on
modernity, much of the new research has presented a relatively narrow vision of reform
projects. Most studies begin only after a major series of government reforms in 1894–96
and focus on reforms that replicate an orthodox interpretation of “modernity” as
embodied in the promotion of technology, capitalism, and western ideas.8 Yet, and
notwithstanding the doubts that might legitimately be raised over the utility of the
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concept of modernity itself,9 it is far from clear that modernity should be synonymous
with reform in this period. Insofar as his policies departed from several established norms
of Chosŏn governance, James Palais also characterized the rule of the Taewŏn’gun
(1864–1873)—the Prince Regent most commonly noted for his conservative Confucian
outlook—as a program of reform.10 While the policies of the Taewŏn’gun and those of
the Korean Empire (1897–1910) may equally be considered episodes of reform, 11 the
two cases, separated by a period of only thirty years, remain largely divided within the
historiography.
Even without reference to recognizably “modern” reforms, there is plenty of
evidence for significant changes within Korean politics and society at this time. Kirk
Larsen’s study of Qing imperialism in Korea details an array of reforms and innovations
introduced before the major government reforms of the 1890s—from commerce in the
treaty ports to the construction of telegraph communications—as Korea and China
redefined their traditional diplomatic relationship. Throughout, Larsen makes clear that
zeal for enlightenment and modernity was not necessarily a determining factor in
reforms; at times, Qing China’s desire to exert stronger political influence over Korea
was equally influential in instigating change.12 At the same time, and as detailed by
Kyung Moon Hwang, long-held Confucian concepts continued to inform enlightenment
discourse about the nature of the state (kukka) even as intellectuals debated new theories
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emerging from Japan, China, Germany, and beyond.13 Elsewhere, Yumi Moon’s research
into the Ilchinhoe—a populist group famous for their anti-monarch stance and
collaboration with imperial Japan—shows in great depth how legacies from Chosŏn
Korea stretched into the political disputes of the 1890s and 1900s. As Moon’s research
demonstrates, grievances over old methods of tax collection, the fate of local elite
associations, and disputes over rents on state-owned lands fueled many of the Ilchinoe’s
anti-government activities just as much, if not more so, than did differing interpretations
of modernity.14 Although it is hard to dispute the growing influence of “modern” reforms
in the late-nineteenth century, it is also necessary to acknowledge the continuity of “nonmodern” aspects as well.
The need to adequately represent the “non-modern” is of particular concern
among economic histories of the late Chosŏn period (1750–1910) given the narrow,
Eurocentric basis of much economic discourse. This challenge is not unique to Korean
history; historians of China too have grappled with similar problems in overcoming
narratives of China’s supposed failure to modernize and the difficulties of accounting for
economic practices that appear different from standard European models. As Gregory
Blue and Timothy Brook argue, the view of Chinese stagnation can be traced back to
eighteenth century European intellectual trends that increasingly recast Western
civilization as a universal norm and that still influence much economic thought today.15
In Korea, similar notions were most destructively perpetuated through colonial theories
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of stagnation, although to the extent that later scholarship accepted the basic premise of
social theories developed in the nineteenth century many challenges remain in adequately
representing late Chosŏn economic activity.16 For this reason, accounts which rely too
closely upon standard narratives of economic development or markers of social and
technological modernity run the risk of overlooking important aspects of Korean
economic history or, at the other extreme, exaggerating only those aspects which fit a
stylized European experience.17
Rather than seeking just the modern aspects of reform projects, then, this chapter
will examine instead the gradual transformation of the Korean state and its interaction
with the economy in response to the demands of the late nineteenth century. In particular,
this chapter will focus on three interrelated aspects to trace the course of government
reforms through (1) the adoption of new ideas concerning the government’s role in
promoting economic growth; (2) government efforts to secure the financial resources
necessary to fulfil its new obligations; and (3) the subsequent reorganization of
government offices in support of new ideas about the state and political economy. As
some of the most fundamental claims that link the state and the population, an
examination of the changes to taxation and government support for economic activity
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will reveal not just the financial health of the Korean government but also ways in which
it engaged the population, be it through the method of tax collection and assessment or
the obligations it assumed. Viewed in this way, the Korean state was not just an agent of
modernity directed from the central government, but was a complex series of offices and
bureaucratic hierarchies that incorporated a range of interests and institutional practices at
each level. To implement reforms required the central government not only to create an
agenda but to find ways to alter the existing government structure and to redefine the
terms of its interaction with the public.
II.

The State and the Economy in Late-Chosŏn Economic Thought

As in China and Japan, a concern for the economy was a well-established facet of
Confucian governance in Korea. Far from early assessments of Confucian thought as
antagonistic toward economic and commercial activity, the ability of the state to secure
the people’s livelihood was a significant aspect in determining political legitimacy, based
on classical texts that emphasized the primacy of the population’s material wellbeing to
ensure social stability and the security of the political realm. To cite a famous passage
from Mencius:
As to the people, if they have not a certain livelihood, it follows that they will not
have a fixed heart. And if they have not a fixed heart, there is nothing which they will
not do in the way of self-abandonment, or moral deflection, of depravity, and of wild
license…Therefore an intelligent ruler will regulate the livelihood of the people, so as
to make sure that, above, they shall have sufficient wherewith to serve their parents,
and, below, sufficient wherewith to support their wives and children.18

Though widely acknowledged, recognition of the importance of economic affairs
within the tenets of Confucian governance did not lead to a uniform interpretation of
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what constituted a healthy economy. At different times, and in different contexts,
governments stressed the importance of commerce over agriculture and vice versa. What
is more, even the extent of the government’s role in supporting economic affairs could
often be unclear. Unlike the mercantilist policies familiar to Western Europe, East Asian
political norms limited the state’s direct involvement in the economy. As Jane Kate
Leonard and John R. Watt explain, despite viewing the economy as integral to both the
state’s strategic sphere and the whole of civilization, the government of Qing China
nonetheless considered it a semi-autonomous productive sphere best left to the
management of the people.19 Still, the basic principle that governments should foster both
material wellbeing and social stability came to underpin a wide array of economic
thought in early modern China and Japan, finding expression in policies as varied as the
state management of granaries for famine relief, low taxation, agrarian policies, and the
regulation of certain commercial industries through licensing and state monopolies.20
In Korea, likewise, governments had long taken an interest in the wellbeing of the
economy. The Chosŏn state was an agrarian state explicitly founded on Confucian
principles and as such government officials took a direct interest in the promotion of
agriculture for the welfare of the people. Early in the Chosŏn dynasty the government
undertook the construction of reservoirs and irrigation facilities in order to stabilize both
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the socio-economic life of the population and the state itself. The government also
bolstered the rural economy through such measures as the publication of agricultural
manuals and the promotion of a granary system to stabilize fluctuations in the harvest.21
Regard for the significance of the economy did not decrease over the years, although
intellectual divisions and an increased rivalry over government posts in the sixteenth
century led to greater contestation over the form of economic policies. Where some
asserted the importance of the material role of the government administration, others
placed a primary emphasis on moral and spiritual self-cultivation as the best way to
satisfy the state’s material obligations to the population.22
By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the most active proponents of
government support for agriculture lay outside of the mainstream intellectual trends of
the Chosŏn court, belonging instead to a loose school of thought often referred to as
“practical learning” (sirhak).23 Among interests in many other subjects, scholars such as
Yu Hyŏngwŏn (1622–1673), Pak Chega (1750–1805) and Chŏng Yagyong (1762–1836)
wrote extensively on proposals to stimulate agricultural production and, by extension,
national wealth. The content of such proposals ranged from the institutional, as in Chŏng
and Yu’s plans to reform land ownership, to Pak’s detailed designs for the establishment
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of a government office dedicated to importing, studying, and promoting advanced
Chinese agricultural techniques.24 These views were not entirely ignored and King
Chŏngjo (r. 1779-1800) in particular was sympathetic toward “practical learning,” but
political conflict between various factions prevented the mainstream adoption of such
ideas at the highest levels within the government.25 Although students of the prominent
sirhak scholars continued to develop their ideas, it was not until the reign of Kojong and
the political crises of the late nineteenth century that sustained debates over the state’s
obligations to support the economy reemerged within the central government.
The four-character phrase puguk kangbyŏng (富國强兵), or “enrich the country
and strengthen the military,” provides a useful lens through which to view changing ideas
about the state and its relationship with the economy at this time. This phrase is
especially significant in the history of modern East Asia, given its adoption within Meiji
Japan as a foremost slogan promoting the development of national industry and military
power.26 The phrase did not originate in Meiji Japan, however, and can in fact be traced
back to Sima Qian’s description of the philosophy of Shang Yang (d. 338 BCE), a Qin
intellectual of the Warring States period (453–221 BCE) who drew an explicit connection
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between the wealth of a state and its military abilities.27 The later association of the
phrase with Legalism—a branch of philosophy openly critical to such basic tenets of
Confucianism as moral governance and hence denounced by mainstream
Confucianism—meant that the phrase was rarely referenced in the Veritable Records of
the Chosŏn Dynasty (Chosŏn wangjo sillok), the official history of the debates and
activities of the central Chosŏn government. Instead, the phrase appears more closely
related to the writings of sirhak scholars, such as Chŏng Yagyong and Pak Chega, who
used the notion of enriching the country and strengthening the military in their critiques
of what they saw as an excessive focus on esoteric morality within the current
administration at the expense of the people’s material welfare.28
When discussion of enriching the country and strengthening the military
resurfaced within the central government in the late nineteenth century, Korea faced a
tense international situation. The spread of imperialism had led to wars in each of China,
Japan, and Korea, to say nothing of the trend toward gunboat diplomacy in which states
used military force as a threat in international negotiations.29 Indeed, usage of the phrase
within the Veritable Records reflected the new military threat. As a minister reported on
the Japanese decision to send gunboats to the Korean coast in 1876: “the Japanese
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consider that now is a time when all countries under heaven resort to arms…they
repeatedly talk of ways to enrich the country and strengthen the military and that is all.”30
Subsequent references to Japan reiterated the significance of the phrase within the
contemporary international climate. On several occasions, Korean officials expressed an
interest in emulating Japanese economic and military policies in order to prevent the
threat of invasion. Similarly, in 1879 Li Hongzhang, a prominent Qing official, reminded
the Chosŏn government of Japan’s recent conquest of the Ryūkyū Kingdom (now
Okinawa), urging Korea to adopt measures to enrich the country and strengthen the
military.31
Compared to earlier discussion of puguk kangbyŏng within the discourse of
“practical learning,” the use of the phrase in the nineteenth century had a defensive,
martial tone in its stress on the need to counter external threats. This reversed the
emphasis of Chŏng Yagyong and Pak Chega, who had referred to the slogan to argue for
the government’s greater interest in economic matters and the welfare of the general
population. Among his many writings, Kyŏngseyup’yo (A treatise on statecraft) in
particular outlined Chŏng’s ideas on how best to reform the government in order to
achieve the wealth and strength (pugang) of the country. Demonstrating the style of
thought described by Leonard and Watt, whereby the state should support the productive
sphere without directly intervening in economic affairs, Chŏng argued that the
government should both maximize its efficiency by removing extraneous government
posts and offices while letting pragmatism and ability guide the people’s occupation
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within industry.32 Meanwhile, the theory to enhance the country’s wealth (pugungnon)
was a core element of Pak Chega’s economic writings. Although equally concerned with
the increasing the welfare of the people—a wealthy population was a necessary
precondition for a wealthy state after all—Pak’s proposals envisioned a greater role for
the government in creating the conditions for material prosperity through the promotion
of trade and the introduction of agricultural technologies.33 Despite such differences in
interpretation, and notwithstanding both authors’ additional writings on the military, in
reference to the notion of the wealth and strength of the country both men placed a
primacy on the economic side in contrast to the use of puguk kangbyŏng early in
Kojong’s rule.
Nineteenth-century discussion of the economy soon grew to match, however, as
the need to enrich the country went hand-in-hand with military concerns. More than just a
means to finance military spending, a strong and wealthy economy became a method to
protect the country in its own right. In the words of one official, “if we cannot emulate
their machinery, how can we stop their insults and resist their greed?”34 As the phrase
gained currency within the central government, reformers of all stripes adopted its
rhetoric to argue for their preferred reforms. On the side of moderate reform, advocates of
“eastern ways and western tools” (tongdo sŏgi) argued that the adoption of foreign
technologies in areas such as agriculture, medicine, transport, and weapons could help
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promote public welfare (iyong husaeng) as long as foreign religions remained safely
excluded from the country:
Truly, if we can reform our government and teaching at home and make alliances of
amity with neighbors abroad, protecting our country’s propriety and righteousness
while making [Korea] equal the wealth and strength of other countries, and so
scholars and ordinary people together can enjoy an era of peace—would this not be a
fine thing?35

Many other early suggested methods to increase national wealth and strength also fit
within established norms of governance, including such measures as maintaining a
balanced budget, decreasing wasteful spending, or concentrating on the proper selection
of officials.36
As increasing numbers of enlightenment reformers took positions within the
government from the mid-1890s, the same slogan was taken in support of more radical
reforms such as cutting one’s hair (a traditional symbol of filial piety), expanding new
forms of education, adopting a land survey, or reforming the standards for weights and
measures.37 The phrase also flourished in the burgeoning popular press. Newspapers
representing views from across the political spectrum—from the Confucian-based
reformist views of the Hwangsŏng sinmun (Capital gazette) to the Western-inspired
Tongnip sinmun (The Independent)—adopted the slogan in articles exhorting the
government and readers to establish new schools and commercial organizations, improve
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industry and the military, and reform popular customs in order that Korea might achieve
the status of a rich and powerful country.38 Even advertisements attempted to capitalize
on the interest in enriching the country and strengthening the military; for almost one
month, a Japanese trading firm with branches in Pusan, a major port city in the south, and
the capital, ran a series of newspaper adverts for agricultural equipment (rice polishing
machines and water pumps) under the tagline, “those who want to enrich the country and
strengthen the military must read.”39
The ubiquity of the phrase puguk kangbyŏng in the late nineteenth century makes
it impossible to classify as belonging to one program of reform over another. Its usage
spanned the gamut of Korean reformers, and beyond. In the most extreme example of the
slogan’s versatility, both Yuan Shikai, the Qing High Commissioner to Korea (1885–
1894), and the imperial government of Japan claimed to be enriching Korea and
strengthening its military while, respectively, demanding recognition of Chinese
suzerainty and establishing Korea as a Japanese protectorate.40 Clearly, the mere mention
of the phrase cannot be taken as proof of ideological sympathy between its users.
Nonetheless, the widespread usage of the phrase points toward a growing consensus that
not only was a wealthy economy of strategic importance to the government, but that the
government bore a responsibility to intervene in the economy to promote economic
activity. Depending on the proponent, the actual form of state intervention might involve
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the direct promotion of particular technologies, indirect support through the provision of
infrastructure or educational facilities, or the elimination of obstacles to the populations’
industry. But, in all of these areas, the calls to enrich the country and strengthen the
military necessarily envisioned a new role for the state in the economy.41
To reimagine the foundation of a wealthy economy was one thing, but to put such
changes into practice was separate challenge entirely. Strengthening the military to
counter foreign threats was an expensive prospect in and of itself, but attempts to fund
new expenditures on education, commerce, and industry in order to enrich the country
placed even greater demands on government finances. Thus, one of the key tasks facing
the Korean government at the end of the nineteenth century was not just the selection of
reform policy, but the manipulation of government finances to secure and direct the
resources required by the various reform projects—in itself a task necessitating much
reform.42
III.

New Spending and Revenues in Pursuit of Reform: Early Reforms

Government finance was inextricably linked to the fortunes of the various reform efforts
that emerged during the late nineteenth century. From an agrarian economy based on the
twin concepts of limited intervention in the productive sphere and low taxation, the
Korean government attempted to transform itself into a state capable of directing the
necessary reforms to secure its independence as a strong and wealthy country. However,
due in part to its willingness to accept the financial burden of reform, for much of the late
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nineteenth century the Korean government faced varying degrees of financial crisis. A
major famine in the early nineteenth century and several years of poor harvests had
already reduced much of the government’s financial reserves.43 Boosting the military and
funding new economic activities would prove an expensive task on top of this. The
ability of the state to secure new revenues was thus an essential precondition common to
the various reform efforts, and for which the various regimes—from the Taewŏn’gun to
the government of the Korean Empire, attempted to resolve in a several ways.
In common with many early modern states, the finances of the Chosŏn
government were divided between multiple offices and were not subject to the overview
of a single finance ministry.44 When Kojong ascended the throne in 1864, the centuriesold Chosŏn dynasty had assembled a patchwork of financial claims and practices.
Multiple offices within the government collected and disbursed discrete streams of
revenue, including several classes of land tax payments measured against the area and
grade of cultivated land, income from a regularized system of grain loans, government
monopolies over the official ginseng trade with China, a military cloth tax assessed
against commoner households, and myriad miscellaneous taxes (chapse) levied on
particular industries (such as fishing or salt production) as well as additional
contributions toward the running of local government offices.45 Despite its complexities,
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Board of Taxation’s competition over revenues with other offices within the central government, see Pak
Soŭn, Chosŏn hugi hojo chaejŏng chŏngch’aeksa (Seoul: Hyean, 2008). On payments between central and
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the Chosŏn fiscal system proved remarkably stable for much of the dynasty. Analysis by
Kim Chaeho shows that between 1730 and 1864 the income of two of the most important
tax-receiving offices—the Board of Taxation (Hojo) and the Taedong Dispensary Office
(Sŏnhyech’ŏng)—remained largely stable, while the expenditures of the same two offices
increased only slightly toward the end of the same period.46
The events that prompted the Korean government to consider enriching the
country and strengthening the military immediately introduced new financial burdens to
the Chosŏn state. Within three years of taking the throne, Kojong and his father, the
Taewŏn’gun, committed to three major expenses: the restoration of the Kyŏngbok palace
from 1865, the recapitalization of the grain loan system between 1864 and 1866, and
military defense from 1866 onwards against incursions from France and the United
States.47 In themselves, the projects were not especially revolutionary. The restoration of
the Kyŏngbok palace, destroyed during the Hideyoshi invasions of the 1590s, and the
reform of the grain loan system were familiar concerns within the government. Previous
rulers had also made plans to restore the Kyŏngbok palace, while a series of peasant
rebellions against high fees and corruption within the grain loan system prompted

57-87. In addition to the original land tax, other taxes were gradually transmuted into land surtaxes over the
years (such as the former tribute tax and a portion of the military cloth tax, under the taedongbŏp and
kyunyŏkbŏp respectively) alongside the imposition of new taxes such as the samsumi (三手米), a surcharge
for military expenditures levied on farmers in the southern three provinces. On the various reforms to taxes
throughout the dynasty, see also Palais, Confucian Statecraft, 769-854.
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chungsim ŭro,” Kyŏngjesahak 43 (2007): 3-40.
47
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discussion of its reform during the reign of King Ch’ŏljong (r. 1849-1864).48 Defending
Korean borders against foreign intrusion also followed established precedent, leading the
government to reject several requests from countries seeking trade with Korea earlier in
the nineteenth century. By 1866, however, the intensity of foreign advances increased to
the point of military action when an American ship, the General Sherman, attempted to
sail up the Taedong river. Later that year, a contingent of French military vessels attacked
Korea in retaliation for the execution of French Catholic missionaries. Both incidents
elicited a military response, with further disturbances in 1868 and 1871 only adding to
expenses.49
Although the precise amounts are unclear due to the lack of a single budget, the
combined expenditure on the three projects was considerable. Previous studies have
estimated the cost of the Kyŏngbok palace reconstruction at 15,000,000 yang and the
recapitalization of the granaries at 1,800,000 yang.50 The total military budget is
unknown, but one recent study calculates a total of at least 593,287 yang worth of
supplemental payments made to military and naval offices between 1865 and 1874, with
further sunms paid in the form of land grants and annual allowances of cloth and grain.51
Given that the total income of the Board of Taxation was around 4,500,000 yang in 1864,
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the vast majority of which was consumed by existing spending, each of these projects
represented a considerable expense beyond the ordinary financial commitments of the
Chosŏn government.52
Subsequent policies implemented after Kojong came of age and resumed personal
rule continued the trend toward greater government spending. In 1874, Kojong
implemented a ban on the use of Qing cash within Korea, at a stroke removing an
estimated three to four million yang from circulation and precipitating a financial crisis.53
From 1876, Korea’s expanding diplomacy introduced a new realm of expenses as the
government looked to strengthen the economy and military through spending on
diplomacy, educational missions abroad and the importation of foreign technologies.
During the 1880s, the Korean government invested in several study and diplomatic
missions abroad, purchased machinery for a new mint and for a workshop to produce
military equipment (Machine Hall, Kigiguk), established a maritime customs service with
offices in each open port, telegraph communications linking Korea to China and Japan,
and an experimental farm to investigate western agricultural methods and crops.54

Data on 1864 finances is taken from the Yukchŏn chorye, as cited in Kim Chaeho, “Chosŏn hugi
chungang chaejŏng.” Following Kim’s conversion methods, the estimate of 4.5 million yang converts
payments in kind at the rate of 5 yang per 1 sŏm of rice. Income to the Board of Taxation here includes
amounts paid through the Taedong Dispensary Office and the Equal Service Office (kyunyŏkch’ŏng),
another major subsidiary of the Board of Taxation.
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Investment in new technologies came at a price. In the early 1880s the
government financed its investment in a new military unit partly by reducing the wages
and supplies paid to soldiers in the traditional units, prompting a rebellion in 1882 as
disgruntled soldiers in the old units rioted after a dispute over the adulteration of their
rations. The soldiers’ riot was both a symptom and a cause of the government’s financial
troubles. During the course of the riot, the soldiers killed a Japanese training officer
attached to the new military unit resulting in the levy of a 500,000-yen reparation
payment to Japan. In 1886, Yuan Shikai admonished the Korean government on the poor
handling of its finances:
Spending according to the amount of revenue is [a revered rule] in the past just as it is
today. Recently, the treasury reserves are insufficient for payments, and national
debts have accumulated…Undertakings such as the mint, the pharmacy, Machine
Hall, and steamships—how are these not good? But if one considers the current
trends in Korea then they are not suitable. First, one must improve the domestic
government, develop new sources of funds, and put effort into the work of
economizing. Only after the national finances are abundant enough that each
household has sufficient expenses, then can one carry out those [policies] gradually
planning for wealth and strength. If there is no measure of the outgoing wealth and
incoming taxes, and the only work is to aggrandize the imitation of foreign things,
then in the future there will be no results but waste day by day and the wealth will be
exhausted getting even weaker and poorer.55

The government adopted several strategies to cover its new expenses, securing
funds through five different methods: one-off, informal exactions from the population;
the diversion of existing taxes; the creation of new or expanded taxes; foreign loans; and
the minting of new currencies. Initially, the government attempted to raise funds through
a variety of temporary, informal measures. In the reconstruction of the Kyŏngbok palace,
the government mobilized corvée labor and solicited voluntary donations (wŏnnap), even
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transferring 100,000 yang from the Royal Treasury as an exemplar.56 In total, James
Palais estimates that voluntary contributions provided 7,728,693 yang—just over half of
the estimated total cost of the reconstruction—in addition to further contributions of
wood, rice, and white alum.57 The government also transferred existing wealth to cover
the initial payments toward the recapitalization of local granaries and increased military
expenses. In 1866, the royal household donated 300,000 yang to impoverished regional
granaries after writing off their bad grain loans and 80,000 yang to supplement the
military budget.58 Later, in a pinch after removing Qing cash from circulation, Kojong
again transferred existing sources of wealth to cover shortfalls in the central
government’s reserves, this time drawing funds from the newly-recapitalized regional
granaries.59
The government also diverted and expanded existing patterns of taxation. The
Board of Taxation claimed an increasing portion of the receipts from the official ginseng
trade which it diverted toward military expenses.60 Between 1866 and 1870, the
government removed exemptions on the military cloth tax, requiring formerly-exempt
elite yangban households to pay the tax alongside commoners.61 A temporary surtax on
the land tax raised an estimated 2,000,000 yang in 1868 toward the costs of the palace
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restoration, while the government removed land tax exemptions from private academies
(sŏwŏn) the same year.62 The government also implemented new surtaxes, such as the
p’oryangmi, or artillery rice, which garnered roughly 50,000 sŏm of rice per year.63 A
miscellaneous “gate tax” (tosŏng munse) on persons entering Seoul further supplemented
the funds for palace reconstruction. Though incomplete, records from two out of the total
seven gates that levied the tax record an income of roughly 8,000 yang per year between
1869 and 1873.64
New taxes on maritime trade also added to the central government’s income. In
1883, the government established a system for tariff collection and installed customs
offices at each of the open ports under the authority of the newly-established Office for
the General Control of Diplomatic and Commercial Matters (t’ongni kyosŏp t’ongsang
samu amun, est. 1882).65 The maritime customs service represented an important new
stream of revenue for the government at a time when most other sources of taxation
remained flat, if not decreasing slightly.66 Moreover, unlike the existing taxes that were
already earmarked for particular government departments, maritime customs were
particularly suited to novel spending projects. As well as the customs revenues
themselves, the government was able to use future revenues as collateral for loans with
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foreign merchants, banks, and governments to further enhance revenues for spending on
new projects (see Table 1.1).
However, in terms of value raised, new currencies far outstripped all other sources
of government revenue. Early in 1867, in the space of just six months, the government
minted an estimated 16 million yang of a new coin, the tangbaekchŏn (one hundred
cash), of which 1.5 million yang was utilized to recapitalize the granaries with a further
180,400 yang transferred toward military expenses throughout the year.67 Later the same
year, the Taewŏn’gun also authorized the use of Qing cash within Korea, boosting the
money supply once again.68 Like the Taewŏn’gun before him, Kojong also minted a new
currency—the tangojŏn (five cash)—sending at least 620,000 yang of the currency to
fund government offices between 1883 and 1884 alone. While the tangbaekchŏn and
Qing cash were swiftly withdrawn from circulation over concern for inflation and a lack
of popular support for the coins, the government continued to produce the tangojŏn until
1894 when it was replaced with several new denominations. Because the tangojŏn was
produced at multiple locations, and to varying quality, it is unclear how much was
produced overall. But, based on the amount of metal imported for coin production, the
volume appears to have increased over time. After importing an average of around 3,000
tam per year between 1885 and 1887, the amount of metal imported for currency
production increased dramatically to an average of around 30,000 tam per year between
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Table 1.1: Foreign loans to the Korean government, 1882–1894
Year
1882

Amount69
Lender70
28,250 yang Qing

1882

2,999 yang

1882

120,500 yen

1882

210,000 yang

18821883
1884
1885
1886
1886
18861894
1887

24,000 yen

First (Daiichi)
Bank
Qing
H.C.E. Meyer
and Co.
H.C.E. Meyer
and Co.
First (Daiichi)
Bank
H.C.E. Meyer
and Co.
H.C.E. Meyer
and Co.
H.C.E. Meyer
and Co.
Qing
Qing
Tong Shuntai
(merchant)

1887
1892
1892

1892

100,000 yang

1893

35,000 yang

1887

Yokohama
Specie Bank
Qing
Qing

44,490
dollars
125,400
dollars
1,487
dollars
2,000 yang
2,800 yang
100,000 yang

1887

Qing

3,540 yang

100,000 yang
20,000 pounds
(112,280 dollars)
30,000
dollars
508,888 yen

Collateral
Ginseng
tax

Tong Shuntai
(merchant)

Maritime
customs
Ginseng
tax

Purpose of loan
Study mission to Tianjin
Construction of official residence in
Tianjin
Indemnity payment (Treaty of
Chemulp’o), study trip to Japan
Establish maritime customs
Purchase machinery, establish
Machine Hall
Operation of maritime customs

Maritime
customs

Installation of overland telegraph
Indemnity payment, interest payment
on Yokohama Specie Bank loan
Purchase of mint equipment

Maritime
customs

Wages of foreign advisers, repayment
of loans (Qing, H.C.E. Meyer and Co.)

Purchase of telegraph equipment
Purchase of steamship
Wages for mint engineer

Inch’ŏn
maritime
customs
Inch’ŏn
and Pusan
maritime
customs

Expenses of Koreans in Tianjin
Repairs to Wŏnsan pier
Repayment of loans (H.C.E. Meyer
and Co., indemnity payment loan)
Repayment of loans (Townsend,
National First Bank)

Indemnity payment re: prevention of
grain exports (panggongnyŏng)
1893
50,000 yen HSBC
Construction, maritime customs
expenses, indemnity payments
Source: Kim Chŏnggi, “Chosŏn chŏngbu ŭi Ch’ŏng ch’akwan”; Kim Chŏnggi, “Chosŏn chŏngbu ŭi
Tokil ch’akwan”; Kim Sundŏk, “1876-1905 nyŏn kwanse chŏngch’aek,”; Larsen, Tradition, Treaties,
and Trade, 143.
69

Qing

Because of the scattered nature of the sources, this table may not be exhaustive. Due to a lack of reliable
exchange rate information, all loans are recorded in original amounts, i.e., in Korean yang, Japanese yen,
pound sterling, and silver dollars. As a rough guide, as of 1892 the prevailing dollar—yang exchange rate
was around 1.48 silver dollars per yang. Kim Sundŏk, “1876-1905 nyŏn kwanse chŏngch’aek kwa kwanse
ŭi unyong,” Han’guk saron 15 (1986): 322.
70
For simplicity, all loans from government departments within China have been labelled Qing. For more
details on the specific offices that lent to Korea, see Kim Chŏnggi, “Chosŏn chŏngbu ŭi Ch’ŏng ch’akwan.”
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1888 and 1893.71
The first decades of Kojong’s reign thus marked a distinct shift in the
management of government finance. Though not necessarily linked by a tightly defined
program of reform, a combination of military threats, financial crises, and a growing
concern to promote national wealth and industry lef to a sustained period of increased
government spending. By the 1880s, spending on government reform projects and new
technologies were a substantial, recurring expense, as seen in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1
which outline spending on technologies and the reform of government offices during this
period respectively. In order to fund all of these projects the government attempted to
secure several new sources of funding, including changes to taxes, voluntary donations,
foreign loans, and the minting of high-denomination currencies.
As it sought new streams of revenue, however, the Chosŏn government
necessarily had to balance its own resource claims against those of the population, with
different sources of finance proving easier than others to obtain. When the Taewŏn’gun
first attempted to increase revenues in the 1860s, he did so within a government reliant on
the politics of brokerage. By the late Chosŏn period, the central government had come to
rely heavily upon a host of elite lineages, hereditary local government positions (such as
hyangni, functionaries), nominal official titles, and local organizations (such as village
associations, tonggye) to supplement its governance through formal state offices.72 In
place of formal government officials, state capacity often rested upon individuals

Wŏn Yuhan, “Tangojŏn go”; O Tuhwan, “Tangojŏn yŏn’gu,” Kyŏngje sahak 6 (1983): 165-227. One
tam 擔 is equivalent to roughly 50 kilograms.
72
On the wide variety of informal governance in Chosŏn Korea, see Eugene Y. Park, “Status and ‘Defunct’
Offices in Early Modern Korea: The Case of Five Guards Generals (Owijang), 1864–1910,” Journal of
71
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Figure 1.1: Pre-Kabo (1894) reorganization of government offices

Source: Table adapted from Han Sŭngyun, “Haengjŏng kaehyŏk kigu ŭi sŏnggong chogŏn,” Han’guk
chŏngch’i hakhoebo 49, no. 1 (2015): 274. Blue arrows show continuity between offices.

Social History 41, no. 3 (2008): 737-57; Martina Deuchler, Under the Ancestors’ Eyes: Kinship, Status,
and Locality in Premodern Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 2015).
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recognized by the state to perform minor tasks, be it gathering voluntary contributions,
taxes, or maintaining order in remote offices. Many of the Taewŏn’gun’s early efforts to
raise funds reflect the delicate negotiation of interests within such a system. For example,
the voluntary contributions that formed a major element in the fundraising for the
Kyŏngbok palace reconstruction were often rewarded with the granting of a rank or
title.73 Less favorably, the removal of tax exemptions from yangban households and
private academies prompted considerable opposition from elite households who
previously benefitted from the exemptions.74 In contrast, minting currencies and raising
foreign loans posed little direct challenge to the existing fiscal organization of the
government or the population, perhaps explaining the government’s continued reliance
on such methods despite the problems of inflation and indebtedness. But, as spending on
reforms continued apace, the government could not avoid restructuring its fiscal
organization indefinitely, the opportunity for which would present itself during the
wholesale reorganization of government offices beginning in 1894.
IV.

New Spending and Revenues in Pursuit of Reform: the Kabo Reforms

The Kabo reform period of 1894–1896 introduced major changes to the organization
of the Korean government. During the 1880s the government had created several new
offices to handle its new diplomatic and commercial responsibilities (shown in Figure
1.1). But, as these offices operated in addition to and within the general framework of the
Six Boards—the basic structure of the central Chosŏn government—the creation of these
73

Palais, Politics and Policy, 39.
Although the granting of a title does not rule out coercion as a method to solicit the donations, the exchange
of contributions for recognition from the state follows a familiar pattern within Chosŏn governance. Similar
methods were also used to secure donations for famine relief. See, Anders Karlsson, “Royal Compassion
and Disaster Relief in Chosŏn Korea.” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 20, no. 1 (2007): 95.
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offices did little to change the overall structure of the government. The occasion to
fundamentally reorganize the government arose in 1894, during the first Sino-Japanese
War (1894-1895). A major peasant uprising, known as the Tonghak rebellion, in
southwest Korea provided the pretext for both China and Japan to send troops to Korea.
Already competing against China for influence within the Korean government and over
access to Korean markets, the Japanese military took advantage of the upheaval of the
rebellion to take over the palace and force a series of major reforms through the Korean
government, placing those sympathetic to enlightenment thought and Japan into positions
of power and removing the post of the Qing High Commissioner. Over several bursts of
legislation, enlightenment reformers replaced the Six Boards with a cabinet-style
structure which consolidated the work of the government within a new set of government
ministries. The Kabo reforms ended in 1896 after Kojong fled from the Japan-sponsored
court to the Russian embassy, declaring a new regime, the Korean Empire, the following
year. However, the basic state organization established during the Kabo reforms would
remain in place throughout the Korean empire period.75
Despite their ambitious plans to reshape the Korean government, the Kabo
reforms did little to alleviate the financial pressures facing the government. On the
contrary, securing and increasing tax revenues became an even greater concern following
the Tonghak rebellion, which saw large numbers of peasants revolt in protest against a
combination of high taxes, corruption among local government officials, and the

For more detail on the progression of the Kabo reforms, see Kyung Moon Hwang, “Governmental
Growth in the Taehan Empire Era: Origins of the Modern Korean State,” in Kim, Duncan and Kim, eds.,
Reform and Modernity, 157-210; Wang Hyŏnjong, Han’guk kŭndae kukka.
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increased presence of foreigners in the new treaty port regions.76 The Kabo reforms,
begun in the middle of the rebellion, were thus forced to address popular concerns about
the burden of high taxes. At the same time, post-Kabo governments embraced the general
goals of reform and modernization as espoused by enlightenment thinkers and placed a
heightened emphasis on technology, commerce, and education as an essential foundation
for the new Korean state. Projects begun in the 1880s—including updating the military
and investing in electric power, the telegram, and agriculture—expanded through the
1890s and 1900s, while additional items such as a nationwide cadastral survey, reforms
to weights and measures, and the construction of railways, streetcars, and schools added
further to government expenses.77
In order to achieve the three simultaneous goals of reducing the tax burden on
peasants, reducing corruption among local officials and increasing revenue for further
investment, the government attempted to overhaul the entire tax system. The Kabo
government replaced multiple layers of land taxes with a single payment per unit of land,
with different tax grades depending on the type and quality of the land.78 Further reforms
abolished miscellaneous taxes and required taxes to be paid in cash rather than in kind.79
Alongside the new tax codes, the government attempted to increase the amount of land

76

For more on the intellectual and spiritual background of the Tonghak movement, see George Kallander,
Salvation through Dissent: Tonghak Heterodoxy and Early Modern Korea (Honolulu: University of
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subject to taxation by reclassifying formerly tax-exempt lands (such as post station lands
yŏktunt’o or military fields tunjŏn, for example), adding hidden fields (ŭn’gyŏl) to tax
registers, and reassessing the quality (and therefore the tax rate) of taxable lands.80
In combination, these measures were intended to equalize the tax burden,
increasing total revenue while decreasing the individual burden, although this was not
always achieved in practice. Tenants of formerly tax-exempt state-owned lands
complained of dual taxation as they paid both rents and taxes to the government under the
new system. Attempts to include hidden fields did not always succeed, and at times
reassessment even provided the opportunity for new parcels of land to go missing from
the official register. The practice of re-grading land taxes by the county, and collecting
taxes by the township or village also led some farmers’ taxes to rise disproportionately
over those of their neighbors despite the lower, theoretically uniform, rate.81 Nonetheless,
the recalculation of taxable lands provided a modest increase in the tax base from 57
percent of total land in 1893 to 66.7 percent in 1896.82
Beyond adjustments to the land tax itself, a further change to the financial system
came in the restructuring of government offices. Within the central government, the Kabo
reforms placed control of all government finances, including those of the Royal
Household, under the new Ministry of Finance, the T’akji-amun (renamed the T’akjibu in
1895). For the first time, a single ministry oversaw the budgets of all other government
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departments and was tasked with the creation of national accounts. To do so, an
accounting section (hoegyegwa) was established within each government ministry to
prepare the ministry’s budgets and correspond with the Ministry of Finance. A similar
system was also planned for local government offices as part of a series of measures
designed to separate local government offices from the direct handling of taxes, although
this measure was never fully implemented.83 Nonetheless, the Ministry of Finance greatly
expanded its authority over local government finances through new controls over local
government expenses and the elimination of miscellaneous taxes which local
governments had previously relied upon to augment their revenue.84
Overall, the finanical reforms were partially successful in their attempt to raise tax
income to meet government spending. The Ministry of Finance made a concerted effort
to increase revenues from the land tax, surveying local offices on their income and
expenses and later initiating a nationwide land survey to correct outdated land registers.
Over time, revenues did indeed increase, as shown in Figure 1.2. In the wake of the land
survey, and after some adjustments to the tax rate, the revenue from the land tax nearly
tripled between 1900 and 1904. Despite this success, however, increases from taxation
were not sufficient to support concurrent increases in expenditure leaving the government
to find other supplemental sources of income.
As in earlier years, the minting of currency served as a significant source of
additional revenue. In an attempt to control the inflation of earlier years, an 1894
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Figure 1.2: Government spending and income, 1896–1904
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Source: “Kakse silip illamp’yo” and “Seip silji subong’aek” as cited in Yi Sunsang, “Ilche e ŭi han
singminji,” 299; Yi Sunsang, “Ilche e ŭi han singminji chaejŏng.”
Note: The heading “other income” refers to income from government-owned enterprises, including the
publication of the kwanbo official gazette, the postal service, and the telegraph service. These figures
do not include the income of the Royal Household (Kungnaebu) or income from loans.

ordinance on the issuance of new currencies introduced five new denominations fixed
against a silver yang.85 But, in practice there were few controls on the issuance of coins
and the government produced large volumes of one denomination in particular—the
paektonghwa nickel coin. Between 1894 and 1904, the government produced nearly
seventeen million wŏn worth of paektonghwa coins at a rate that closely corresponded to
the gap between tax receipts and government spending during the same period. This
helped to solve some of the government’s financial difficulties, but was not without
consequence. As the mass production of the paektonghwa stoked inflation, the value
ofthe taxes collected by the government decreased to as little as one-third of the original
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amount. In 1900, the government recalculated land taxes accordingly, raising the highest
rate to 50 yang, although as a result of inflation even this revised figure represented a real
decrease in the value of taxes.86
The government also continued to rely upon maritime customs as a supplement to
other forms of taxation. Although the government continued to receive some revenue
directly from maritime customs, over the years the value of future maritime customs as
collateral for foreign loans eclipsed customs receipts themselves as a direct source of
revenue. Overall, between 1895 and 1905, foreign loans (most secured against maritime
customs) provided the government with some eight million yen worth of additional funds
toward spending on various reform projects, as shown in Table 1.2. Unlike earlier foreign
loans, Japanese banks now dominated the supply of loans during the post-Kabo period
reflecting the decline of Chinese influence and increase in Japanese influence in Korea
following the Sino-Japanese war.
As in previous years, the Korean government attempted to secure new sources of
revenue through several different channels. The central government could not act
unilaterally, however. Even in the minting of new currencies, the government had to
manage a level of opposition from dissenting officials and from the public whose refusal
to accept any new currencies had the potential to undermine the central government’s
efforts, as happened with the Taewŏn’gun’s short-lived experiment with the one-hundred
cash. In order to collect taxes, in Korea, as anywhere, the government had to confront the
twin problems of information and negotiation.87 Tax collection requires sufficient
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Table 1.2: Foreign loans to the Korean government, 1895–1905
Year
1895

Amount (yen) Lender
130,000 First (Daiichi)
Bank

1895

3,000,000 Bank of Japan

1900

300,000 First (Daiichi)
Bank
1,220,000 First (Daiichi)
Bank

1901-1905

1902-1904

1905
1905

250,000 First (Daiichi)
Bank

3,000,000 First (Daiichi)
Bank
150,000 Bank of Japan

Collateral
Inch’ŏn customs
receipts
Taxes, maritime
customs
Ginseng monopoly
Taxes, paektonghwa

Income from Office
of Weights and
Measures
(P’yŏngsikwŏn)
Maritime customs

Purpose of loan
Salaries
Government reform
Palace expansion
expenses
Payment for military
supplies and other
expenses
Improving weights
and measures

Currency reform

Emergency relief re:
financial crisis
Source: Kim Sundŏk, “1876-1905 nyŏn kwanse chŏngch’aek”; Yu Wŏndong, “Hanmal Ilbon ŭi
ch’agwan kongse.”

knowledge of that which is to be taxed, with the pursuit of such knowledge forming a
constant endeavor on the state’s behalf to update the relevant records as well as
monitoring against fraud. Collecting tax revenues also involves aspects of negotiation,
whether with powerful rivals who might challenge the state for the right to the same
resources or, in a democratic context, with citizens who might vote for or against certain
taxes. A degree of bargaining between the taxer and the taxed may take place even under
the most coercive of regimes, as in the guise of tax resistance or rebellions against undue
predations. Negotiation may occur at the moment of payment, but might also be observed
over access to the information that makes taxation possible, as in the misclassification of
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land as unproductive (hidden fields) or the underreporting of household size on registers
that served as the basis for certain forms of taxation, for example.
Under the Kabo reforms, the reorganization of the tax system promised to move
from the personal politics of brokerage that informed the Taewŏn’gun’s attempts to raise
taxes toward a uniform, more bureaucratic system, although even this process was not
without conflict. The establishment of the maritime customs system serves as a precursor
in this regard, as the customs system introduced new sites of negotiation over state
finances albeit now centered on the bureaucratic organization of the customs offices.
At the signing of the Kanghwa treaty with Japan in 1876 there was no designated
mechanism in place to levy maritime customs on behalf of the central government.
Rather, records show that local government officials in the vicinity of the port of Pusan
first implemented measures to tax Korean merchants engaging in new trade with Japan
through the magistracy of Tongnae.88 However, after diplomatic objections from Japan
halted this practice over concerns that taxing merchants contradicted the free trade terms
of the 1876 treaty, the opportunity arose to restructure the flows of maritime tax
revenues. Writing to the Korean government in 1879, Li Hongzhang advised the creation
of a separate customs service based on the system existing in China at the time.
According to Li’s recommendation, a well-established system of maritime customs could
serve the additional benefit of providing funds for the government’s new projects: “if
[Korea] establishes maritime customs, then it will not lack for that small help toward the
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national expenses, and if [Korea] becomes skilled in trade, then it will not be difficult to
purchase munitions.”89
Korea’s eventual system of maritime customs emerged in 1883 after negotiations
with Japan over the introduction of taxes on international trade, and with China over the
design and management of maritime customs.90 Unlike the earlier system which taxed
merchants through the Tongnae magistracy, the new maritime customs were collected as
part of a national system that placed collection offices in each open port under the
oversight of a central office, the Office for the General Control of Diplomatic and
Commercial Affairs. Not only did the new system direct revenues toward the central
government as advised by Li, but the bureaucratic structure of the maritime customs
offices reinforced and enabled the government’s reform efforts in other ways. Within this
system, the maritime tax revenues and the loans made against them were directly under
the authority of the same office responsible for sending foreign study trips, purchasing
machinery, and managing early reform projects such as the new Mint, Machine Hall, and
telegraph facilities, among others. As well as the ready access to customs receipts that
such a bureaucratic structure provided, the organization of the Office in parallel to its
Chinese counterpart facilitated interaction between not only the staff of the customs
offices but also among the technical advisers for reform projects in both China and
Korea.91
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Subsequent changes to the Chosŏn fiscal system during the Kabo reform period
further reordered the collection and distribution of tax receipts within a hierarchical
bureaucratic system. The establishment of the maritime customs system was a first step in
this regard, albeit with little impact on the rest of the fiscal system in which several
separate government offices continued to collect and manage taxes in parallel to one
another. This changed following the Kabo reforms which granted the Ministry of Finance
greater control over the finances of other government offices and the setting of national
budgets. The Ministry of Finance’s new powers extended horizontally, over other
ministries within the central government, and vertically, through a hierarchical chain of
local government offices through the departments (pu) and counties.
The initial Kabo reform proposals transferred the functions of tax collection from
local government offices themselves to an independent system of tax offices within a
parallel administrative system. Clerks within the local government offices were selected
to assist with land registration and to field questions over taxes but were formally
prevented from having anything to do with the actual collection of taxes.92 Ultimately,
these reforms were not implemented in the face of bureaucratic difficulties and
opposition from existing tax collectors within the local government. A later edict
reversed the initial reforms to confirm the role of local magistrates (kunsu) within tax
assessment and collection.93 Nonetheless, the Ministry of Finance still gained significant
oversight over local governments’ financial affairs through the Kabo reforms. The
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regulations that restored tax collection to local magistrates also granted the Ministry of
Finance the right to appoint collectors within the local administration (following the prior
endorsement of the magistrates), to control levels of taxation, and to otherwise manage
the activities of tax collectors.94 The Ministry of Finance also exercised its authority over
local government offices to limit spending as part of its efforts to increase the proportion
of taxes available to the central government.95
Despite the reorganization of the administrative structure, and the Ministry of
Finance’s new powers to set budgets, reforming the national tax system proved a
complex task. For one thing, just as the Taewŏn’gun faced in his attempts to divert funds
from the ginseng taxes toward the military, when it came to the management of
information regarding taxes the Ministry of Finance was still reliant on the work of local
government offices in compiling reliable information over the assessment and collection
of taxes. Local government officials thus emerged as both the target and necessary ally of
capital-based reform efforts hoping to increase the flow of funds toward the treasury. In
this regard, the implementation of a nationwide cadastral survey in 1898 was not just an
attempt to modernize Korea’s national finances and system of property rights.96 The
attempt to establish nationwide land registers under the control of central government
agencies equally symbolized the accumulation and centralization of knowledge over
taxes and taxable lands that had hitherto been the domain of local government offices.
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The new bureaucratic organization of the government did not obviate the potential
for conflict over the flow of information and resources. Rather, disputes emerged within
the new fiscal system in line with the institutional and organizational changes
implemented by the government. As a gatekeeper to both tax revenues and the loans that
could be made against future receipts, the office of Chief Commissioner of the maritime
customs service was one such center for conflict within the new system. Since the
establishment of the maritime customs system the Korean government had employed
foreign advisors to the most senior posts within the service. From the outset, the
appointment of foreigners to the post of Chief Commissioner invited a certain amount of
political intrigue. The first foreign adviser, Paul Georg von Möllendorf, was fired after
attempting to court Russian influence in Korea over the interests of the Chinese Customs
Service which had engineered his appointment in the first place. Robert Hart, the
Inspector General of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service, also indulged his
own (ultimately unsuccessful) designs to annex the Korean Maritime Customs Service
into the Chinese system as a way to increase not only his own power but to use China to
check Russian influence in Korea on behalf of British interests.97 Nonetheless, and the
potential for such mischief notwithstanding, the relative independence of the maritime
customs system under the Office for the General Control of Diplomatic and Commercial
Affairs insulated the operation of maritime customs from most domestic conflict within
the Korean government.
This changed during the course of the Kabo reforms, which placed all revenue
sources, including that of the maritime customs, under the authority of the new Ministry
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of Finance.98 Conflict emerged again, as John McLeavy Brown, the Chief Customs
Commissioner (ch’ongsamusa) at the time (in office 1893–1905), increasingly diverted
customs revenues toward the direct payment of the expenses of running the customs
houses, the salaries of foreign advisers, the costs of study missions abroad, the Imperial
Household, and the repayment of existing loans. Brown also deposited additional
amounts in overseas accounts in Hong Kong and Japan, thus preventing the Ministry of
Finance from accessing at least a portion of the customs revenues.99 Under Brown’s
management, the proportion of customs revenues remitted to the treasury diminished over
time, falling from nearly 75 percent of total customs receipts in 1896 to less than 5
percent from 1899 onwards, even as total customs receipts rose.100 Where customs
revenues were to be the collateral for loans, Brown also played an important role in
negotiating and approving or denying potential loans.
While some have charged Brown with running the maritime customs as his own
private agency, Brown’s unorthodox actions reflect competition between the Imperial
Household and the Ministry of Finance as much as they do his arrogance and frustration
with the Korean bureaucracy.101 British diplomatic records show that Kojong granted
Brown a supervisory authority over the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury to the effect
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that “without Mr. Brown’s signature no Treasury Order would be valid.”102 Throughout a
series of confrontations with the Ministry of Finance over the use and reporting of tax
revenues, Brown continued to claim authority from the Royal Household in support of his
actions in keeping aside portions of customs revenue and bypassing the Ministry of
Finance to report customs revenues directly to the Emperor.103 While the British view
that “the absence of supervision by competent foreigners [would] not only encourage [the
Corean Government] in their present reckless expenditure but also lead to further
disorganization of the finance of the country” undoubtedly underpinned Brown’s actions,
the form of Brown’s meddling was a product of contestations over the bureaucratic
hierarchy between government departments.104
Disputes over the handling of finances within the Kabo system were not limited to
the upper levels of government. Despite early claims during the Kabo reform period to
abolish miscellaneous taxes, subsequent legislation shows that it was not the taxes
themselves that were the target of reform but the manner in which they were levied and
collected. In late 1895, when the government published a law to “abolish miscellaneous
taxes on items other than the land tax, household cloth tax, the mining tax, tax on land
and sea-based trade routes, on the import and export of goods, and national levies
(kukkwa),” taxes on items such as salt or maritime products were not abolished but
instead reclassified as belonging to national levies under the purview of the central
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government.105 Although the Ministry of Finance claimed authority over the largest
sources of tax revenue, such as the land tax, household tax, and maritime customs,
different departments within the central government competed with one another over the
collection of the various miscellaneous taxes. Competition did not remain within the
central government, but extended down to local government offices as well as rival
departments attempted to outdo one another in the assessment and collection of the taxes
themselves.
This process is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the example of the maritime
taxes (haese), levied on salt and maritime products. Immediately after the Kabo reforms,
the Ministry of Finance was granted authority over maritime taxes, for which it received
surveys on the object of taxation from each provincial administration (kamyŏng).
However, it was not long before concerns that local officials might omit sources of
taxation from the reports led the Ministry of Finance to dispatch its own surveyors to
assess the maritime tax. Meanwhile, as part of its responsibilities concerning the
development of communications and industry, the Ministry for Agriculture Commerce
and Industry (nongsanggongbu) also undertook its own surveys of post station lands, salt
fields, and the fishing industry, dispatching officials and observation committees (sich’al
wiwŏn) in 1895 and 1896. For the next couple of years the Ministry for Agriculture
Commerce and Industry handled both the assessment and collection of the maritime
taxes, although in practice the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry relied
upon a combination of village heads (hyangjang) and traders to collect the taxes. By
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1898, the Ministry of Finance reclaimed control over maritime taxes after the new system
failed to solve the problems of unpaid taxes and excessive levies against taxpayers,
returning to the former system where regional government offices collected and enforced
payment of the maritime taxes.106 But, in 1901 control over the maritime taxes changed
hands again, this time as part of the Palace Department (kungnaebu)’s efforts to secure
additional streams of revenue independent from the annual grants made to the Imperial
Household by the Ministry of Finance.107
In a similar manner, the Palace Department and Office of Crown Property
(naejangwŏn), a separate office within the Palace Department, gradually gained control
of a range of revenue streams through the late 1890s and early 1900s, including income
from ginseng, mining rights, various state-owned lands (tunt’o), post stations and a
butchers’ tax (p’osase). Just as with the maritime taxes, the incorporation of new taxes
into the revenue stream of the Palace Department or Office of Crown Property involved
the establishment of new systems of tax assessment and collection working in parallel
and in competition with existing tax collection offices. The Office of Crown Property’s
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ability to maintain its new tax revenues was directly linked to its ability to gather
sufficient information which it achieved through dispatching central officials to local
areas to supervise intermediary tax collectors.108 In the process, such reforms to the tax
system brought with them the potential to engender considerable confusion and
resentment among both the population and the local officials who were excluded from the
new system of tax collection. By 1904, an anti-monarch populist group, the Ilchinhoe,
were able to capitalize on such resentment over tax collection to organize tax resistance
protests and rent protests among tenants on some state-owned lands. In some cases, these
protests even emulated the tactics of the Imperial Household in claiming the authority to
collect rents and manage state-owned lands themselves in place of the Office of Crown
Property.109
The political leanings of the Kabo reform government, John McLeavy Brown, the
Imperial Household, and the Ilchinhoe have tended to attract the most attention in
assessments of this period. But, if one takes a step back to examine the means by which
each group attempted to advance their own agenda, there is a remarkable similarity in
their efforts to gain access to financial resources. Beneath the overt claims of each group,
their ability to mobilize finances was only as strong as the bureaucratic order that they
were capable of building. After the Kabo reforms established a new organization of
government offices, contestations over taxes played out within this new system with
conflict centering on the position of local government offices within the system of tax
collection.
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V.

Conclusion

Previous studies of government finances in the late nineteenth century have often focused
on the government’s inability to raise tax revenues or its reliance on foreign loans as a
precursor to colonization. Indeed, particularly following the Kabo reforms, Korea’s
foreign loans were not insulated from the politics of the time and many scholars have
noted the strings that Japanese lenders wished to attach to the loans.110 With regard to the
Korean government, the use of foreign loans in itself has been taken as proof of the lack
of financial assets available to the reform movement and, by extension, evidence of
reformers’ ignorance of the financial burdens of modernization and their inability to
adequately mobilize resources.111 Such an interpretation is too simplistic, however, and
falls into the trap of searching for the root of Korean “failure” in the nineteenth century.
Not only does the nineteenth century provide copius examples of the government’s
ability to mobilize revenues—from pre-reform famine relief efforts to the numerous
methods adopted under Kojong’s reign—but the mere existence of a fiscal crisis in itself
is not a sufficient condition to explain “success” or “failure”; as Wenkai He has
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Bloc, 1895-1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2012), 74, 75.
111
Dong-no Kim, “The Failure of State Reform Movements in Early Modern Korea and Its Relevance to
the Mobilization of Resources,” in Chang Yun-Shik, et al., eds., Korea Between Tradition and Modernity:
Selected Papers from the Fourth Pacific and Asian Conference on Korean Studies (Vancouver: Institute of
Asian Research, 2000), 172-83; Dong-no Kim, “Views of Modern Reforms,” 66, 67.
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persuasively argued, both Japan and Great Britain faced fiscal crises of their own during
periods of intense political transformation without succumbing to a loss of
independence.112
Instead of building a causal narrative of decline, the financial challenges of the
late-nineteenth century offer an opportunity to examine the institutional and
organizational changes that the government confronted in establishing a new basis for its
interaction in the economy. The late nineteenth century saw a series of wide-ranging
reforms to the Korean state. Serious financial and military challenges to Korea led the
government to adopt a program of reform which reshaped its relationship with the
economy. A general acceptance of the tenets of enriching the country and strengthening
the military saw the government adopt new spending obligations in pursuit of the growth
of new industries and military capabilities. In order to meet its new responsibilities, the
government also found it necessary to maximize its income which it attempted to do so
through a range of measures.
Any change to the fiscal system, whether through the Taewŏn’gun’s use of
voluntary donations, to the minting of new currencies, to the use of foreign loans and
reforms of the tax system itself, introduced the potential for conflict and negotiation with
different interest groups. That the post-Kabo reform tax system shared some
characteristics that might be described as modern (a central Ministry of Finance and
payment of taxes in cash) was no panacea in this regard—rather than the status-based
conflict that the Taewŏn’gun courted, the Kabo reforms instead focused conflict toward
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the formation of a new bureaucratic hierarchy and over access to the information that
facilitated tax collection itself. In this regard, the local dimensions of reform were just as
significant as the various modernizing ideologies espoused by the politicians and
bureaucrats. When the project of reform was the state itself, the reordering of central
government offices could only form one part of the reform agenda. The institutions
surrounding the government’s interaction with the population, and the mechanisms that
linked central to local government offices, were an inseparable aspect of reform, both for
the post-Kabo governments and, looking forward, for the colonial government as well.
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CHAPTER 2:
THE ECONOMIC WORLDVIEW OF SIM WŏN’GWŏN

I.

Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s Place in History

On May 10, 1876, an envoy passed through Ulsan, in southeastern Korea, on its way to
the port of Pusan and ultimately Japan. The envoy marked the conclusion of the
Kanghwa treaty that renegotiated diplomatic and trade relations between the two
countries. Kim Kisu (1832–n.d.) led the envoy in a typically lavish manner. On observing
its passage, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn (1850–1933), a local resident, counted around three hundred
people bearing gifts of tiger skins, animal manes, paper, gold, and silver, along with flag
bearers, attendants, cavalry, military officials, interpreters, clerks, and palanquins, and
recorded the spectacle in his diary. Local residents lined the streets to catch a glimpse of
the envoy, the first in nearly sixty years to follow the traditional route of diplomatic
missions to Japan.1
As it passed through Ulsan, Sim gleaned information about the course of the
envoy and its purpose in going to Japan. Sim became one of the first in Korea, especially
those outside of the capital, to see an image of the Meiji emperor—“at twenty-five years
of age, his face is pale and slightly wan, and his eyes bright and sparkling”—and to hear
about the new Japanese government’s endeavors:
I heard in detail about the customs of Wae [Japan]. First I saw an image of the Wae
emperor…then I saw the offices of the state. The interior ministry, the exterior
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi, 1876.4.19. Official records of the envoy note between 73 and 80 members besides
Kim Kisu. The additional crowd seen by Sim most likely included couriers transporting the envoy’s effects
(Sim counted 14 loads, each carried by 16 people) and any local people who accompanied the envoy for
only part of the journey. For more on the envoy, see Han Ch’ŏrho, “Che-1-ch’a susinsa (1876) Kim Kisu ŭi
kyŏnmun hwaltong kwa kŭ ŭiŭi,” Han’guk sasang sahak 27 (2006): 283-317. On previous envoy missions
to Japan, see also Ronald P. Toby, “Carnival of the Aliens: Korean Embassies in Edo-Period Art and
Popular Culture,” Monumenta Nipponica 41, no. 4 (1986): 415-56.
1
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ministry, and the three censorate offices are like the departments in the Chosŏn
government. The county magistrates and senior regional officials are all administered
by these state offices. The method by which young children learn to read and write is
this: First they write the two characters of ‘Japan’ [ilbon 日本], and next they master
Chinese characters, then agriculture and military affairs. Other countries send
diplomats to Wae, then they hear of their technical skill. Even though it is a difficult
task, it is all the custom of learning, and it is all the skill that enriches the state and
strengthens the military.2

What to make of Sim’s account of the envoy? As for the envoy itself, Sim’s
description adds little that cannot be found elsewhere. The diplomatic mission was welldocumented, and Kim Kisu and others within the court kept detailed records of their
travels.3 Two images of the envoy even survive—one in the form of a wood block print
by Utagawa Yoshitora (歌川芳虎) and the other as a drawing for the Illustrated London
News (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Subsequent accounts have neatly placed the envoy at a
turning point in Korea’s history of international relations with Japan, weighing its
significance at a time when new standards of diplomacy and civilization began to
supplant long-established norms.4 By this measure Sim’s account is almost
inconsequential, for the thoughts of Sim Wŏn’gwŏn and the countless other farmers like
him, mattered little to Kim Kisu’s agenda in Japan or the dynamics that sent the envoy on
its journey.
If Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s experience does not fit within the formal diplomatic history,
neither does it fit within standard accounts of popular resistance to an increased Japanese

Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi, 1876.4.19.
Susinsa kirok (Kwach’ŏn: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 1958).
4
Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys; Donghyun Huh, “The Korean Courtiers'
Observation Mission's Views on Meiji Japan and Projects of Modern State Building,” trans. Vladimir
Tikhonov, Korean Studies 29 (2005): 30-54; Han Ch’ŏrho, “Che-1-ch’a susinsa (1876); Iwakata Hisahiko,
“1876 nyŏn susinsa yŏn’gu: Kojong ŭi kuho hoebongnon ( 舊好回復論) ŭl chungsim ŭro,” Han-Il
kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu 27 (2007): 235-71; Yi Chŏnghŭi, “Che-1-ch’a susinsa Kim Kisu ka kyŏnghŏm han
kŭndae Ilbon ŭi oegyo ŭirye wa yŏnhoe,” Chosŏn sidae sahakpo 59 (2011): 173-207.
2
3
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Figure 2.1: Utagawa Yoshitora, “Chōsen shinshi raichō no du,” 1876

Image from: Chōsen kankei nishikie kolekushon, Tōkyō keizai daigaku gakujutsu kikan ripojitori,
Sakurai bunko, no. 4036.

Figure 2.2: “The Corean Embassy to Japan”

Source: The Illustrated London News, August 26, 1876.
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presence in Korea in the late nineteenth century.5 After hearing about Japanese customs
and the innovations of the Meiji government, Sim articulated neither animosity nor praise
but merely wondered at the differences between the two countries: “Both countries under
Heaven, Korea with its extreme droughts and Japan with long rains—how different they
are. What is the reason for these country’s fates?”6 The next day, Sim returned to his
daily life and paid little attention to Japan. From time to time he noted the appearance of
Japanese ships on the horizon, and in 1884, after a coup attempt by pro-enlightenment
officials, Sim briefly recorded a rumor of Japanese violence in the capital:
Today I heard that in Kyŏnggi there are several thousand Japanese people. It is said
that they used long swords to kill seven ministers and several hundred soldiers. Now
people say that those fleeing the disorder in Kyŏnggi will go all over. Afterwards, a
general entered the city, routed the enemy Japanese and killed several hundred.
Recently people’s hearts are not as of old. There are violent thieves everywhere, and
in the evening they enter village houses and take the valuable things, dishes, and
clothing. Many of the wealthy are afraid.7

As seen in the above passage, even though the report of Japanese crimes reached Sim’s
ears it can hardly be said to have engendered any particular ill will toward Japan. Indeed,
Sim appears more disturbed by rumors of thieves and general social disorder than he was
outraged at Japanese villainy in the capital. Even with regard to the rapid growth of grain
exports to Japan—one of the issues that directly affected his everyday life as a farmer—

According to this view, the Korean people “came to regard the Japanese as a vile people or as
plunderers,” based on memories of the 1592 Korea-Japan war and the Taewŏn’gun’s appeals to protect the
orthodox and reject the heterodox around 1876. Eventually, after several political scandals including
suspected Japanese involvement in the 1882 soldiers’ rebellion and the 1884 coup attempt, such antiJapanese feelings are considered to have fed into the conservative and anti-foreign sentiment expressed in
the Tonghak rebellion of 1894. See, Eunsook Park, “The Minjung’s Perception of Japan During the Period
Immediately Following the Kwanghwa Treaty (1876-1884) and Their Response to Japan,” International
Journal of Korean History 5 (2003): 53-84; Cheolbae Son, “The Ordinary Reaction by Koreans against the
Foreign Penetration, 1876 to 1910,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, Department of History,
2006.
6
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi, 1876.4.19.
7
Ibid, 1884.11.10.
5
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Sim’s thoughts are quite removed from prevailing narratives of an incipient anti-export
sentiment among Koreans.8 As Sim wrote on several occasions:
Several years ago, in 1876, there was a great famine in Chosŏn and a great harvest in
Wae so grain left Wae for Chosŏn. This year, Chosŏn grain will enter Wae.
(1879.9.15)
This year and the last, there have been great harvests in this region and grain left for
other countries. Why was this? In 1893 and 1894, grain from other countries arrived
here. From whence does this virtue come? In 1895 and 1896, even though grain
leaves there is a lot of foreign money in this region, and this also is fortunate.
(1897.2.10)
Grain leaves for other countries, therefore the price of grain rises. The people in this
region have profits from farming. There are no problems and all is peaceful. The
people who left last year have all come back. (1897.2.11)9

Although Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s experiences need not discount the emergence of
tensions related to the grain trade elsewhere, it is clear that negative views of Japan and
of the grain trade were not universal. Writing in the late nineteenth century, Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn felt no inherent anti-Japanese sentiment nor an aversion to the export of grain
in and of itself. This is not to say that Sim was especially pro-Japanese, or even proexport. Shortly after commenting on the favorable price of grain due to trade, Sim
nonetheless expressed some unease: “If every year grain is traded away, then there is a
fear that grain will be expensive in one area and the people become oh so fearful. Until
now those who trade the grain have not yet realized the damage to themselves, they
merely know the desire to earn a profit.”10 Though recognizing some favorable effects,

See, Ha Wŏnho, “Kaehanghu Pusan ŭi taeoe muyŏk kwa yut’ong kujo ŭi pyŏndong: kongmul muyŏk ŭl
chungsim ŭro,” Sarim 25 (2006): 151-81; Yamada Ryosuke, “Japanese Residents in Korea and the
Modernization of Chosŏn: A Preliminary Analysis based on the case of the Conflicts Relating to the
Panggongnyŏng (Grain Export Prohibition Order),” International Journal of Korean History 10 (2006): 95120.
9
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi, 1879.7.29; 1896.12.30; 1897.1.10.
10
Ibid., 1897.1.29.
8
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Sim tempered his view of the international grain trade with concerns about the potential
long-term impact of the trade.
Here, and indeed throughout his diary, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s views on trade and
Japan, defy easy characterization. His diary reveals him to be neither pro- nor antiJapanese; at times he celebrated the international trade of grain, while at others he urged
caution. Held against standard historical narratives of the period, the comments within
Sim’s diary may appear to be the product of indifference or contradiction but these were
not arbitrary decisions and Sim followed a consistent logic in his judgement of events.
Such a logic cannot be found in national histories of the period, however, deeply rooted
as it was in Sim’s personal experiences and daily life. This chapter examines Sim’s view
of the world, as recorded within his diary. After uncovering the basic criteria by which he
judged the world and the rural economy, only then does it become possible to understand
Sim’s actions and responses to the economic and societal changes of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
II.

Sim Wŏn’gwŏn and His Diary

Sim Wŏn’gwŏn was born in 1850, the eldest son of Sim Noik (1816–1873). Sim’s
patrilineal ancestors had deep roots in the Ulsan region. Sim’s family maintained
marriage ties to other local lineage groups, such as the Yangsan Yi and Ulsan Yi, and for
generations Sim’s forebears were buried in the vicinity of Ulsan. Sim and his family
identified themselves as members of the Ch’ŏngsong Sim descent group—one of Korea’s
aristocratic yangban lineages which included some prominent early Chosŏn scholarofficials among the lineage ancestors—and maintained genealogical records accordingly.
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn and his family traced their descent from Sim Kwanghyŏng (fl. late

90

fifteenth c.), who was said to have been exiled to the Ulsan region. As an Ulsan branch of
the Ch’ŏngsong Sim, however, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s family line was relatively obscure.
Sim’s direct ancestors first presented a record of their lineage-branch for inclusion in the
1787 edition of the Chŏngsong Sim genealogy, despite the fact that earlier editions listed
Kwangyŏng without an heir. Most likely, Sim’s family were social newcomers—either
local functionaries (hyangni) or upwardly mobile commoners—seeking to enhance their
status through a claim to an aristocratic lineage.11
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s lifestyle reflected his family’s marginal claim to elite status. In
his youth, Sim attended local schools (his diary notes a number of haktang, sŏsuk, and
sŏdang) and studied with the hope of passing one of the state examinations—an
important status marker in Chosŏn society. But, shortly after his father passed away in
1873, Sim took on the main responsibility for the household’s farming activities and
subsequently abandoned his scholarly training. Sim’s two younger brothers, Wŏnju
(1852–1884) and Wŏnch’u (n.d.), shared in the farming duties with Sim along with other
male relatives, including Sim’s uncles, brothers-in-law (Sim had three sisters) and a longtime farmhand/slave named Irŏn. Sim remained a farmer for the rest of his life. He
married twice (his first wife passed away in 1885) and produced two sons, Chongin

The 1843 edition of the genealogy noted the discrepancy over Kwanghyŏng’s heirs in earlier editions,
and recorded the Ulsan branch in special appendix. Ch’ŏngsong Sim-ssi sebo, (place unknown: publisher
unknown, 1843), 23.1a-b.
http://yoksa.aks.ac.kr/jsp/aa/VolumeList.jsp?mode=&page=1&fcs=f&fcsd=&cf=a&cd=&gb=1&aa10up=k
h2_je_a_vsu_B10B%5E322_000&aa10no=&gnd1=&gnd2=&rowcount=100 (accessed May 4, 2015).
Claiming descent from an heirless ancestor was a relatively common method for families to increase their
social status. See, Edward W. Wagner, “‘The Three Hundred Year History of the Haeju Kim ChapkwaChungin Lineage,’’ in Song Chun-ho kyosu chŏngnyŏn kinyŏm nonch’ong pyŏlswae (Seoul: Song Chunho
Kyosu Chŏngnyŏn Kinyŏm Nonch’ong Kanhaeng Wiwŏnhoe, 1987), 1-22; Eugene Y. Park, “Old Status
Trappings in a New World: The ‘Middle People’ (Chungin) and Genealogies in Modern Korea,” Journal of
Family History 38, no. 2 (2013): 166-87.
11
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(1879–1953) and Chongji (1887–n.d.) as well as three daughters (Kyuhyŏk, Kyuho, and
Chaebok).
Despite the claim of an aristocratic lineage, Sim’s lifestyle was far from
extravagant. Altogether, Sim and his family farmed between 52 to 70 turak of land each
year. Initially Sim managed the family’s land as one household, but appears to have
divided the land with his brothers as each married and established their own households.
From the mid-1880s onwards Sim farmed roughly 20-30 turak per year—a relatively
small area.12 The land that Sim farmed varied each year as he bought and sold the rights
to cultivate different plots.13 Some years, Sim had more land than he had seed for, while
in other years the reverse was true and Sim eagerly sought out scraps of unused farmland
where he could transplant additional rice seedlings.14 In particularly hard years, Sim
could barely produce enough food to feed his family let alone cover his other obligations
such as taxes and debt repayments.15 In such a situation, Sim relied upon state-managed

12

At the most Sim farmed 37 turak, and at the least 11 turak. Converting turak into comparable units of
area is imprecise, although James B. Palais estimates 1 turak to be equivalent to 0.163 acres. According to
colonial statistics, in 1919 the mean area farmed per household in South Kyŏngsang province was 1.18 chō,
or 2.89 acres. At somewhere between 3.26 acres (20 turak) and 4.89 acres (30 turak), Sim Wŏn’gwŏn was
therefore slightly better-off than the average household. All the same, at this time the majority of farming
households in South Kyŏngsang province were tenant farmers (64 percent for paddy fields, and 52 percent
for dry fields), and so even though Sim farmed slightly more than the average household, at the same time
he cannot necessarily be considered wealthy. Palais, Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions; Chōsen
sōtokufu shokusankyoku, Chōsen no nōgyō (Keijō: 1921), 14.
13
Based on their low value, in these transactions Sim appears to have been a tenant purchasing temporary
rights rather than purchasing the land outright. In 1870, Sim purchased a certificate (mun’gi) for a plot of
three tu of paddy for just 11 yang (1870.1.7). Other transactions fell into a similar range of prices: 28 yang
for 2 turak of paddy in the fourth month of 1874, and 9 yang for 18 turak of dry field in the twelfth month
of 1884. As a point of comparison, Ch’a Myŏngsu and Yi Hŏnch’ang record the nominal price of 1 turak of
paddy in North Kyŏngsang province to have fluctuated between 20 and 30 yang between 1867 and 1881.
The difference in land prices between South and North Kyŏngsang is unknown, as is the impact of the
quality of land in each case—this information is merely a rough guide to give context to the value, and
likely nature, of Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s transactions. Ch’a Myŏngsu and Yi Hŏnch’ang, “Uri nara ŭi non kagyŏk
mit saengsansŏng, 1700-2000,” in Yi Yŏnghun, ed., Suryang kyŏngjesa ro tasi pon Chosŏn hugi (Seoul:
Sŏŭl taehakkyo ch’ulp’an munhwawŏn, 2004), 148-71.
14
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi, 1877.4.14; 1896.5.29.
15
Ibid, 1886.12.30.
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granaries which provided seasonal grain loans and famine relief. Sim also came to rely
upon local markets to sell non-food crops (in particular pine branches, songji) as a source
of income to supplement his own production. In a typical year, Sim farmed rice, beans,
barley, and smaller amounts of cotton and tobacco. In addition to field crops, Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn cultivated persimmons, pine trees, and bamboo; raised and traded cows; and
wove straw shoes and rush mats which he periodically sold at local markets. Later in his
life Sim also amassed a large collection of fish (by Sim’s count, he collected up to 2,000
trout (songŏ) between 1909 and 1910) in the pond near his home, although this appears to
have been more of a leisure activity than a strictly economic enterprise.16 Sim
participated in the work of farming himself, although he frequently hired laborers during
the agricultural busy season as well.
A typical day for Sim Wŏn’gwŏn involved much travelling. The land that Sim
farmed was scattered across several locations which he visited in loose rotation. Most of
the time Sim stayed within Taehyŏn township (see Figure 2.3), located to the south of
central Ulsan, frequenting villages such as Yaŭm, Sŏnam, Kosa, Nabu, and Taeil in
particular. Sim often travelled further afield as well, especially to visit the periodic
markets held at regular intervals in the center of Ulsan, at the nearby provincial military
command post (pyŏngyŏng), and at several other nearby locations. Figure 2.4 shows the
extent of Sim’s regular travel, with frequently visited towns and villages circled in red.

As Sim described his fish collection: “At the east river and Yongyŏng valley I got over one hundred trout
and put them in the front pond. Since the spring, I have put over 1,300 fish in the pond. The more there are,
the better it is for forgetting my pain and troubles. I get them from under the ice.” Ibid, 1909.11.5; “At noon
I went to Yongyŏn valley. I got over one hundred mudfish and trout, and put them in the pond. Both this
year and the last I put over two thousand trout in the pond, and caught over three hundred fish. My intent in
putting fish in the pond is to raise the fish; catching fish brings joy to my heart.” Ibid, 1910.10.3.
16
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Figure 2.3: Map of Ulsan, Ulsan county gazette (1899)
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Ulsan

Ulsan military
command post

Taehyŏn
township

Image courtesy of Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, Seoul National University.

Sim would often visit several locations within the same day, staying overnight
with friends, family, or in commercial lodgings when necessary. Sim visited nearby
markets at least every ten days, sometimes more frequently, at which time he checked the
price of rice and other items, met with friends and acquaintances, and handled official
affairs. Until the tax reforms of 1894, Sim regularly visited the military command post to
deliver taxes in both cash and kind, though Sim continued to visit the market held at the
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Figure 2.4: Places frequented by Sim Wŏn’gwŏn
Ulsan military
command post
Central
Ulsan

Yaŭm
Sŏnam

Taehyŏn
township
Kosa

Taeil

Image from: National Institute of Korean History, Korean History Database. 1:50,000-scale map of
Ulsan (1918).

military command post even after the post stopped levying taxes on the surrounding
population.
Since commencing his habit in 1870, Sim wrote in his diary every day in the
Classical Chinese he learned at the local schools. His entries followed a general pattern,
recording first the weather, then the basic details of his daily activity—where he went,
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what he did, who he met, etcetera—followed by any further observations. The only times
when Sim did not record a daily entry in the diary occurred in 1873, following the death
of Sim’s father, and in 1885, around the death of his first wife.17 Sim’s diary appears to
have served several purposes throughout the course of his life. Although the vast majority
of entries focused on the detail of Sim’s everyday life, the diary was more than a jotter of
facts related to Sim’s farming activities and Sim frequently added commentary on his
thoughts and feelings. While still studying at local schools, for example, Sim lamented
that even after reading late into the night he could not understand the meaning of the
sentences in front of him. On another occasion, when officials at the military command
post refused to issue a receipt (ch’ŏngmun) for a delivery of some firewood, Sim vented
his resulting anger into his diary, describing in detail his altercation with the command
post officials and his lingering sense of mistreatment.18
Although much of the subject matter remained mundane, Sim’s diary was thus a
very personal account of his life. Even when recording basic facts, Sim choice of which
figures to include reveals how he ordered information to narrate the events around him.
Often, on the final day of the year, Sim summarized the key details of the previous year’s
agriculture, calculating the total amount of rain (measured in days) and other notable
weather events, as well as trends in the prices of major products such as rice, salt, and
fish. As Sim grew older, his reflections turned toward the act of writing the diary itself.
To his annual summaries Sim added details on the length of time he had faithfully kept
his diary as he worked it into the tally of his life: 14,400 days (1908) …17,280 days

17

Entries from late 1922 to 1925 are also missing, although these appear to be lost rather than not written at
all.
18
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi, 1871.11.27; 1876.7.8.
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(1917) …20,160 days (1925) …22,680 days (1932) …. In 1919, at the age of 70, Sim
described his diary thusly:
For 50 years, I recorded each of the 18,000 days: wind, rain, frost, and snow; sunny
days and cloudy days; my comings and goings to the south, north, east and west; I
surely recorded all affairs. I know what has happened, but how can I know what is to
come? On reaching 70 years of age, what else can I do with my stupid self? When I
started learning the Thousand Character Classic I learned two characters a day, but
even at the end of the day it was hard to master them. When the people beside me
said, “Being a farmer will do for him,” my departed parents always replied, “Even
though he has no talents, encouraging him to study will do.” Seeing and hearing this I
was lazy in my studies, and even as an adult I still could not distinguish common
characters. The Gods could know how unfilial my heart was. All my life, I have not
forgotten my parents desire to encourage me to study, and from 1870 to this day in
this year, every day I take up my brush. My crime of being unfilial is incomparable—
how can I fully express this?19

As the above passage shows, Sim used his diary to give a sense of order to his
world. Even though he could not know what the future held, Sim assiduously recorded
the weather, prices, and major events, creating a chronicle to which he could refer to
understand the world around him. At the same time, Sim combined his descriptions of
events with commentary about his feelings—in this case his regret at not fulfilling his
parents’ wishes to which he retroactively ascribed his motivation to write the diary itself.
It is this combination of entries, and Sim’s personal interpretation of events, that makes
his diary a particularly valuable source in understanding how the changes to the rural
economy at the turn of the twentieth century appeared to an individual farmer.
III.

Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s Theory of Economic Cycles

Sim’s diary reveals a range of intellectual influences. In everyday life he adhered to
general Confucian principles through such practices as placing a value on education,
respecting his parents, and performing memorial rituals for deceased relatives. At the

19

Ibid, 1919.12.29.
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same time, scattered mention of concepts such as the accumulation of virtue (chŏksŏn)
and samsara (yunhoe) reveals the additional influence of Buddhist thought. With regard
to the economy, however, Sim referred to one concept in particular to describe and
interpret events: namely, kwich’ŏn (貴賤), or propitious and unpropitious fortune.
Generally translated as noble (貴) and base or mean (賤), the two characters are
most frequently found in Chosŏn texts in relation to discussion of social status. James
Palais’ translation of Yu Hyŏngwŏn’s comments on status distinction in Chosŏn society
shows how the two characters appeared in typical usage. In Yu’s depiction, nobility and
baseness were distinct, opposing attributes against which social status could, and should,
be judged. Although Yu argued that one’s moral character ought to play a greater role in
the assessment of one’s nobility or baseness rather than the official court ranks of one’s
ancestors, he nonetheless presented the relation between the characteristics of noble and
base in terms of their difference and as a basis for the strict maintenance of a social
hierarchy. As Yu wrote:
The moral obligation [to recognize status distinction] [myŏngbun] is a natural
principle of Heaven and Earth. How could one help but be strict about maintaining it?
In general, however, the so-called distinctions of social status basically arise from the
fact that we have grades between the noble and base, and nobility and baseness
[kwich'ŏn] basically derives from the difference between worthiness and ignorance,
and that is all there is to it.
At the present time we do not distinguish whether a man is good or bad. Instead, his
nobility or baseness is determined exclusively in terms of how exalted the official
posts and rank of his forebears were, and yet we still say that we are maintaining
strict distinctions of social status.20

But, when writing in his diary, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn used the two characters to refer to
a much wider range of affairs than social status alone. In the broadest sense, Sim applied
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the idea of kwich’ŏn to any phenomena with two potential opposing outcomes: the
temperature, amount of rainfall, occurrence of drought, or quality of the harvest, for
example, all lay along a spectrum of warm and cold, high and low, abundant and scarce,
propitious and unpropitious. Sim invoked the notion of kwich’ŏn to describe not only the
favorability of such phenomena but also the pattern of transition from one extreme to the
other. Writing one day in 1875, Sim commented:
There is an old saying about the two characters of propitious and unpropitious. Will
next year’s events be the same as this year’s? If this year for six straight months there
were long rains then, eight or nine times out of ten, the next year will surely have a
severe drought. Who can know this? Flourish and perish, prosper and decline,
abundant wealth and mean poverty—their coming and going belongs to fate. The sun
is warm and the moon cool, this is the principle of Heaven. The daytime is bright and
the [evening] dark, that is [the sequence of] propitious and unpropitious. This year
had six months of continued rain and one month of intense drought. Next year there
will be extreme drought, how can we not know in advance? …All things, on reaching
a low must then reach a high, and if things reach a high then in later days they will
reach a low. All things under Heaven are within this one principle.21

As the above passage shows, in referring to “propitious and unpropitious,” Sim did not
just describe immediate events but placed them within a cycle of expectations where
what was previously abundant would return to scarcity, and current low values would
eventually rise again.
Sim grounded his understanding of kwich’ŏn within wider patterns of Confucian,
Buddhist, and Daoist thought. Like most Chinese and Koreans at the time, Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn understood “religion” in a syncretic manner and blended principles from each
school of thought within his view of propitious and unpropitious fortune. The notion of
cyclical change so central to Sim’s interpretation of propitious and unpropitious fortune
drew heavily on a basic tenet of Daoist thought: “Things in the universe are ever
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changing according to an endless cycle…Because of this principle, everything that
reaches a certain peak, must revert to its opposite.”22 On several occasions, Sim also
linked the logic of kwich’ŏn to the Buddhist principle of samsara, the perpetual cycle of
rebirth:
Last winter and this spring there were great floods and the people met with continued
bitter rain. Looking forward after this month, few people expect it to change, but
Heaven and earth have samsara [yunhoe], and among men there is [the cycle of]
propitious and unpropitious—fear and respect them.23

For Sim, the cycle of rebirth between Heaven and earth was matched by the cycle
of propitious and unpropitious fortune among humans. To some extent this placed natural
events outside of human control. Treating the vicissitudes of fortune as something of a
natural law left little room for individual farmers to influence the patterns of prices or
weather that followed the principles of Heaven. Nevertheless, Sim still acknowledged the
impact of personal action within such a frame. Sim related the cycle of propitious and
unpropitious fortune to morality, believing that the accumulation of virtue would
naturally be followed by the accumulation of material assets, and vice versa.24 In this
view, even the fortunes of people from illustrious backgrounds would eventually decline
if future descendants lost their appreciation for virtue and concentrated only on the desire
for material profits, while people from lowly backgrounds might achieve prosperity it
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their descendants behaved virtuously.25 Here, the accumulation of virtue and diligent
work were not just abstract moral principles but part of Sim’s basic understanding of the
cycles of fortune:
The two characters of propitious and unpropitious [mean that] after a rainy spell there
will surely be a drought. Last autumn and this spring there was a drought which
greatly damaged the wheat and barley. After the well-timed rain of the third month,
the people say that barley will have a great harvest, and recently there is a popular
saying that drought in the winter and spring acts as a fertilizer. The affairs of all men
are governed by Heaven. Profit will belong to those who make diligent efforts. Work
diligently, and then trust in the principles of Heaven. In times of drought, it will do to
think of long rains, and in times of long rains it will do to think of the later drought.
Working diligently and fertilizing the soil will do.26

Sim Wŏn’gwŏn thus combined the general principle of cyclical patterns of fate with a
certain faith in ethical and personal responsibilities. While the weather may have been
beyond his control, Sim believed that a combination of hard work and trust in Heaven
was nonetheless a route to success.
Sim used the logic of propitious and unpropitious fortune to explain a variety of
phenomena but for the most part he applied it to economic affairs—in particular the price
of goods: “All things share equally in the cycle of fortune. Things that were expensive
two years previously, have returned to low prices, and the things that were cheap two
years previously are now expensive.”27 Importantly in an economy dominated by
agriculture, Sim applied the cycle of good and bad fortune both temporally, from one
year to the next, and relatively, tracing the prices of different goods as alternate patterns
of scarcity affected their relative value. In a year with good rainfall and a strong rice
harvest, the price of rice might fall in relation to the price of salt, while in a famine year
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the relative price of salt might decrease as grain prices soared. Again, Sim factored these
changes into his theory of kwich’ŏn: “To talk of [what is] propitious and unpropitious at
this time, this year 100 sŏm of grain is not equal to 10 sŏm of salt, but two years ago how
could 100 sŏm of salt equal 10 sŏm of grain?”28
The connection between the relative price of goods could be both direct and
indirect. In the prior example, the year in which salt became cheaper than grain was a
famine year (1876) and an absolute shortage of rice caused its increase in relative value,
regardless of the scarcity or abundance of other goods. In addition to such independent
price movements, Sim also noted how the harvest in one crop could directly influence the
prices of other agricultural products. In particular, the price of cows and other livestock
bore a strong inverse correlation to the price of grain. On several occasions, Sim
commented that the price of livestock tended to fall in famine years as households
struggled to gather the spare grain and money to feed the animals, while their price
tended to rise during good years when a greater number of households had sufficient
grain and cash to support livestock.29
Sim’s appreciation for the cycle of propitious and unpropitious fortune involved
more than passive reflection on the world around him; he used it as a guide for his own
economic activity. Sim expected changes in future weather conditions and the future
price of goods based on the logic of recurring price and weather cycles:
After the barley grew fat, I reflected on how propitious and unpropitious fortune are
in every thought and every object. Now the price of 15 toe of barley is worth the price
of 1 toe of white rice. Last year, in the seventh or eighth month, this was worth 12
mal of salt. Recently, [the same] one yang is worth 7 or 8 mal of salt. Yet, after this
there will be a day when the price of salt rises greatly, and the price of white rice is
28
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exceedingly low. If items are cheap then store them, and if they are expensive then do
not seek them. (1877.5.23)

Things flourish and die, prosper and decline; abundance and value, and poverty and
lowliness, these are the principles of Heaven. In this world, we can look at future
events through the two characters of propitious and unpropitious. At this time, after a
long drought there will be a long rainy season and great floods. (1883.7.8)
Truly there are the two characters of propitious and unpropitious, and trusting in them
will do. Last year was a famine year. This year the grain price is the same as a lean
year. Looking at it from this point of view, I therefore expect that next year will be a
bountiful year. How could one know in detail the myriad affairs of the world or the
principle of what is expensive or cheap? Simply trust in propitious and unpropitious
fortune, and then eight or nine times out of ten you will be somewhere between profit
and loss. (1885.2.14)30

As shown in the excerpts above, Sim incorporated his expectation of future fluctuations
in propitious and unpropitious events into his plans for economic activity, preparing
himself for future rain or drought, or waiting to buy and sell goods until prices became
advantageous. In his reliance on such cyclical patterns Sim differentiated himself from
the farmers around him who believed in folk sayings that forecast the harvest through
natural events. From time to time, Sim also recounted popular sayings that predicted
good harvests based on the timing of the appearance of particular birds or the amount of
snowfall in the previous year, but he did not trust them entirely and even used his diary to
highlight the occasions when such sayings contradicted one another and actual events.31
Instead, Sim prided himself on his ability to see the long-term progression of cyclical
patterns, aided by his diary-keeping:
Everyone talks of fear of a dry spell and so forget how in recent days [when] they
only knew the suffering of a lengthy rainy season. I, and I alone, am not so—how can
that be? I have looked at the diary that I kept for fourteen years now, and in recent
years the rain and dew have been uneven. In olden times, there would be wind once
every five days and rain once every ten days, but now for four months there is a
continued drought then ten days of unbroken rain. The drought exceeds the long rain,
30
31
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and after the rainy spell there is drought. I looked at previous volumes [of the diary],
and therefore if there is drought then I worry about the rain, and if there is rain then I
worry about the drought. My worries are different than the worries of other people—
why is that the case? People talk of the sweetness and suffering before their eyes, but
I know of the propitious and unpropitious fortune of later days. If something is
propitious, then I think deeply that in later days it will be unpropitious, and if
something is unpropitious, then I can know that in later days it will return to
propitiousness. This is the reason why. All things under heaven have [the cycle of]
propitious and unpropitious.”32

Sim applied his expectations of such price and weather patterns to structure his decision
making, creating his own version of the maxim “buy low, sell high”: “The principle of all
things, is that they all have propitious and unpropitious fortune. Storing things when they
are unpropitious, and selling them when they are propitious, that is the way to make great
profits.”33
Sim’s theory of price and weather cycles was not infallible. Extraordinary weather
patterns contradicted Sim’s short-term expectations, as in the years between 1876 and
1878 when successive droughts and crop failures led to an extended period of famine.
When lean years exhausted Sim’s resources he had little choice but to sell his cows and
other household valuables along with everyone else, despite the fact that Sim’s own
theory told him to store, not sell, goods with temporarily depressed values.34 But, such
hiccups notwithstanding, the cyclical view of rise and fall, good and bad fortune
remained the basic logic of Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s economic worldview throughout his diary.
IV.

Economic Cycles in (Human) Action

Sim’s understanding of cyclical economic fortune influenced several of his farming
practices, including both his individual farming and his interactions with the local
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community. Above all, Sim valued diversity in his agriculture and cultivated a wide
range of crops across several different locations. In this, Sim’s style of farming
corresponded to patterns common across the early modern agrarian world, where the
cultivation of scattered plots functioned as a strategy to minimize the risk of crop
failure.35 For Sim Wŏn’gwŏn, the decision to farm in such a manner was a direct
consequence of his belief in the cycle of rise and fall. Sim acknowledged and even
expected fluctuation in weather and harvest patterns and farmed accordingly, choosing a
mix of crops and fields that might differently withstand a drought in the spring or
winter.36
Sim’s belief in the rise and fall of market prices only bolstered this position. As
the grain trade flourished in the vicinity of the newly opened ports, Sim cautioned against
those who placed too much faith in the international demand for rice as a way of seeking
profits:
This year, the rice price increased greatly, and the reason is that a lot was permitted to
be traded away. Recently, the people’s hearts only know of profits in the present and
they do not yet know the harm of later days. Why? Remember to eliminate the desire
for profit, and cultivate the intent to store up virtue. The heart that would desire
profits only sees the present profit or loss, and from this there is no fortune. The
intent to accumulate virtue must in all things plan for it in the long term, and profit
will come of itself as you manifest your virtue. Since long ago, everything has the
cycle of propitious and unpropitious. After something is extremely unpropitious, it
will become propitious. And if it becomes propitious, then it must return to extreme
unpropitiousness. The storage of grain is sufficient to lie between profit and loss;
simply knowing to get profits from trading grain away will not do.37
On other examples of similar behavior, see Donald N. McCloskey, “The Persistence of English Common
Fields,” in William N. Parker and Eric L. Jones, European Peasants and Their Markets (Princeton:
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Although Sim himself sold grain in local markets and benefitted from price rises along
with many other farmers, two factors prevented him from fully relying on the
international grain trade. On one hand, he was reluctant to put the profits of the grain
trade above his personal values. Although Sim was not averse to profit, he critiqued grain
traders’ pursuit of profit above all other considerations.38 On the other hand, Sim simply
did not trust that the price of individual crops would remain high. Although Sim noted the
potential to earn huge profits from the export of rice in the short term, he always returned
to his cyclical view of the rural economy, expecting that increases in the rice price would
not last. Even though he may have found additional profit in converting more of his land
to producing rice for the market, Sim continued to cultivate a wide range of crops
throughout his life, trusting that diversity would see him through fluctuations in both
prices and the weather.
The natural world was not the only source of economic cycles in Sim’s life,
however, and Sim’s interaction with institutional and social structures also placed regular
demands on his livelihood. Taxes, for example, posed a recurring burden that Sim had to
account for in his farming and finances. By the nineteenth century, ordinary Koreans
were subject to three main taxes: the land tax, levied against the area of land cultivated;
the military tax, paid in cloth and levied against the number of able-bodied men per
household; and a regularized system of grain loans, whereby farmers received loans from
state-managed granaries to be repaid with interest.39 In addition to the main taxes levied
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by the central government, local government offices collected myriad additional taxes
from farmers like Sim Wŏn’gwŏn in the form of miscellaneous taxes on the production of
particular goods, such as salt or marine products; the requisition of materials used in the
running of local government offices, such as charcoal; or additional payments to cover
budget shortfalls, a practice that seems to have been particularly prevalent in areas where
local government officials mismanaged or embezzled public funds.40
In a typical year, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn encountered a combination of each of the
above-mentioned forms of taxation. As a resident of Kyŏngsang province, in the south of
Korea, Sim paid both the military cloth tax and the land tax as well as several surtaxes
(kyŏlchŏn, kunsumi, p’oryangmi) introduced by the central government over the years.41
Because of the scattered nature of Sim’s farming activities, he paid national taxes in
several locations—at the main seat of Ulsan (ponbu), at the military command post, and
occasionally at Hwajin, located to the southeast of Ulsan. Although the exact time of
Sim’s tax payments fluctuated from year to year, he generally paid the land and military
taxes around the beginning or end of the (lunar) calendar year. On several occasions, Sim
also made advance tax payments (sŏnse) at this time, reinforcing the temporal pattern of
tax payments.42
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The third major tax—grain loans—introduced yet another seasonal pattern to
Sim’s household finances. Sim regularly received loans of both rice and barley, which he
repaid respectively in the winter and summer in line with the growing season of each
crop. Again, Sim received and repaid grain loans at several different locations, but most
frequently Sim received loans from the military command post which managed several
granaries around Ulsan.43 The size of the loans varied, but generally fell somewhere
between one to two sŏm of rice or barley. Although Sim generally calculated the loans in
terms of the volume of grain borrowed or repaid, on at least several occasions Sim repaid
the loan in cash, repaying three yang for one sŏm of barley in the summer of 1883, and
one yang in the summers of 1893 and 1894.44 In this way, Sim’s tax obligations
complemented the seasonality of agricultural production, with land tax and grain loan
payments coming due after the relevant harvest.
Not all of Sim’s financial obligations followed the cyclical pattern of harvest
crops, however, leading Sim to develop several strategies to balance his seasonal income
against irregular expenditure. In particular, local and miscellaneous taxes paid to the
military command post and other local government entities presented a challenge to
Sim’s budget. Some local taxes followed a broadly discernable pattern. For example, Sim
generally paid firewood (somok) levies to the military command post around the second
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and seventh lunar month. On the occasions that Sim recorded the precise amount, the
firewood levies appear to have been broadly comparable to the typical cost of grain loan
payments—somewhere between one to three yang—and paid in both cash and kind.45 In
addition to such relatively regular payments Sim also paid numerous additional payments
to the local government which he generally referred to as kongchŏn, or “public
payments.” As shown in Table 2.1, these additional public payments followed no clear
pattern either in terms of timing or amount. In some years, Sim made multiple payments
of amounts ranging from 1 to 2 yang, to as much as 50 or 100 yang in extreme cases. In
most cases, Sim learned of the need to pay public payments during a township or village
meeting which divided the total amount due in the district into smaller obligations for
each household. In 1881, for example, Sim heard that a total of nearly 30,000 yang was to
be divided among district residents, amounting to an obligation per household of 9.7
yang. Two days later Sim went to Hwajin where he paid the amount alongside an
additional 1.14 yang of public payments.46
The wide range of tax obligations—both regular and irregular—reinforced Sim’s
decision to farm a diverse range of crops. By farming barley in the winter, alongside
summer grains such as rice, Sim attempted to balance his sources of income throughout
the year. Where the system of grain loans expanded to follow both the barley and rice
harvests, Sim relied upon additional items, such as pine branches, as an extra source of
funds between harvests.47 As Sim found to his dismay in 1886, when a temporary ban
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Table 2.1: “Public payments” (kongchŏn) recorded in the diary of Sim Wŏn’gwŏn,
1873–1895
Month

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Year

1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886

X
X
7.7
X

[30]

1

2
50

1

X
1.2*
X

X

10.84

1.14

X
X

X
X

1887
X
1888
1889
1890
10
1891
1892
1893
1894
X
1895
Source: Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi.

2
100
10

6070

X

1.4

X
2

X*
3

2
X

1.13

X
48.9

Note: Payments are recorded in yang. “X” indicates payments of unspecified amounts. Entries marked

with an asterisk indicate intercalary months. Entries in brackets [] denote amounts which combine
“public money” payments along with other taxes due—in the third month of 1877 Sim paid 30 yang
for the land tax and an additional payment of public money. Sim did not record any payments between
1870 and 1872, although this likely reflects the fact that Sim’s father handled this aspect of the
household finances rather than an absence of additional payments.

prevented Sim from selling pine branches as usual, he struggled to cover his household
expenses without regular supplement to his farming income:
In the year of 1886 altogether there were 113 days of rain and snow, but in the
summer there was a drought and the reason for this was because [the rain] was
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uneven. The year was a good harvest, but some farmers lost their livelihood. I farmed
37 tu, but the amount that we need to eat has already gone. We have a shortage of
rice, and already there is around 60-70 yang in public payments due, and a great
many private debts. My heart is troubled; I grieve and suffer amidst this. Moreover, I
am without even one unit of pine branches. It is hard to get 1 pun from the land. As
for next spring’s grain and “public money”—how can I gather these? I do not know.48

Despite these efforts, cultivating multiple crops could not forestall all of Sim’s
financial difficulties. As in the example above, extraordinary events might limit the
production of certain goods from year to year, be it through temporary bans on the cutting
of pine trees (kŭmsong) or through damage from adverse weather conditions or insects.
Although the government could, in theory, suspend taxes in the midst of a famine, in
practice Sim rarely benefitted from such provisions. During the aftermath of the 1876
famine, Sim wrote of the hardships he faced in feeding his family let alone finding any
additional funds for tax payments:
Following the drought from last spring and summer, the grain price has gradually
increased. In the spring one toe of rice was 2.2 or 2.3 chŏn, in the summer one toe
was 3-4 chŏn and in the autumn it was 4.3 or 4.4 chŏn. In the winter too, the price
gradually increased, sometimes falling by 0.1-0.2 chŏn, and sometimes rising by 0.80.9 chŏn. It was easy for the price to rise, but hard for it to fall…My household has
around ten people, and every day we consume around one toe of rice and so my heart
is troubled. I have less than half of sufficient seed rice, and in the third month I need
to pay around 30 yang of land tax and additional payments [kongchŏn]. Seed rice
[chongjo], public payments [kongchŏn] and immediate provisions [siryang] are my
three hardships. At present [I need] around 80 yang—where will this come from? My
heart is worried and that is all. What to do?49

Ten years later, Sim found himself in a similar bind. With 100 days until the summer,
Sim needed to find around 100 toe of rice to feed his family, in addition to seed rice, tax
payments (kyŏlyŏk) and additional public payments comprising a total 200 yang in Sim’s
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estimate.50
In such situations, Sim had little choice but to borrow money in order to make up
for temporary shortages in his income. Like many other late-Chosŏn households, debt
was a matter of course for Sim Wŏn’gwŏn and he regularly borrowed and lent among a
range of acquaintances, including his peers, merchants, and minor local officials.51 Sim’s
borrowing generally consisted of small but frequent loans, most often small sums
(between one to twenty yang at a time) although he occasionally borrowed larger
amounts (between twenty and eighty yang, and on rare occasion as much as five hundred
yang).52 While the full terms of each loan mentioned in the diary are hard to trace, such
loans seem to have rarely persisted for longer than one year and were instead intended to
cover short-term fluctuations in Sim’s income. In the most extreme example, Sim
borrowed five yang to buy cotton at the market, repaying the loan only two days later.53
More often, Sim’s loans lasted for a number of months, with interest charged monthly at
rates generally ranging between two to five percent.54 Although the annualized rate of
interest could therefore rise to as much as sixty percent, the short term of the loans
reduced Sim’s borrowing costs, as did regular fluctuations in the price of rice which, as
the major crop which retained some functions as a commodity currency alongside cash,
served as the main indicator of inflation in the rural economy. Thus, if rice prices
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increased over the term of loan, the real rate of interest for borrowers decreased, and vice
versa.55
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s understanding of price and weather cycles was thus intimately
connected to a wider range of his farming decisions and practices. Some, such as the
choice of crops to cultivate, were within Sim’s control, while others, such as the need to
prepare funds for tax payments, were indirectly influenced by seasonal price and harvest
patterns. Still, Sim’s understanding of cyclical economic patterns was a key factor in
shaping his responses to events. Where demands for taxation matched, or did not match,
Sim’s seasonal income, he compensated through the practice of borrowing and loaning
money, the favorability of which in turn reflected the cyclical price trends once again.
V.

Changing Fortunes in the Rural Economy

Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s economic worldview was rooted in a combination of his everyday
experiences and the intellectual heritage of the long Chosŏn dynasty, but the world in
which he lived was not static, and the late nineteenth century brought great changes to
both the government and the rural economy. As discussed in Chapter One, attempts to
strengthen government finance prompted a series of reforms to both taxation and the
structure of the government itself. The manner in which these reforms impacted Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn’s daily life, however, cannot be assumed. As a farmer far-removed from the
politics of the central government, Sim interpreted such events not through the lens of
international politics but through the concrete effects that central government decisions
brought to his local community.

On calculating the nominal and real rate of interest in rural lending, see Kim Chaeho, “Nongch’on sahoe
ŭi sinyong kwa kye,” 312-321; Kim Chaeho and Pak Kijun, “Nongch’on ijayul ŭi changgi pyŏndong, 17421953: Yŏngam chibang kye ijayul ŭl chungsim ŭro,” in Yi Yŏnghun, ed., Suryang kyŏngjesa, 110-145.
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The most direct impact of the Kabo reforms upon Sim’s daily life concerned
taxes. After 1894, Sim no longer recorded the payment of grain loans or additional levies
of firewood to the military command post. Nonetheless, these changes were relatively
minor in relation to the intent of Kabo-era tax reforms. Although new laws decreed that
taxes be paid in cash, Sim already paid a significant portion of his taxes in cash. Where
tax payments were due at the same time of year, Sim’s habits and seasonal calculations
therefore varied little. This continued to be so, even for much of the first decade of
colonial rule as the Government-General of Korea explicitly maintained the existing
system for the calculation and collection of land tax payments.56 Perhaps for this reason,
beyond the disappearance of entries referencing grain loans and payments to the military
command post, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s diary contains little clue of the changes to the tax
system. By the 1920s, Sim spoke of the land tax (chise) rather than the kyŏl tax (the
traditional unit of land measurement used in tax assessments), but he continued to pay the
tax at seasonal intervals and, beyond noting the payment of the tax, had little to say about
any changes.
Rather than taxes or politics, the opening of Korean ports to international trade
brought the most significant impact to Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s livelihood. Following the
signing of the Kanghwa treaty in 1876, Korea gradually opened a number of ports to
international trade. Beginning with the port of Pusan, which opened in 1876, ports in
Wŏnsan (1880); Chemulp’o (Inch’ŏn, 1883); Mokp’o and Chinnamp’o (1897); Kunsan,
Masan, and Sŏngjin (1899); Yongamp’o (1904); Ch’ŏngjin (1908); and Sinŭiju (1910)
opened one after the other, drawing an ever-wider swathe of Korea into contact with new
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Article 4, “Chizeirei,” Chōsen sōtokufu kanpō, gōgai, March 16, 1914.
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markets. Foreign trade brought new products to Korea, chief among them industriallyproduced textiles and other manufactured goods. In return, Korea exported mainly
primary products such as rice, beans, and gold dust. Although Western-made goods
accounted for a majority of Korea’s early imports, for the most part international trade
flowed through Chinese and Japanese merchants who used their connections to regional
financial and commercial networks to gain an advantage in the re-export trade over
European and American merchants.57 Despite the signing of additional treaties which
introduced competition from other trading nations, Japanese dominance in Korea’s
international trade only grew over time, helped along by the removal of travel restrictions
on Japanese in Korea in 1883 and victory in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895.58
Located on the south-eastern tip of Korea, Pusan, the closest port to Ulsan, was
particularly significant in the trade between Korea and Japan, serving not only as a point
of international trade but also as a hub for domestic trade along Korea’s eastern coast (see
Figure 2.5).59 Thanks to its position in one of Korea’s main agricultural regions, outward
trade through Pusan chiefly comprised agricultural products, of which rice, soybeans, and
cow hides were major export items. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the changes to Pusan’s
international trade between 1876 and 1910. As seen in Figure 2.6, the total value of trade
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Between 1876 and 1882, Western goods accounted for 88 percent of Japanese exports to Korea. This
figure would decrease later, as Japan’s own industrial manufacturing took off. Duus, The Abacus and the
Sword, 255; Takeshi Hamashita, “Overseas Chinese Networks and Korea,” in Sin’ya Sugiyama and Linda
Grove, eds., Commercial Networks in Modern Asia (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001), 55-70; Larsen,
Tradition, Treaties, and Trade.
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Prior to 1883, Japanese nationals were restricted to designated treaty settlements within the open ports, in
effect making them dependent on Korean brokers. Even after 1883, Japanese merchants often still worked
with Korean counterparts when buying rice due to language difficulties and the risk of fraud against
Japanese buyers. Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 274-77.
59
Yi Hŏnch’ang, “Han’guk kaehangjang ŭi sangp’um yut’ong kwa sijangkwŏn: Han’guk kaehanggi esŏ ŭi
sijang kujo ŭi pyŏndong ŭl ch’orae han ilch’ajŏk yoin,” Kyŏngje sahak 9 (1985): 119-294.
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Figure 2.5: Major trade routes between Korean open ports and Japan

Ulsan

Image adapted from Ch’oe Ŭnjin, “Kunsan mi ŭi taeil such’ul kujo,” 369.

rose steadily after 1876. Among the Korean ports, Pusan was second only to Inch’ŏn
which served the capital region) in terms of the total value of goods traded (both exports
and imports).
Figure 2.7 shows the changing position of rice exports through the same period.
After slowly increasing in the 1880s, total rice exports jumped in the early 1890s and
again from 1896, averaging a value of roughly 1,200,000 yen in the period 1890-1895
and 3,000,000 yen in the period 1896-1900. Although data for the early 1900s is missing,
between 1905 and 1909 the value of rice exports increased again to average 4,400,000
yen per year. As an agricultural crop, the amount of rice exported was subject to strong
variation from year to year depending on the quality of the harvest, and the share of rice
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Figure 2.6: Value of international trade (exports and imports) by port, 1876–1910
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as a proportion of total exports ranged from as little as 15 percent in 1893 to as much as
79 percent in 1897. The proportion of rice exported through Pusan also varied according
to the relative performance of agriculture in the southeast as compared to other regions,
albeit to a lesser extent; between 1890 and 1900, when the rice trade took off, Pusan
handled roughly 40 percent of all rice exports on average, decreasing to roughly 30
percent of all rice exports in the 1900s as more ports opened to the rice trade.60
As a resident of Ulsan, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn did not participate directly in Pusan’s
international rice trade. Even so, Sim quickly felt the effect of the new trade in Ulsan’s
local markets. Local brokers served as intermediaries, buying rice in periodic markets and
selling it to Japanese traders in the treaty ports, creating one of the main mechanisms that
linked local farmers to the international grain trade and expanding the reach of the open
port economy.61 As early as 1879, Ulsan was sufficiently connected within a network of
brokered trade that Sim was aware of the grain trade and even retrospectively attributed
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Kunsan in particular grew rapidly as a center for rice exports. After opening in 1899, between 1905 and
1909 average annual rice exports through Kunsan accounted for roughly one-quarter of total rice exports. It
should be noted that, due to a lack of reliable information for the period, these figures have not been
adjusted for inflation. Nonetheless, the value of exports is recorded in Japanese yen which, despite
suffering inflation during the early Meiji period, was relatively stable by the 1890s and much more so than
Korean currency. Based on the price per unit of rice, with 1895 as a base year, the average price index for
Pusan rice exports between 1895 and 1903 was 126. Separate data based on the national price per unit of
rice exported gives an average price index of 111 between 1902 and 1907 (base year is 1902). Although
therefore subject to some inflationary influence, Figures 2.4 and 2.5 may still be considered reliable
illustrations of the general trend in rice exports. Data on rice prices in Pusan taken from Tsūshō isan, as
cited in Ha Wŏnho, “Kaehanghu kokka pyŏndong yŏn’gu (1895-1904),” Kuksagwan nonch’ong 53 (1994):
1-53. Data on the national price of rice exports is calculated from Tōkanfu, Tōkanfu tōkei nenpō (Keijō:
multiple years). On Japanese measures to control early Meiji inflation, see also Motokazu Shindō, “The
Inflation in the Early Meiji Era: History of Inflation in Japan,” Kyoto Economic History Review 24, no. 2
(1954): 39-59.
61
P’yo Yongsu, “Kaehanggi Pusan-hang ŭl chungsim ŭro han kaekchu sangin ŭi sangŏp hwaldong,”
Kyŏngju sahak 15 (1996): 231-263; O Miil, “Kaehang(jang) kwa iju sangin: kaehangjang tosi rok’ŏllit’i ŭi
hyŏngsŏng kwa kiwŏn,” Han’guk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn’gu 47 (2008): 40-79; Ch’oe Ŭnjin, “Kunsan mi ŭi
taeil such’ul kujo: kaehang (1899 nyŏn)–1910 nyŏndae rŭl chungsim ŭro,” Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil 81 (2011):
343-83.
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imports of Japanese grain as a response to a severe famine in 1876.62 As trade grew over
the years, Sim saw with his own eyes the passage of rice and other agricultural products
out of Korea and toward Japan where prices were higher. By 1896 Sim could write of
seeing “hundreds of loads of rice” each day, travelling down the eastern road toward the
grain trading centers.63
Not all of the effects of the new grain trade were equally obvious as the physical
transportation of rice. Beyond the immediate environs of Ulsan, the organization of
markets across Korea responded to new trading patterns in ways that escaped Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn’s local perspective. This did not begin with the opening of Korean ports.
Research into late Chosŏn rice prices has shown that prices in regional markets began to
diverge through the nineteenth century as declining agricultural productivity disrupted
state-run grain redistribution mechanisms and, in turn, the number of local markets and
their degree of inter-regional integration. By the 1880s and 1890s, when trade in the
treaty ports began to take off, prices in the southeast further diverged from prices in the
rest of Korea as the increased trade with Japan prompted price convergence along the
new trade routes, displacing Seoul as the traditional center of the domestic rice market.
Within the new market network, higher prices and demand for rice from Japan fuelled
price rises in Korea for both rice and other goods.64

Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi, 1879.7.29. Although Sim does not mention the origin of the rice, this perhaps refers
to an 1877 diary entry in which Sim noted the arrival of 300 sŏm of “traded grain” (mumi) at the nearby
market-village of Naehwang. Ibid, 1877.4.4. The connection to Japanese imports is not entirely clear-cut
however. In 1874, well before the opening of Pusan, Sim heard tell of another 300 sŏm delivery of “traded
rice” to Naehwang, suggesting that imports of Japanese rice would not have been the only source of
additional rice in a famine. In the midst of the famine, Sim also wrote of his efforts to get emergency
famine relief from the local granary. Ibid, 1874.8.7; 1877.1.28.
63
Ibid, 1896.11.29.
64
According to one set of calculations, not all of the increases in the rice price rice can be attributed to
international trade as prices in the southeast started to climb from the 1850s onwards before the opening of
62
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To some extent, Sim was aware of the impact of trade on rice prices. On several
occasions he linked the busy grain trade in the open ports with high prices in local
markets for both land and grain. Writing in early 1885, Sim commented: “Nowadays the
price of grain is gradually increasing. A lot of rice is traded out of each port, therefore
grain is as valuable as gold.” Just one month earlier, Sim had used the high grain prices to
his advantage when he sold 300 toe of rice to repay a 100 yang debt.65 Still, even though
Sim recognized the connection between trade and rising prices, there were no guarantees
that conditions would stay the same from one year to the next. As Korean markets
became increasingly integrated with trade networks leading to the treaty ports, grain
prices within Korea became subject to trends in the global economy. And, as shown in
Figure 2.8, the global influence on local grain prices could be extreme indeed. After
fluctuating around a mean price of roughly 0.5 yang per toe of white rice during the
period 1870-1894, and a mean price of roughly 1.2 yang during the period 1895-1910,
the price of rice rose sharply during the First World War, corresponding to an economic
boom in Japan. After a sharp decline, the price rose once again in the early 1920s, only to
follow global price trends of a sustained decline from a peak of around 5.5 yang per toe
in the mid-1920s, falling below 2 yang once more late in 1930.
The global influence on long-run price trends was one consequence of Ulsan’s
incorporation into international market networks, but one further outcome had an even

ports. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that international trade contributed to the continuation of this trend
from 1876 onwards. Pak Kiju and Yi Uyŏn, “Nongch’on ŭi chaehwa kagyŏk kwa mulka ŭi ch’ui: 18341937,” in An and Yi, eds., Matjil ŭi nongmindŭl, 150-177; Yi Yŏnghun and Pak It’aek, “Nongch’on migok
sijang kwa chŏn’gukchŏk sijang t’onghap, 1713-1937,” in Yi Yŏnghun, ed., Suryang kyŏngjesa, 226-300;
Pak It’aek and Yi Yŏnghun, “18-19 segi migok sijang ŭi t’onghap kwa punyŏl: Yŏngam chibang ŭi miga
pyŏndong e taehan saengsan ch’unggyŏk ŭi yŏnghyang punsŏk,” in Yi Yŏnghun, ed., Suryang kyŏngjesa,
302-32.
65
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi, 1884.11.20; 1884.12.30.
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Figure 2.8: Nominal rice price in Ulsan markets, per toe of white rice, 1870–1933
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greater influence on Sim’s understanding of the rural economy. Although extreme rises
and falls in rice prices undoubtedly impacted Sim’s livelihood, as a farmer who both
bought and sold grain in local markets Sim was in a relatively favorable position to
weather long-run increases or decreases in the price of rice. Unlike landless laborers, Sim
had relatively stable access to land and could thus benefit from rising prices. Even when
prices fell, Sim’s cultivation of alternate crops provided a buffer against losses while
Sim’s efforts to match his purchases and sales to favorable price trends also augmented
his ability to withstand turbulence in the price of rice. Sim’s practice of taking mostly
short-term, rather than long-term, loans also insulated him to some degree from the
problem of indebtedness that made many other farmers vulnerable to collapse in rice
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prices during the 1920s.66 Important though they were, long-run price trends measured
over a number of years were not the most significant economic indicator in Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn’s life.
Instead, Sim was most concerned about seasonal price changes. In common with
many farmers, the hardest part of Sim’s agricultural year came in the springtime when
reserves from the previous year’s harvest were running low. At this time farmers often
borrowed money and grain to cover seasonal shortages, repaying their debts in the
autumn. Thus, seasonal price fluctuations were one of the most important criteria
affecting any farmer who engaged in seasonal loans, with the degree of variation between
spring and autumn prices directly impacting the financial health of both lenders (who
benefitted from large variation) and borrowers (who benefited from the reverse).
Over time, increased trade in rice and other agricultural products began to affect
seasonal fluctuations in the rice price. In the absence of large volumes of trade, the price
of rice was largely determined by local supply and demand, with prices rising in the
spring and summer as farmers’ stores of grain became exhausted and falling in the
autumn after the harvest came in.67 Increased trade reduced such fluctuations over time,
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On the role of debt in land transfers during the Great Depression, see Edwin H. Gragert, Landownership
Under Colonial Rule: Korea’s Japanese Experience, 1900-1935 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1994).
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For this reason, the Chosŏn government, following Confucian precedent, had instituted a state-run
granary system that in theory could stabilize prices by lending grain. The system declined somewhat by late
Chosŏn, as a combination of unscrupulous local officials looking to line their pockets and high rates of
default on grain loans leading to the erosion of grain reserves led many granaries to engage in exploitative
practices. Complaints ranged from the forced receipt of grain-loans, regardless of farmers’ need; high
interest rates; and the practice of loaning out chaff but demanding that farmers repay the loan with high
quality rice. See, Sun Joo Kim, “Taxes, the Local Elite, and the Rural Populace.” On the early Chosŏn
granary system and its Chinese counterpart, see also Yi Chŏngsu, “Chosŏn chŏn’gi sangp’yŏngch’ang ŭi
chŏn’gae wa kinŭng: mulka pyŏndong kwa kwallyŏn hayŏ,” Yŏksa wa kyŏnggye 27 (1994): 65-120; PierreEtienne Will and R. Bin Wong, Nourish the People: the State Civilian Granary System in China, 16501850 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1991).
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although the process was not always a smooth one as markets across Korea integrated
unevenly due to differing access to transportation and the new grain trade. Local officials,
especially in the northern region which was not a major rice-producing area, complained
that exports exacerbated the effect of famine years, instituting temporary grain export
bans (panggongnyŏng) to try and prevent extreme shortages in popular export products
such as rice and beans. Meanwhile, the central government experimented with rice
imports as an alternative measure to reduce fluctuations in the supply and price of rice
during famine years.68
The impact of the grain export bans and rice imports was mixed. As Ha Wŏnho
has argued, the fact that most rice imports went through Inch’ŏn limited the effect of
price stabilization in regions outside of the capital. Meanwhile, restrictions on grain
exports were a relatively crude measure that prevented merchants and farmers from freely
trading grain but did not necessarily solve price and scarcity problems in local markets. 69
As one of the centers of the new grain trade, however, Pusan and its environs were wellplaced to avoid the logistical problems that characterized the expansion of the rice trade
elsewhere. Indeed, Pusan only instituted two grain embargoes, in 1887 and in 1893.
Meanwhile, Pusan’s close proximity to Japan and the large community of merchants
facilitated trade in both directions. In 1888 and 1894, rice was one of the largest import
items to Pusan each year, suggesting that the market was somewhat responsive to rice

Ha Wŏnho, “Kaehanggi panggongnyŏng silsi ŭi wŏnin e kwanhan yŏn’gu (sang-ha),” Han’guksa yŏn’gu
49-51 (1985): 79-97, 145-187; Ha Wŏnho, “Kaehanghu kokka pyŏndong yŏn’gu (1895-1904).”
69
Indeed, new research by Kim Hŭiyŏn argues that at least one well-known example of the grain embargo
can be understood as an attempt by local officials and grain traders to corner the local rice trade for
themselves at below-market prices. See, Kim Heeyeon, “Soybean Controversy of 1889: Panggongnyŏng.”
27th Association for Korean Studies in Europe Conference, Bochum, Germany, July 10-13, 2015; Ha
Wŏnho, “Kaehanghu kokka pyŏndong yŏn’gu (1895-1904).”
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shortages in at least the southeast of Korea.70
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s diary supports the interpretation that increased trade helped to
smooth price fluctuations within the Ulsan region. Figure 2.9 shows the change in the
seasonal fluctuation of rice prices recorded in Sim’s diary. Although a lack of reliable
data makes it impossible to adjust the prices for inflation, Figure 2.9 displays the
coefficient of variation (CV) of rice prices, calculated as the standard deviation of rice
price variation for each year adjusted against the annual mean price. Thus, 1877 is
calculated as having the highest degree of seasonal price variation (0.52 CV) after being
adjusted against the mean price (0.6 yang per toe of white rice), despite having one of the
lowest ranges between the highest (1.3 yang) and lowest (0.3 yang) absolute prices. In
contrast, the absolute range between the highest and lowest rice prices was much greater
in 1920 (4.1 yang), but once adjusted against the average price that year (4.9 yang), the
coefficient of variation is shown to be comparatively lower than in 1877, at 0.30. As
Figure 2.9 shows, the seasonal fluctuation of rice prices decreased through the 1880s to
the 1910s as the international rice trade expanded, before rising again slightly in the
1920s as prices became more volatile.71
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn recognized these changes to grain prices, although where such
patterns fell outside of his established view of seasonal price cycles he found himself
uneasy at the prospect of being unable to predict future changes. Even as Sim celebrated
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In 1888, 32,565 yen worth of rice was imported, the third largest import by value (5.1 percent), while in
1894 111,777 yen of rice was imported, the second largest import by value (11.1 percent). Rice also
appeared among the top three import items by value in 1884, 1886, and 1889. Data from Ha Wŏnho,
“Kaehanghu Pusan ŭi taeoe muyŏk kwa yut’ong,” 146.
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This result is statistically significant in both quadratic and linear forms. My thanks to U Taehyŏng for his
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124

Figure 2.9: Seasonal fluctuation in Ulsan rice prices, 1870–1933 (coefficient of
variation)
Coefficient of Variation, Ulsan rice prices
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high grain prices at the end of 1884, he expressed a certain apprehension at the disruption
to the established relationship that he expected between harvest, weather, and price:
How can I know the logic of things? I do not yet know how much the grain price next
spring will be. Everyone says that [this is] a bountiful year, [but] the grain price is
like during a famine. Poor households and craftsmen in particular are at the utmost
edge of fear. This autumn, everyone said that one toe of rice would be
3 chŏn. At the end of autumn and beginning of winter, they said that it would not
exceed 4 chŏn. Nowadays it almost reached 5 chŏn.72

As the years passed, and prices diverged still further from Sim’s theory of price cycles,
he commented again on the problem, diagnosing trade as the underlying factor behind the
new trends: “Today I thought to myself that each country communicates peacefully and
truly there are no propitious or unpropitious events. Traded grain goes out and comes in,
and it is hard to distinguish a famine from a good harvest.”73 Nonetheless, perceiving the
72
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Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi, 1884.12.30.
Ibid, 1899.6.10.
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connection to trade, Sim remained uneasy about his ability to foretell prices based on
patterns of production and trade that lay beyond his experience. As he continued in the
same diary entry, “although we say that we know what is within the valley, what about
the sea routes of 100 ri?”74 Such sentiments recurred throughout the remainder of Sim’s
diary as he commented on the disjuncture between actual prices and the “summer price”
or the “autumn price” of grain, repeatedly questioning, as if a refrain, “how can one know
if grain prices will rise or fall?”75
Decreasing seasonal price fluctuations might commonly be assumed to benefit
consumers and producers alike. Indeed, minimizing extreme variation in prices has been
a mainstay of agricultural policy worldwide, from the Confucian “ever-normal granary”
(sangp’yŏngch’ang) to the buffer stock schemes introduced in the aftermath of the Great
Depression and that continue to underpin the European Union’s Common Agricultural
Policy.76 But, while it may be possible to make an objective case for the benefits of stable
agricultural prices throughout the year, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s diary shows that stable prices
may not automatically be recognized as beneficial by farmers. Sim expected seasonal
variation in prices, the weather, and the harvest among different crops, and he prepared to
farm accordingly. As Sim wrote in 1879, “every year in the summer months cash
becomes extremely valuable. In the spring I consider affairs and the money I will use in
the summer, and prepare 30 to 40 yang.” That year, Sim took advantage of the high
prices and cut down 40 loads of pine trees to sell at the prevailing price of 1.4 yang per
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load to prepare for the summer months.77 A few years later, Sim was not so fortunate.
After a poor harvest and some bad investments, in 1881 Sim borrowed 18 sŏm of rice in
the spring but struggled to repay the principle and interest, eventually having to plead
with his debtor for relief from a portion of the debt.78 In both cases, Sim made
arrangements on the assumption that prices would follow a certain seasonal pattern. As
new patterns in the rice trade led prices to contradict Sim’s expectations, they became
increasingly unpredictable and jarring to his established practices.
This is not to say that Sim could not have benefitted from greater seasonal
stability in prices. Sim’s diary entries suggest that he was unsettled less by changing price
and trade patterns per se than he was by the fact that Ulsan’s absorption into wider
trading networks introduced additional factors that, while unknown to Sim, nonetheless
influenced the price of grain. This explains Sim’s comment on the problems posed by
distant sea routes and his repeated questioning of how to know the price of grain. Had
Sim regularly read the newspapers of the day, or found a reliable source of information
on global grain markets elsewhere, it is possible that he may have incorporated additional
knowledge into his existing economic worldview and found a new way to predict prices.
As it was, Sim could only lament that the parameters by which he once judged the rural
economy were no longer sufficient to assess the world around him.
Ironically, Sim’s very awareness of the changes to the rice trade led him to
maintain the same farming habits he cultivated over the course of his life. Although Sim
recognized the changing patterns of rice prices, his own logic of interrelated cycles of
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propitious and unpropitious fortune directed him to seek variation in the face of
uncertainty in the hope that favorable conditions for one product might offset potential
problems in another. Sim therefore resisted the temptation to shift more of his land to rice
cultivation to take advantage of higher prices. If anything, Sim actually increased the
diversity of his farming over the years. In the early 1880s, Sim tried his hand at salt
farming but struggled to make a profit. Throughout his diary Sim relied upon pine
branches as a source of additional income, but from the 1890s Sim began weaving straw
shoes and rush mats to sell in local markets. During the winter of 1896, for example, Sim
sold between 40 to 50 pairs of straw shoes to earn around 5 yang, enough to make an
overcoat (turumagi).79 From the 1890s, Sim also began to regularly cultivate
watermelons and tobacco in the summer months, and during the 1900s and 1910s Sim
purchased a number of fruit trees (pear, persimmon, and jujube). In these activities, Sim’s
pursuit of diverse agriculture remained consistent throughout his life. Although from the
outside Sim’s farming decisions may have appeared the product of unthinking,
conservative habit, they were in fact a calculated decision made in relation to the ongoing
patterns of change in local markets.
VI.

Conclusion: Reconsidering Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s Place in History

Sim Wŏn’gwŏn lived within a period of immense change. But, as Sim’s response to the
impact of increased international trade demonstrates, Sim judged changes to the rural
economy not just by the content of changes (the export or import of rice) but against the
standards of his everyday life (his expectations of seasonal price variations). Though it is
tempting to look for a dramatic response to follow a dramatic change, such as the opening

79

Ibid, 1897.3.9.
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of Korean ports or annexation, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s diary offers an alternative example
which affords insight into the dynamics that shaped a range of responses to the changes
in rural society. Throughout his life, Sim’s daily schedule largely remained the same. Sim
paid constant attention to the weather, checking for signs of drought, rain, or wind that
might damage his crops. Year in and year out, he tilled, planted, transplanted, weeded,
and harvested the crops in his fields. En route to his various farming locations, Sim
attended markets, meetings, and visited friends and family. Rather than radically
embracing the new or rejecting it outright, Sim continued to live and farm as he knew
best, absorbing and interpreting changes within the framework of his previous
experience.
Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s diary is a rich primary source that makes it possible to draw a
detailed portrait of the everyday life of a farmer in the Ulsan region. It also serves as a
challenge to existing accounts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in
Korean history. Seen from the perspective of an ordinary farmer, certain long-held
assumptions about the impact of the opening of Korean ports or the processes of
annexation require additional qualification. For Sim Wŏn’gwŏn, the simple expansion of
the rice trade between Japan and Korea was less problematic than was the subsequent
effect that such trade had on seasonal price trends and their relation to weather and
harvest patterns. Similarly, the political events taking place in the capital only acquired
significance for Sim within the changes taking place in Ulsan. Even though rice prices
rose and fell, and new organizations appeared in Ulsan’s town center, for the most part
this did not prevent Sim from maintaining his existing habits; Sim farmed the same
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fields, met the same set of acquaintances in the same set of organizations, and judged it
all by the same worldview that he developed throughout the course of his life.
How representative is the experience of one man? To be sure, it would be
unreasonable to assume that everyone shared Sim’s theory of price cycles or felt the
effects of the new rice trade in the same way. Indeed, it was a point of pride for Sim that
his diary enabled him an alternative perspective to that offered by the folk sayings upon
which other farmers apparently relied. But one can feasibly assume that the pressures
facing Sim were similar to those facing other farmers. Where Sim suffered from the
weakening of seasonal price cycles or from a lack of information about the new factors
that came to influence the rural economy, then so too did many other farmers beside him.
The question of who did, or did not, gain access to the new information on market prices
through newspapers and trade associations was surely as meaningful to farmers across
Korea and not just Sim Wŏn’gwŏn alone.
But, even beyond the aspects of Sim’s life that can be generalized, a further
consideration lies in the areas of Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s experience of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century that do not match perfectly with typical accounts of the same
period. The private, personal experience recorded in any diary could never replicate
exactly accounts based on official sources and political documents. In its very divergence
from official narratives, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s diary highlights the convoluted process by
which government policies translated into the events experienced by farmers. If Sim did
not mention the central government politics or the colonial government, it was not
because their decisions had no impact on his livelihood. Rather, the decisions of the
central government to open ports or introduce new financial organizations were mediated
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through a series of offices, organizations, and individual actions, only the culmination of
which was visible to Sim.
Paradoxically, the scarcity of reference within Sim’s diary to Korea’s annexation
and the Japanese empire demonstrates the necessity to analyze in detail the colonial
government, its policies, and the methods it used to implement them. As Sim’s example
shows, the context of government policy and the manner of its implementation mattered
greatly in how individual farmers interpreted its impact upon their lives. If Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn’s livelihood and worldview, as represented within his diary, were not
substantially affected by encroaching Japanese imperialism, then to understand how this
was the case—as well as the question of who was affected, when, where, and in what
manner—one must first re-examine the colonial government itself.
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CHAPTER 3:
GOVERNMENT BY ASSOCIATION: SEMI-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COLONIAL
AGRICULTURAL POLICY

In the eyes of colonial administrators, Korea was an agricultural nation. Numerous
colonial reports introduced agriculture as Korea’s most important industry, asserting its
position as the foundation of the nation (Ja. kokuhon) since time immemorial.1 As much
as these claims were statements of fact—agriculture was indeed the major industry in
Korea, with upwards of two-thirds of the population engaged in agriculture throughout
the colonial period2—they were also statements of intent. For many colonial officials,
Korea’s value to the Japanese empire lay precisely in its status as an agricultural nation,
and bureaucrats developed a series of policies to capitalize on Korean agriculture,
ranging from the encouragement of settler farmers to programs aiming to increase the
export of agricultural goods to Japan.3 Despite frequent reference to Korea’s long
agricultural history, colonial agricultural policies envisioned great changes for the rural
economy.
This chapter focuses on the question of how the colonial government attempted to
put its ambitions into practice, examining both colonial agricultural policies and the

Chōsen sōtokufu, Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō (Keijō: multiple years); Chōsen sōtokufu nōrinkyoku,
Chōsen no nōgyō (Keijō: 1921), 1.
2
Sang Chul Suh, Growth and Structural Changes, 52.
3
On various Japanese attempts to profit from Korea as a colony, see Nōshōmushō nōmukyoku, Chōsen
nōgyō gaisetsu (Tokyo: 1910); Karl Moskowitz, “The Creation of the Oriental Development Company:
Japanese Illusions Meet Korean Reality,” Occasional Papers on Korea 2 (1974): 73-121; Peter Duus,
“Economic Dimensions of Meiji Imperialism: The Case of Korea, 1895-1910” in Ramon H. Myers and
Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 12871; Yi Sangsun, “20C hajime Nihon shokuminchi ni okeru keizai seisaku: Chōsen sanmai zōshoku keikaku
wo chūsin ni,” Nihon bunka gakuhō 6 (1999): 553-78; Chŏng Yŏnt'ae, Singmin kwŏllyŏk kwa Han'guk
nongŏp.
1
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various organizations established to implement them. In particular, this chapter traces the
growth of a series of semi-governmental organizations (generally termed associations,
Ko. chohap; Ja. kumiai) and their functions during colonial campaigns for cotton and rice
production. Initially, semi-governmental organizations played a crucial role in the
construction of distribution networks for seeds, capital, and technical expertise in support
of colonial goals. At the same time, the government used the associations to correct
perceived problems in the rural economy, redirecting sales routes and, from the 1930s
onwards, attempting to control price and production levels in the face of the global
agricultural crisis, the great depression, and the demands of wartime mobilization.
Although the colonial government’s policy imperatives changed over time, this chapter
demonstrates how the semi-governmental organizations provided a consistent, yet
malleable, network through which the government attempted to intervene in the rural
economy.
Yet, if the associations were a major tool of colonial agricultural policy, an
examination of their activities reveals the limits of the colonial government’s reach as
much as it does its ambition. The colonial government’s desire to boost production,
control prices, and influence farmers’ behavior could only succeed through the practical
work of the associations within local areas. As this chapter examines the work of the
associations, it also therefore reveals the factors that shaped the colonial influence on
agricultural production. The organization of the associations, how they accepted or
rejected members, and the activities that they engaged in directly affected the impact of
colonial policies. In detailing the organizational infrastructure that underpinned colonial
policy, this chapter therefore lays the foundation to understand how Koreans encountered
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and interpreted the state within their daily lives, questions which will be explored in
Chapters Four and Five respectively.
I.

Inducing Innovation: The Organizational Infrastructure of Colonial
Agriculture

To achieve its agricultural ambitions, the colonial government established an
infrastructure that would have been familiar to many outside observers. From the midnineteenth century, governments around the world began to promote the new field of
agricultural science through the systematic funding of agricultural research stations. Just
fifty years after the founding of the first such station in Germany in 1851, over 776
agricultural experiment stations and similar institutions had been established in 47
countries and colonial territories, many of which received public funding.4 Compared to
earlier government support for agricultural technology, where research was funded on an
ad hoc and limited basis, the new agricultural research stations emerged at the forefront
of national programs that aimed to facilitate the advance and widespread diffusion of
scientific knowledge about agriculture. Concurrent to the growth of agricultural research
stations, governments also fashioned various networks to disseminate knowledge of
scientifically tested crops and techniques through designated schools, colleges,
publications, lectures, exhibitions, and visits from agricultural technicians.5 In Korea too,

4

A. C. True and V. A. Clark, The Agricultural Experiment Stations in the United States, bulletin no. 80,
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Experiment Stations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1900); A. C. True and D. J. Crosby, Agricultural Experiment Stations in Foreign Countries, bulletin
no. 112, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Experiment Stations (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1902); Federico, Feeding the World, 105-107.
5
Harold C. Knoblauch, E. M. Law, and Werner P. Meyer, State Agricultural Experiment Stations: A
History of Research Policy and Procedure. USDA Miscellaneous Publication No. 904, (Washington, D.C.:
1962); Charles E. Rosenberg, “Science, Technology, and Economic Growth: The Case of the Agricultural
Experiment Station Scientist, 1875-1914,” Agricultural History 45, no. 1 (1971): 1-20; Grantham, “The
Shifting Locus of Agricultural Innovation”; Sheingate, The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare; Federico,
Feeding the World, 105-14.
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as early as 1884, reformers within the government supported an experimental farm as part
of an effort to introduce Western agricultural technology, although the project struggled
to achieve results in the face of organizational and technical difficulties.6
As Japanese interest in Korea grew through the 1900s, agricultural technology
became one arena in which competing political goals clashed. Japanese traders and
bureaucrats alike claimed a leading role for themselves in promoting their interpretation
of better agriculture. In 1900, Nose Tatsugorō (能勢辰五郞), the Japanese consul in
Pusan, drafted an opinion in which he suggested leasing land from the Korean
government to open agricultural experiment stations in Chŏlla, Kyŏngsang, and
Ch’ungch’ŏng provinces. According to Nose’s proposal, Japanese farmers would move to
the experiment stations in order to test the cultivation of various crops, providing a model
for Korean farmers and eventually stimulating production and trade with Japan.7 Several
years later, in 1903, a federation of Japanese chambers of commerce in Korea petitioned
Hayashi Gonsuke (1860–1939, 林権助), the Japanese minister to Korea, to urge that
Korea follow the Japanese example in improving agriculture through the establishment of
agricultural experiment stations and scientific agriculture.8
Whether influenced by the petition or not, the Japanese government shared an
interest in the commercial potential of Korean agriculture. Following a brief rivalry with
Russia, which was also looking to expand its empirewithin Northeast Asia, Japan claimed

Kim Yŏngjin and Hong Ŭnmi, “Nongmu mokch’uk sihŏmjang”; Yuh, “Guns, Farms, and Foreign
Languages.”
7
“Nichi-kan bōeki shinkō kakuchō ni kansuru ken,” September 1, 1900, in Chu-Han Ilbon kongsagwan
kirok, vol. 14 (Kwach’ŏn: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 1995).
8
Oka Yōichi, Saishin Kankoku jijō: ichi mei Kankoku keizai shishin (Tokyo: Aoki sūzandō, 1903);
Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 35.
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de facto control over Korea following the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), formalizing its
dominance in Korea through the establishment of Korea as a protectorate in 1905.
Between 1904 and 1905, the (Japanese) Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce
(nōshōmushō) conducted extensive surveys of Korean agricultural production, adding to
a body of literature that described local conditions for prospective traders and migrants. 9
In November 1905, the Ministry took a further step in developing plans for a model
agricultural farm (Ko. nongsa mobŏmjang; Ja. nōji mohanjō) in Korea. As the Ministry
stated in a report on the project:
As a means to develop the wealth of Korea and further trade on both sides, the
promotion of agriculture is a most urgent task. Based on improvements in farming
and livestock, the usage of wastelands, and facilities for irrigation, etc., we can expect
great increases in Korean agricultural production, and the most direct route to achieve
this goal will be through the establishment of a model agricultural farm.10

According to the report, the model farm would carry out experiments in irrigation,
sericulture, livestock, horticulture, and general agricultural methods with the goal of
producing information on farm management and crops for both farmers and potential
entrepreneurs.11
Plans for the model farm were intimately related to the politics of the time. Not
only did Japanese proposals claim an ever-increasing role for Japan within Korea, but
they stood in direct competition to the Korean government’s own agricultural
administration. Almost simultaneous to the development of the Japanese proposal, the
The surveys were published in several volumes under the general title Kankoku tochi nōsan chōsa hōkoku
(Tokyo: Nōshōmushō, 1907). Examples of additional surveys of Korea include, Nōshōmushō, nōmukyoku,
Kankoku shucchō fukumeisho (Tokyo: 1901); Saishin Kankoku jijō; Chang Yongkyŏng and Hŏ Yŏngran,
“Ilche ŭi singminji ‘chosa saŏp’ kwa Chosŏn ch’ongdokpu chungch’uwŏn chosa saryo,” survey for Kuksa
p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, 2001; Hŏ Yŏngnan, “Singminji kugwan chosa ŭi mokjŏk kwa silt’ae: ‘sijang chosa’
rŭl chungsim ŭro,” Sahak yŏn’gu 86 (2007): 211-46.
10
“Kankoku nōji mohanjō secchi riyū,” Nihon gaikō bunsho vol. 38-1 (Tokyo: Gaimushō, 1978), 877.
11
Ibid.
9

136

Korean Ministry of Education announced its own intention to establish an agricultural
experiment station (Ko. nongsa shihŏmjang; Ja. nōji shikenjō) attached to an industrial
and agricultural school at Ttuksŏm, to the east of Seoul. Operating within the grounds of
the school, the station would research agricultural techniques and educate students on the
best methods as part of a plan to “promote the national interest.”12 Any overlap between
the two proposals was soon quashed, however, as Japan secured political authority over
Korea as a protectorate. In short order the Japanese-appointed protectorate administration
withdrew support for the Ttuksŏm experiment station on the grounds of poor soil quality,
shifting to favor Japanese proposals for a farm in Suwŏn instead. In 1906 control of the
farm at Suwŏn passed to the (Korean) Ministry of Agriculture, Trade and Industry (Ko.
nongsangkongbu; Ja. nōshōkōbu) where it continued as a model industrial farm (Ko.
kwŏnŏp mobŏmjang; Ja. kangyō mohanjō; hereafter, model farm).13 The model farm,

“Nonghak sijang,” Taehan maeil sinbo, November 3, 1905; Ch’ingnyŏng che-60 ho, “Nongsanggong
hakkyo pujok nongsa sihŏmjang kwanse,” in Hanmal kŭndae pŏmnyŏng charyojip, vol. 4, (Seoul: Taehan
Minʾguk Kukhoe Tosŏgwan, 1970), 452-53; Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 48-49.
13
Kankoku shisei kaizen ni kansuru kyōgikai, no. 3, April 9, 1906; Kojong sillok, 1906.5.31; “Ch’ingnyŏng
che-17 ho: kwŏnŏp mobŏmjang kwanje,” Hwangsŏng sinmun, March 27, 1907; Kobayakawa, Chōsen
nōgyō, 48-49.
The significance of the distinction between “model industrial farm” (Ko. kwŏn’ŏp mobŏmjang; Ja. kangyō
mohanjō) and agricultural experiment station (Ko. nong’ŏp sihŏmjang; Ja. nōji shikenjō) is open to
interpretation. On a basic level, the agricultural experiment stations developed new seeds and farming
methods while the model industrial farm focused on testing agricultural conditions in Korea in order to find
the most suitable crops and methods from already-known seed varieties and agricultural techniques. Under
the colonial system, with many of its staff receiving training in Japanese schools and universities, the
model farm frequently (though not always) relied upon Japanese cultivars and farming methods, leading
some scholars to conclude that the model industrial farm was an attempt to “Japanize” (Ilbonhwa) Korean
farming and destroy traditional practices. Although the model farm certainly directed its activities toward
colonial priorities and believed in the general superiority of Japanese agriculture, this view ignores the
international dimension of agricultural science. The model farm did not hesitate to promote knowledge and
cultivars from other regions if they proved advantageous, as in the promotion of American upland cotton
seeds, and agricultural technicians published their research in German and English in dialogue with a
global community of agricultural scientists. Moreover, this argument relies upon a highly problematic
conception of nationally bounded technologies and assumptions of the genetic purity of Korean flora and
fauna. U Taehyŏng supplies a more balanced interpretation, arguing that the model industrial farm’s
activities were guided by a desire to increase productivity at minimum cost. Thus, only when productivity
gains from the direct transfer of already-known seed varieties were exhausted did the colonial government
begin to fund comprehensive research into new varieties within Korea, upgrading the status of the model
12
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converted to an agricultural experiment station in 1929, remained the centerpiece of the
colonial government’s agricultural infrastructure throughout the colonial period.
Compared to previous efforts to promote agriculture, the model farm embodied a
greater ambition in both scale and function. The farm at Suwŏn was not an isolated
facility, but oversaw multiple branch farms and offices throughout the country (see Table
3.1). Under the direction of Honda Kōsuke (1864–1930, 本田幸介), the inaugural director
of the Suwŏn model farm, each site employed numerous agricultural technicians who
researched local soil and climate conditions and conducted experiments on various crops.
From 1908, the government also established seed stations (Ko. chongmyojang; Ja.
shubyōjō) to support the model farm’s activities in each province.14 Between the two, the
model farm and the seed stations worked to select and provide a supply of “improved”
(Ko. kaeryang; Ja. kairyō) seeds and livestock varieties in support of government policies
to increase production.
In addition to research, a second major task of the model farm was to increase
public awareness of the new seeds and techniques it developed. Of the farm’s four
official objectives, two explicitly concerned outreach to farmers:
1. To carry out model surveys and tests as a resource for the development and
improvement of industry;
2. To survey production, and to analyze and assess materials necessary for industry;
3. To distribute seeds, seedlings, silkworm eggs, breeding poultry, and stud livestock;
4. To offer guidance, communication, and lectures on industry.15

industrial farm to an agricultural experiment station in 1929. On these arguments, see Kim Tohyŏng,
“Kwŏnŏp mobŏmjang ŭi sikminji nong’ŏp chibae,” Han’guk kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn’gu 3 (1995): 139-206;
Hong Kŭmsu, “Ilche sidae sinp’umjong pyŏ ŭi toip kwa pogŭp,” Taehan chiri hakhoeji 1 (2003): 48-69; U
Taehyŏng, “Ilcheha Chosŏn esŏ ŭi migok kisul chŏngch’aek ŭi chŏn’gae: isik esŏ yukjong ŭro,” Han’guk
kŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn’gu 38 (2006): 72-107.
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Chōsen sōtokufu, Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō, 1910 edition (Keijō: 1912), 277, 278; Kobayakawa,
Chōsen nōgyō, 57, 58.
15
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Table 3.1: Location and function of model farm and branch farms, 1906–1944
Location and
original title
Suwŏn model
industrial farm

Year
founded
1906

Mokp’o branch
office

1906

Ttuksŏm model
horticultural farm

1906

Kunsan experiment
site
Pyŏngyang branch
office
Taegu branch office
Yongsan branch
farm
Wŏnsan branch
office
Sep’o sheep farm

1907

Year
Notes
closed
School of agriculture and forestry, from 1906.
Site of silkworm egg manufacturing site from 1913,
renamed as sericulture test site in 1917.
Women’s sericulture training center from 1914.
Upgraded to agriculture experiment station in 1929.
Provisional cotton cultivation site, 1908-1910.
Upgraded to branch farm in 1910. Renamed Mokp’o
cotton cultivation branch farm in 1917.
1924
Former planned agricultural experiment station.
Upgraded to branch farm in 1910, Renamed
Ttuksŏm horticultural branch farm in 1917.
1909
Upgraded to branch office in 1908.

1908

1914

1908
1910

1914
1914

1912

1923

1913

1924

Nangok horse1916
1929
rearing site
(Sariwŏn) Western 1920
Korea branch farm
Yonggang cotton
1920
1932
cultivation branch
office
(Iri) Southern
1930
Korea branch farm
Kimje land
1930
reclamation branch
office
(Ch’aryonggwan)
1930
Sericulture branch
office
(Poch’ŏn-bo)
1931
Northern Korea
branch farm
Provincial branch
1932
farms
Yonggang cotton
1933
cultivation branch
farm
Source: Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō.

Site of women’s sericulture training center
(transferred to Suwŏn in 1914)
Upgraded to Tŏgwŏn branch farm in 1914.
Renamed Tŏgwŏn horticultural branch farm in 1917.
Renamed Sep’o branch office in 1914.
Upgraded to sheep-rearing branch farm in 1917.
Upgraded to Nangok horse-rearing branch farm in
1917.
Site of South P’yŏngan provincial sugar beet
nursery from 1925.

Upgraded from former provincial seed stations.
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Accordingly, several of the model farm’s branches developed secondary facilities, such
as a school of agriculture and forestry at Suwŏn, a sericulture training center for girls at
Yongsan, and a cotton spinning factory at Mokp’o. The agricultural technicians
employed at the farms also played a role in disseminating scientific knowledge about
agriculture within their local area. Agricultural technicians held lectures and product fairs
(Ko. p’ump’yŏnghoe; Ja. hinpyōkai) to educate farmers about new varieties of crops and
how best to produce them.16 Technicians also provided instruction on farming methods,
either through the direct management of model fields or through “guidance” (Ko. chido;
Ja. shidō) offered to various farmers’ organizations and selected villages.17
In all of these activities, the technicians worked as agents of the colonial state. In
most cases the technicians were employed by the government, either through the model
farm, the seed stations, or local government offices (generally at the provincial or county
level). Provincial technicians attended annual meetings in the capital where they shared
reports on their activities, learned of new policies and targets, and, occasionally, received
admonition from their superiors for failing to follow government-compiled agricultural
manuals with sufficient care.18 Similar meetings for technicians were replicated within
each region and according to agricultural specialization, maintaining an organized system

“Kaku-dō no tanki nōji kōshūkai,” Chōsen nōkaihō (hereafter, CNH) 7, no. 9 (1912): 57; “Keijō fugai
yon kun rengō nōsanbutsu hinpyōkai,” CNH 7, no. 12 (1912): 59-60; “Zenra hokudō nōsan hinpyōkai
jōkyō,” CNH 8, no. 2 (1913): 68-69; “Keinan [Kyŏngnam] nōji kōshūkai jōkyō,” CNH 9, no. 4 (1914): 67;
“Keinan beikoku chōseihō denshū jōkyō,” CNH 11, no. 3 (1916): 70-71; “Chūhoku jinushi kōshūkai
jōkyō,” CNH 13, no. 12 (1918): 55; Keishō hoku-dō [Kyŏngsangbukto], Mensaku kōshūkairoku (Taikyū
[Taegu]: 1918).
17
“Daisankai nōgyō gijutsukan kaigi no ketsugi jikō,” CNH 6, no. 1 (1911): 27-34; “Junten [Sunch’ŏn]
Kōyō [Kwangyang] chihō no nōji kairyō,” CNH 6, no.6 (1911); 62, 63; “Zennan Muan-kun mensaku
kumiai jōkyō,” CNH 9, no. 11 (1914): 61; “Yūryō hinshu saibai seiseki,” CNH 10, no. 5 (1915): 41-44;
“Taishō 4-nen yūryō hinshu fukyū jōkyō,” CNH 12, no. 2 (1917): 65.
18
“Nōgyō gijutsukan kaigi,” CNH 11, no. 1 (1916): 97-99; “Nongŏp kisulgwan hoedong,” CNH 12, no. 1
(1917): 87.
16
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among the technicians to manage the diffusion of state-sanctioned agricultural
knowledge.19
Nevertheless, despite the government’s ambition to create a comprehensive state
system to promote its agricultural policies, the model farms, seed stations, and
agricultural technicians were only one element within a larger network of organizations
that worked to transform Korean agriculture. For one thing, the colonial government’s
pursuit of financial independence led it to minimize expenditures from the central
treasury, including those associated with agricultural research.20 Immediately following
the formal annexation of Korea the central government transferred control over, and with
it the financial responsibility for, the seed stations to their respective provincial
governments.21 As shown in Figure 3.1, throughout the first decade of colonial rule an
ever greater proportion of government spending on agriculture was sourced from local
expenses (funded by local surcharges on taxation) over funds provided by the central
government.
Perhaps even more significant than financial concerns, though, was the colonial
government’s desire to engage the population. In Japan, newly established agricultural
organizations such as the industrial associations (Ja. sangyō kumiai) and agricultural

“Mokuho ni okeru nōgyō gijutsukan kyōgikai no kaisai,” CNH 4, no. 2 (1910): 52; “Heinan [P’yŏngnam]
nōringyō gijutsuin kyōtei jikō,” CNH 13, no. 9 (1918): 61.
20
The colonial government ran continuous deficits throughout its rule of Korea, but financial pressures
were particularly acute during the first decade of colonial rule as the government attempted to reduce its
dependence on transfers from Japan. After the introduction of “cultural rule” (Ko. munhwa chŏngch’i: Ja.
bunka seiji), spending increased and the goal of financial independence was relaxed somewhat, although it
was never abandoned entirely. See, Mitsuhiko Kimura, “Public Finance in Korea under Japanese Rule:
Deficit in the Colonial Account and Colonial Taxation,” Explorations in Economic History 26 (1989): 285310; “Chōsen zaisei no dokuritsu keikaku,” Chōsen sōtokufu geppō 4, no. 8 (1914): 1-3; Chōsen sōtokufu,
Chōsen tōchi sannenkan seiseki (Keijō: 1914).
21
A portion of the expenses continued to come from the central treasury, but the remaining costs were
newly funded through local taxes. Chŏsen sōtokufu, Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō (Keijō: 1910), 63-69,
277, 278.
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Figure 3.1: Sources of government spending on agriculture, 1910–1919
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Source: Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 24-27.

associations (Ja. nōkai) formed a crucial link between farmers, government projects, and
the formal state infrastructure of agricultural experiment stations and local administrative
offices. Although designed as interest groups to represent local residents (especially
landowners) engaged in agriculture and other industries, the Japanese government played
a significant role in the establishment of the associations, often placing local government
officials in leadership positions. Unlike alternative forms of village organization that
might be formed on the initiative of farmers themselves, this type of semi-governmental
organization offered an effective mechanism for the state to incorporate local populations
into national campaigns, as well as an avenue for farmers to access resources—in the
form of information, credit, or market networks—beyond the boundaries of their
individual villages.22

On the role of village-level, semi-governmental organizations in Japan, see Kenneth B. Pyle, “The
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From the 1900s, Japanese settlers and bureaucrats replicated familiar agricultural
organizations as they assumed prominent roles within Korea. Partially emerging from
settler community efforts at self-management, following Korea’s establishment as a
protectorate, Japanese officials within the Korean government also began to promote the
creation of semi-governmental organizations at the national level as part of their wider
administrative program.23 Generally termed “associations” (Ko. chohap; Ja. kumiai), the
new organizations were established according to industry with different associations for
the management of general agriculture, finance, irrigation, sericulture, cotton production,
forestry, fishing, livestock, and the trade and manufacturing of several “important”
products (as designated by the government), among many others. Three organizations in
particular played a central role in the subsequent implementation of agricultural policies:
the irrigation associations (Ko. suri chohap; Ja. suiri kumiai), established in 1906 to
facilitate investment in large-scale irrigation projects; the financial associations (Ko.
kŭmyung chohap; Ja. kin’yū kumiai), which served as small-scale rural banks, modelled
on the German Raifeissen cooperatives; and the Korean agricultural association (Ko.
Chosŏn nonghoe; Ja. Chōsen nōkai; hereafter agricultural association), the major interest
group for farmers which, in 1926, would eventually take over the activities of several
other agriculture-related associations, including among them the cotton associations (Ko.
myŏnjak chohap; Ja. mensaku kumiai).24

Studies 33, no. 1 (1973): 51-65; Penelope Francks, Technology and Agricultural Development in Pre-War
Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Kerry Smith, A Time of Crisis: Japan, the Great
Depression, and Rural Revitalization (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001);
Sheingate, The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare; Matsuda Shinobu, Keitō nōkai to kindai Nihon, 1900-1943
(Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 2012).
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24
For details on other semi-governmental organizations established under the colonial government
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The degree and form of government involvement varied with each type of
association. At the lowest end of the spectrum, irrigation and trade associations could be
formed at the government’s approval of the request of a simple majority of landowners or
tradesmen within a particular district. Although the central government published some
regulations outlining the scope of each associations’ activities—mainly regarding the
handling of finances, personnel and reporting requirements, and the associations’ legal
ability to enforce common production standards and fees among its members25—the
irrigation and trade associations were designed to rely upon the motivations of the local
population. For this reason, variation among irrigation projects was a key characteristic of
the early irrigation associations. Although the colonial government had hoped that the
irrigation associations would be a vehicle for farmers to collectively borrow and invest in
new, large-scale irrigation facilities, several of the early irrigation associations were
formed around existing weirs and reservoirs.26 The size of irrigation projects also varied
widely, with areas ranging from 312 chŏngbo at the Magup’yŏng Irrigation Association

Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2014), 130-167; David A. Fedman, “The Saw and the Seed: Japanese Forestry in Colonial
Korea, 1895-1945,” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Stanford University, 2015.
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research, thanks in part to the popularity of class-based analysis of colonial rural society. Nonetheless, by
1920 only 124 landlord associations existed throughout Korea, with only one in South Chŏlla province—a
major agricultural region. Given the irregularity of landlord associations they will not be discussed here.
Due to their similarity in activities, however, the landlord associations may be broadly understood as a subunit of the agricultural associations. In 1926, the landlord associations were merged into the county
agricultural associations along with other industry-specific groups. On the landlord associations, see Mun
Chŏngch’ang, Chōsen nōson dantaishi (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1942), 60-67.
25
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in South Ch’ungch’ŏng province to 6,861 chŏngbo at the Taechŏng Irrigation Association
in North P’yŏngan province.27 Indeed, the formation of irrigation associations rested so
heavily on farmers’ own desire to organize that few were organized during the early years
of colonial rule. By 1917, ten years after their introduction, only 12 irrigation associations
were operating throughout the country—a situation that the colonial government would
attempt to remedy through additional subsidies and pressure to form irrigation
associations from local government officials in the 1920s.
Other associations maintained closer ties with the government in their activities.
Introduced in 1907 as part of a wide-ranging reorganization of the financial system, the
Ministry of Finance carefully planned the location of each new finanical association and
provided each with an initial capital of 10,000 yen, which the associations lent out to
middle- and lower-class farmers whose financial needs fell outside of the scope of the
mainstream banks. Alongside their work providing low-interest loans and basic banking
services, the government intended the financial associations to play a central role in the
rural economy. In this capacity, the associations also organized warehouse services for
their members, facilitated the bulk purchase and sale of products, and promoted new
agricultural techniques by hosting lectures from agricultural technicians and raising
awareness about new seed varieties and crops developed at the model farms.28 The

Data on irrigation associations is taken from Hŏ Suyŏl, ed., Kukka kirogwŏ n ilche munsŏ haeje: Suri
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government appointed a director to each association to oversee its work, although
maintaining an active membership was an important feature of the financial associations
with many local elites and minor administrative officials, such as township heads, also
taking on prominent leadership roles.29 Ten years after the establishment of the first
finanical association at Kwangju in 1907, the number of associations had risen to 260
with a total membership of 120,216.30
Like the finanical associations, the agricultural associations also relied upon a
mixture of prominent farmers and government officials to enhance its position as the
dominant agricultural interest group in Korea. Originally founded as a society for
emigrant farmers in 1906, the agricultural association swiftly moved to recruit Korean
members as support from the Protectorate administration helped it to eclipse its rivals.31
While the central government did not actively assign leaders to the branches of the
agricultural association, as in Japan local magistrates and township heads frequently took
prominent roles within the association alongside local entrepreneurs and farmers. The
central government subsidized the publication of a monthly journal, distributed to
association members, that contained a wealth of articles in both Korean and Japanese on

seiseki,” KCNH 4, no. 4 (1909): 12-13; Chōsen sōtokufu, Chihō kin’yū kumiai riji kaidō tōsinsho (Keijō:
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wo kangaeyo: toku ni kin’yū kumiai hōmen he no kibō,” Chōsen chihō gyōsei, April 1929, 51-56.
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31
Originally known as the Korean Central Agricultural Association (Ja. Kankoku chūō nōkai), the
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such topics as new agricultural methods and crops; current events; regional, national and
international statistics and reports; and information about government campaigns, laws,
and new regulations concerning agriculture.32 The association opened branches in the
major agricultural regions, reaching a total of thirteen branch associations in 1910, each
of which hosted periodic lectures from agricultural technicians and provided members a
connection to government projects and the latest developments from the model farms.33
Unlike its Japanese counterpart, membership in the Korean agricultural assocation was
voluntary until 1926, helping the group to maintain the character of an interest group
despite its ties to the government. For ambitious, literate farmers who could afford the 1.8
yen per year membership fee, the agricultural association offered privileged access to
information about opportunities to test new seed varieties, government initiatives, and
even recruitment drives for other state-sponsored organizations such as the financial
associations.34
Associations proliferated under colonial rule. Despite the slow expansion of the
irrigation associations, by 1920 there were 400 financial associations spread across the
country with a total of 228,247 members. By the following year a branch of the
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agricultural association had also been established in each province, with hundreds of
additional cotton, sericulture, and livestock associations dedicated to the promotion of
industry-specific activities operating in counties throughout Korea.35 Taken together, the
financial, irrigation, agricultural, and other associations formed a network of semigovernmental organizations that provided a focus for the government to target favored
industries, and to sponsor particular activities among the rural population.
In all cases, the colonial government regulated and limited the activities of the
semi-governmental organizations. Freedom of association was not guaranteed, and only
organizations that complemented colonial priorities received the approval of the colonial
government. Nonetheless, the semi-governmental organizations were more than the
simple extension of the central government into the countryside. The incorporation of
private interests was an essential feature of each of the associations mentioned here.
Groups whose interests aligned with colonial policies—be it landlords looking to invest
in irrigation or farmers seeking wealth in the sericulture business—benefitted from not
only the sanction of the colonial state but also the material support provided through the
various associations. Even if farmers did not sympathize with the wider objectives of the
colonial government, membership in an association could still offer farmers important
resources or an avenue for influence in local politics. For its part, in exchange for
authorizing a limited degree of autonomy within the associations, the central government
gained a method of interaction with the population which minimized the burden on its
bureaucratic and finanical resources. To understand how this dynamic functioned in the
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implementation of colonial policies, government campaigns for two of the most
important colonial crops—cotton and rice—will now be examined.
II.

Enacting Colonial Policies 1: Cotton (1910s-1920s)

Cotton was an important target of agricultural policy throughout the colonial period. In
Japan, the dramatic growth of the textile industry fueled imports of raw cotton, especially
after the removal of import tariffs in 1896.36 But, despite the promise of textile
manufacturing as a source of wealth and as an industry in which Japanese producers
might compete against western firms, Japanese politicians feared a new dependence on
the British empire in the market for raw cotton as much of Japan’s imported cotton came
from a small number of countries, with over half of raw cotton imported from British
India.37 It was with these concerns in mind that politicians and bureaucrats began to
investigate Korea as an alternative source of cotton for Japanese industry. Over the
decades, this desire for cotton would lead to the rise of an organizational and institutional
infrastructure that fundamentally changed the way that farmers produced and marketed
cotton in Korea.
From the outset, Japanese commercial interest in Korean cotton was buttressed
with political support. In 1902, Wakamatsu Usaburō (1869–1953, 若松兎三郎) first began
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to experiment with the cultivation of various strains of cotton in his position as the
Japanese consul in Mokp’o, a port city in southwestern Korea. Although cotton had been
grown in Korea for centuries, the short staple fiber of existing varieties was considered
unsuitable for industrialized spinning processes, leading Wakamatsu and others to
investigate the viability of alternative strains of cotton.38 Over the next few years
Wakamatsu played a vital role in the promotion of Korea as a source of raw cotton,
forming the Society for Cotton Cultivation (Ja. mensaku saibai kyōkai) in 1905 which
linked Japanese politicians, bureaucrats, and representatives of the spinning industry.
After Japan gained control of Korea as a protectorate, Wakamatsu, the Society, and the
chamber of commerce of Japanese residents in Mokp’o found additional support for their
project, eventually partnering with the Protectorate government to operate a branch of the
model farm in Mokp’o dedicated to the cultivation of cotton.39 After annexation in 1910
the colonial government continued to promote cotton cultivation with the goal of
increasing exports to Japan, to which end a series of national cotton promotion plans
(1912–1918, 1919–1928, and 1933–1942) introduced detailed targets for the expansion of
cotton cultivation (see Figure 3.2).40
The colonial government’s cotton promotion policies involved three major
elements: increasing the general cultivation of cotton; encouraging the cultivation of
American upland cotton (gossypium hirsutum) over local varieties (gossypium
arboretum); and increasing the export of cotton. As seen in Figure 3.2, the colonial
On the industrial preference for upland cotton, see “Naeji sijang e taehan Chosŏn yukjimyŏn ŭi changso
kŭp tanso,” CNH 10, no. 3 (1915): 37-42; Nichi-man menka kyōkai, Chōsen shibu, Chōsen no menka jijō
(1937), 18-23; Beckert, Empire of Cotton, 101-105.
39
Rikuchimen saibai enkakushi, 39-51.
40
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Figure 3.2: Cotton cultivation and government targets, 1910–1942
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Source: Chōsen sōtokufu, Chōsen sōtokufu tōkei nenpō; Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō.
Note: Non-dashed line (1912-1918) indicates annual cultivation targets within the first cotton
expansion plan. Dashed line (1919 onwards) indicates the final target for each cotton expansion plan.

government was largely successful in achieving its first two goals. With the exception of
a decline between 1926 and 1932, which some have attributed to the global collapse of
cotton prices, cotton cultivation steadily increased in line with targets.41 What is more,
the cultivation of upland cotton rapidly increased. By 1918, at the conclusion of the first
plan, upland cotton accounted for 93 percent of all cotton planted in the six southern
provinces (the area identified by the government as most suited to cotton production).42
Increasing exports proved a greater challenge for the colonial government. Despite
Wakamatsu’s ambitions, the sheer scale of Japanese demand for cotton meant that Korea

Chŏng An’gi, “Cheguk ŭi nongjŏng.”
The six southern provinces refer to North Ch’ungch’ŏng, South Ch’ungch’ŏng, North Chŏlla, South
Chŏlla, North Kyŏngsang, and South Kyŏngsang. Chōsen sōtokufu tōkei nenpō.
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never provided anything more than a negligible share of imports. Nevertheless, the
colonial government enacted significant policies in its attempt to influence the behavior
of farmers in all three areas.
Cotton promotion policies began in earnest in 1912, when Governor-General
Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919, 寺内正毅) issued a directive on cotton cultivation to the
provincial governors. In the directive Terauchi laid out an idealized vision of the colonial
economy, describing the mutual benefits that increased cotton cultivation and exports
were bound to bring to both Korea and Japan in the form of increased profits for
individual farmers, the general expansion of the Korean economy, and the development
of the spinning industry in Japan. To achieve its goals, the directive listed five specific
tasks: (1) to encourage upland cotton cultivation among farmers; (2) to preserve upland
cotton seeds; (3) to offer guidance on upland cotton cultivation; (4) to expand upland
cotton cultivation in the six southern provinces; and (5) to improve the cultivation of
local varieties of cotton in areas not suitable for the new seeds.43
Shortly after the announcement of Terauchi’s directive, South Chŏlla province
responded with a plan to establish cotton cultivation associations (hereafter, cotton
associations), publishing sample regulations for the associations the following year.44 The
cotton associations were typical of the many semi-governmental organizations
established under colonial rule in their intentional blending of public and private
interests. According to the model regulations, cotton associations were to correspond
with local administrative districts, generally at the township or county level, with the
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township head or county magistrate often playing a prominent role in establishing the
association and serving as its head. All farmers of upland cotton within the district of a
cotton association automatically became members, with supplementary leadership
positions elected from among the association members (Articles 1, 4, 18).
The other southern provinces quickly followed suit to establish similar cotton
associations in their own regions. By 1922, ten years after the publication of the directive
on cotton cultivation, cotton associations existed throughout Korea’s cotton growing
regions with a total recorded membership of 642,265.45 By the colonial government’s
own pronouncement, the cotton associations were the government’s chief mechanism for
influencing cotton production within Korea. As one report on cotton promotion activities
in South Chŏlla province stated, “it is no exaggeration to say that cotton promotion in this
province is carried out entirely through the cotton associations.”46
The primary goal of the cotton associations was to increase the cultivation of
upland cotton, for which the associations provided their members with a range of
incentives and assistance. At the outset, the cotton associations distributed an initial stock
of upland cotton seed (supplied by the model farm and seed stations) after which the
associations encouraged members to collect and maintain their own supply (Articles 9,

The associations were only absent in Kangwŏn, North Hamgyŏng, and South Hamgyŏng provinces,
which were not cotton-growing regions. In the northern and western provinces, where the climate was
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14).47 As well as seeds, the associations provided members with credit via the local
financial association or branch of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (another statemanaged financial organization; hereafter AIB) to facilitate the joint purchase of
fertilizers and tools for members (Article 9).48 In addition to such material inputs,
agricultural technicians visited the cotton associations regularly to spread awareness of
the benefits of upland cotton, educate members on appropriate techniques for the new
crop, hold lectures at annual association meetings, and host product fairs where farmers
could compete for prizes for the best cotton crop.49 In each of these activities, the work of
the cotton associations closely followed the goals set by Terauchi in his 1912 directive.
The work of the cotton associations went far beyond increasing cultivation,
however, and the associations also played a significant role in shaping cultivation
practices to meet the demands of the international cotton market. The promotion of
upland cotton cultivation over local varieties already embodied such concerns. Beyond
the initial distribution of upland cotton seeds, the cotton associations monitored the
cotton produced by members and implemented measures to continually maintain the
quality of the crop. After noticing a tendency for upland seeds to become diluted over
time due to accidental mixing with existing cotton seeds, the cotton associations worked
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with the model farm to establish seed renewal programs. In North Kyŏngsang, the
provincial government acquired imported American upland cotton seeds from the model
farm at Mokp’o and contracted local cotton associations to run three cotton seed fields to
ensure a supply for the province’s seed renewal program. South Chŏlla province similarly
used its regional budget to purchase seeds from the model farm and offered subsidies to
the nine largest cotton associations to operate county and township cotton seed fields on
behalf of the local government. As part of a rolling program, the cotton associations
invited farmers to exchange their seeds for fresh ones to remove diluted seeds from
cultivation and maintain the quality of upland cotton.50
Concerns over the quality of the crop also led the cotton associations to take an
interest in cultivation methods, rewarding farmers who adopted prescribed methods and
punishing those who did not. Farmers who wished to cultivate upland cotton in South
Chŏlla province had to commit to grow upland cotton exclusively.51 Farmers who
produced high quality cotton had the opportunity to win flags, certificates, and prizes at
product fairs hosted by the cotton associations. At Nonsan county, in South
Ch’ungch’ŏng province, a women’s cotton group received a certificate for the high
quality of their cotton, while a Taejŏn cotton fair awarded cash prizes ranging from five
to eighteen yen per person to the seven farmers who had sold the most cotton the previous
year.52 Meanwhile, farmers who violated the rules of the association risked fines or
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worse. In 1925, the Yŏnggwang cotton association in South Kyŏngsang province banned
members from cultivating cotton in “mixed” fields (Ko. kanhonjak; Ja. kankonsaku),
where cotton was planted alongside another crop (often barley), over fears it would
damage the quality of the cotton. One day in August, Mr. Sim, an employee of the
Yŏnggwang cotton association, led two township clerks and around twenty students of
the local school to inspect nearby fields when, upon spotting a field of mixed cotton, the
group leapt into the offending field and violently destroyed the crop for breaking the
association rules.53
Sales constituted the final major element of the cotton associations’ activities as
colonial policies positioned the cotton associations as an entryway to new imperial
markets. Association members were required to sell any remainder of the cotton crop that
they did not use themselves through the cotton associations (Article 13).54 The
associations used a variety of methods to carry out the joint sale of cotton. Early on, most
associations followed a system of designated joint sales (Ko. chijŏng kongdong p’anmae;
Ja. shitei kōdō hanbai), under which system members delivered their cotton to an
association technician who assessed its quality before selling it on to designated factories
or traders at a price set against global cotton prices in the United States, Ōsaka, and

Mensaku kōshūkairoku, 85-88; “Kahok han kwŏnŏp haengjŏng,” Tonga ilbo, August 27, 1925. This
incident appears to have been the exception, rather than the norm. In a special issue of the Bulletin of the
Agricultural Association in 1935, former agricultural technicians recalled their first attempts to persuade
farmers to grow upland cotton prior to annexation. The methods discussed included bribing farmers to
grow the new cultivar, as well as more violent means such as destroying recalcitrant farmers’ crops or
calling upon the local magistrate who beat farmers until they switched to the new cotton. Such candid
accounts notwithstanding, by 1935 the technicians prided themselves on how quickly they had been able to
move past such “unimaginable” methods to be able to persuade farmers by the superiority of the new type
of cotton alone. The rarity of accounts of violent crop destroyal similar to the case in Yŏnggwang suggests
that the technicians’ recollections, though rosetinted, were likely accurate. “Zadankai kiroku,” CNH 9, no.
11 (1935): 36, 45.
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Mokp’o. From 1917, the cotton associations in South Chŏlla province introduced an
alternative system based on the competitive bidding of purchasers (Ko. kyŏngjaeng
ipch’al; Ja. kyōsō nyūsatsu). As before, association members delivered their excess cotton
to the local association where technicians assessed its quality and set a time and place for
transactions. Purchasers then placed bids for the cotton, with the sale awarded to the
highest bidder. Each province adjusted its associations’ sales regulations in response to
local conditions, with major cotton regions tending to adopt competitive bidding while
areas with fewer traders maintained the designated sales system. But, in each region the
cotton associations served as the point of contact between individual farmers and
purchasers.55
The cotton association’s sales activities served two main functions. First, the
associations helped to redirect existing market networks. The cotton associations actively
competed with existing cotton traders by offering members credit from the financial
associations. In this way the associations hoped to undercut what they called “green field
lending” (Ja. aotagashi), whereby local traders would offer loans to cotton farmers in the
spring, when farmers were typically low on funds, in return for the farmers’ future cotton
harvest. By connecting farmers to the financial associations as an alternative source of
credit, the cotton associations explicitly hoped to “remedy the evils of green field
lending” and drive a greater share of the cotton harvest toward their own sales
mechanisms.56
Men no zennan; Keishō nandō [Kyŏngsang namdo] mensakukei, Keinan no men (Fusan: 1931); Chōsen
shokusan ginkō chōsaka, Chōsen no menka (Keijō: 1934), 37-49. For a detailed discussion of the factors
influencing changes to sales regulations in South Chŏlla province, see Chŏng An’gi. “1920-1930 nyŏndae
Ilche ŭi myŏnŏp chŏngch’aek kwa Mokp’o chomyŏnŏp: k’arŭt’el (Cartel) hwaldong ŭl chungsim ŭro,”
Kyŏngje sahak 49 (2010): 73-113.
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Second, the position of the cotton associations as an intermediary for cotton
transactions also allowed the government to monitor and control the quality of cotton that
reached the market. Early in the government’s efforts to establish Korea as a source of
raw cotton, industrial buyers in Japan noted several disadvantages of Korean cotton
including excessive moisture content, discoloration, and unreliable grading standards.57
By requiring all members to sell their surplus cotton through the cotton associations, the
government used the cotton associations to regulate the quality of cotton entering the
market. This regulatory role applied to traders of cotton as much as it did farmers. In
South Chŏlla province only pre-approved purchasers were permitted to participate in the
association-managed competitive bidding system as the province attempted to weed out
unscrupulous traders. Purchasers who were found guilty of adulterating upland cotton
with the cheaper local variety, adding moisture to cotton to artificially increase its weight,
or falsely classifying cotton grades were excluded from the association-managed
marketplace as the colonial government attempted to improve the reputation of, and
demand for, Korean cotton in Japan.58
In all of the above, the cotton associations emerged as the primary organization
that implemented colonial cotton policies. Yet, although the parameters of the cotton
associations were set by government policy, it was only by incorporating local interests
and activities that the associations could succeed in their goal to increase cotton
production. Despite the associations’ restrictive regulations that forced upland cotton
farmers to join and sell their excess crop through the associations, farmers could still

“Naeji sijang e taehan Chosŏn yukchimyŏn ŭi changso kŭp tanso”
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choose how much cotton to grow and sell, if any at all. Indeed, despite the colonial
government’s aspirations to establish Korea as a major source of raw cotton, until the
conclusion of the second cotton promotion plan in 1928 the proportion of the cotton
harvest sold through the cotton associations rarely exceeded 20 percent.59 The cotton
associations’ ability to engage with farmers directly affected their ability to influence
farmers’ behavior in this regard—a factor which would become increasingly important as
colonial targets grew ever more ambitious.
After the conclusion of the first cotton promotion plan in 1918, the central
government immediately announced a second that built on the institutional framework of
the first. Once again, cotton associations served as the major organization that put cotton
promotion into practice, although the expanded targets of the second plan led provincial
governments to adopt additional initiatives to focus promotional activities toward
particular communities.60 Each year, provinces selected “guided villages” (Ko. chido
ridong; Ja. shidō ridō) and townships (Ko. chido myŏn; Ja. shidō men) to receive the
concentrated attention of cotton association staff and agricultural technicians. Parallel to
such efforts, many regions also encouraged the formation of separate women’s cotton
groups and other village-level organizations to coordinate cotton cultivation between the

Chōsen no menka jijō. This rate varied by province. South Chŏlla province stands out as having the
highest rate of group sales to harvest thanks in part to higher cotton prices within the province under the
competitive bidding system. Chŏng An’gi, “1920-1930 nyŏndae Ilche ŭi myŏnŏp.”
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village and the associations (which by the 1920s had largely been consolidated at the
county level).61
A 1931 publication—Villages of cotton—reveals how a dense network of
subsidiary village-level organizations emerged to supplement the work of the cotton
associations in three South Chŏlla villages: Oktang village in Naju county, Kŭmho island
in Haenam county, and Kwangjŏng village in Muan county. Chosen for their exemplary
status, all three of the villages had been selected as guided villages during the 1920s,
while from 1922 both Oktang and Kŭmho villages also contracted with the local cotton
associations to operate seed selection fields (Ko. ch’aejongjŏn; Ja. saishuden), for which
they received additional support in the form of grants of seeds and fertilizers.62
Multiple village organizations embedded upland cotton cultivation within the
social structures of each village. In Oktang, for example, Yi Tonghyŏn, who Villages of
Cotton credited with bringing upland cotton to the village after hearing a lecture on the
topic in 1909, headed the village’s Revitalization Society (Ko. chinhŭnghoe; Ja.
shinkōkai)—another project supported by the colonial government—which officially
encouraged the joint cultivation of cotton within the village, the maintenance of improved
seed varieties, and the joint sale of the cotton crop. Alongside the Revitalization Society,
cotton cultivation within the village was supported by a diligent farmers’ mutual aid
association (Ko. kwŏnnong kongje chohap; Ja. kinnō kyōsai kumiai), which provided
financial support for non-financial association members; a cotton cultivation group (Ko.
myŏnjakkye; Ja. mensakukei), which arranged the joint purchase and distribution of
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fertilizers within the village under the supervision of the county agricultural association;
and a communal savings fund for cotton cultivation founded by Yi Tonghyŏn, Yi
Kyŏnghwa, the district headman (Ko. kujang; Ja. kuchō), and No Chisu, a teacher at the
nearby Komagwŏn Normal School.63
Similarly in Kwangjŏng and Kŭmho, the work of the cotton associations became
replicated through multiple organizations and practices within the villages. In some cases,
village organizations maintained a formal connection to the semi-governmental
associations, as with the Oktang cotton cultivation group and the agricultural association,
or organizations such as Kwangjŏng’s diligent savings association (Ko. kŭn’gŏm
chŏch’ul choap; Ja. kinken chochiku kumiai) whose members committed five percent of
the value of their cotton harvest as savings within the financial association.64 In other
cases, indiviudals within the village took on much of the work of cotton promotion, such
as Yi Tonghyŏn in Oktang village and Cho Chonghyŏp in Kwangjŏng village, a former
clerk, township head (1918–1923), and head of the Kwangjŏng Revitalization Society,
the diligent savings association, a cotton cultivation improvement implementation
association (Ko. myŏnjak kaeryang sirhaeng chohap; Ja. mensaku kairyō jikkō kumiai),
and a general agricultural improvement association (Ko. nongsa kaeryang sojohap; Ja.
nōji kairyō shōkumiai).65 Of course, Cho Chonghyŏp’s position as a local government
employee no doubt placed him under a certain amount of pressure to conform to the
campaign du jour, however his concurrent status as a farmer must also be seen as equally
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important in his decision to focus on the cultivation of upland cotton. In the year
surveyed, Cho earned 280 yen from the cultivation and sale of upland cotton—a
considerable amount.66
As a promotional publication of the South Chŏlla provincial agricultural
association, the examples listed in Villages of Cotton must be viewed as ideal cases rather
than the norm. Nonetheless, that the villages were chosen as exemplary models confirms
the prominent role of village and semi-governmental organizations as a means to
implement the government’s cotton promotion policies. Throughout the 1920s, a
comprehensive network of organizations emerged to facilitate the production of upland
cotton. At the county level, cotton (and, after 1926, agricultural) associations oversaw the
production and sale of cotton within each county. In turn, the cotton associations relied
upon smaller organizations within townships and villages to select sites for intensive
production and contracted the management of seed selection fields. Whether through
formal connections between the associations and the village organizations, or through the
personal and informal mediation of prominent farmers, a mixture of local administration
and village organizations combined to support the spread of upland cotton cultivation
under the umbrella of the cotton associations.
To the extent that the price of upland cotton rendered its cultivation profitable,
this array of semi-governmental organizations arguably constituted an effective method
of encouraging the production of upland cotton. Between 1912 and 1926, the acreage of
cotton planted more than tripled, rising from 64,566 to 215,910 chŏngbo, broadly
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following colonial cotton plans. However, the collapse of global cotton prices in the mid1920s proved a serious limitation. From its peak in 1926, the acreage cultivated fell by as
much as a quarter to reach just 159,269 chŏngbo in 1931 as farmers turn to alternative
crops instead, dashing the government’s ambition to reach an acreage of 250,000
chŏngbo by 1928.67 Indeed, considering the timing of its publication in 1931, Villages of
Cotton itself appears to be less proof of a healthy cotton industry and more an appeal to
farmers to reconsider the benefits of upland cotton. As the foreword stated, the authors of
the book intended it to “serve as a reference for others engaged in the guidance of rural
villages.”68 But, as long as the global price of cotton remained depressed, the colonial
government would have to use the semi-governmental organziations in new ways in order
to try to increase cotton cultivation once again in the 1930s.
III.

Enacting Colonial Policies 2: Rice (1910s-1920s)

In 1912, one day after announcing the directive on cotton cultivation, Governor-General
Terauchi issued a similar directive on the promotion of rice. Terauchi listed four targets
for particular improvement: the spread of high-yielding seeds; improving the drying and
processing of rice; expanding the supply of irrigation; and encouraging the use of
fertilizers. Just as with cotton, the directive revealed twin priorities in colonial rice
policy—to increase production through the adoption of technologies such as improved
seeds, fertilizers, and irrigation, and to improve the quality of rice entering the market
through changes to processing methods.

Chōsen sōtokufu tōkei nenpō; Kimura Mitsuhiko, “Shokuminchika Chōsen mensaku ni tsuite,” Ajia
keizai 30, no. 1 (1983): 54-79; Chŏng An’gi, “Cheguk ŭi nongjŏng.”
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Despite the similarities with colonial cotton policies, there were some important
differences in the implementation of rice policies. With cotton, the colonial government
attempted to create an entirely new market based on the introduction of a distinct strain of
cotton, the production and sale of which was largely managed through the single
organization of the cotton associations. For rice, a thriving export market already existed.
Though new varieties of rice had the potential to increase yields, they did not produce a
substantially different crop. Rather than creating a market from scratch, the colonial
government therefore focused instead on redirecting existing markets and rice
production. What is more, while the cotton associations occupied a central position in
both the cultivation and sale of upland cotton, colonial policies for rice relied upon a
diffuse array of organizations. The government’s plans to increase rice production
involved multiple different initiatives, ranging from the provision of finance for fertilizers
to the construction of large-scale irrigation facilities. As such, the implementation of
colonial rice policies relied upon the concerted action of several semi-governmental
organizations.
The first priority of the colonial government was to distribute high-yielding seeds
to farmers. The model farm advertised high-yielding seeds in the Bulletin of the Korean
Agricultural Association, and organized local tests of seeds through the financial
associations, branches of the AIB, Japanese-owned farms and farmers’ groups, and even
the Taegu branch of the finance office. To further spread the new seeds, local government
offices at the county and township level organized seed exchanges where farmers could
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swap their existing seeds for the high-yielding varieties supplied by the model farms.69
By 1916, each province had established its own network to supply high-yielding seeds to
farmers building on the basic framework of the model farm and provincial seed farms.
As shown in Table 3.2, each province adapted its distribution chain to suit the
local context. In regions with a strong presence of farmers’ organizations, such as North
Chŏlla province, groups such as the industrious farming association (Ko. kwŏnnonghoe;
Ja. kannōkai), financial associations, agricultural associations, and the association for
tenants of state-owned lands (Ko. kugyuji sojagin chohap; Ja. kokuyūchi kosakunin
kumiai) all participated in the distribution of seeds to their respective members.
Elsewhere, local government offices, trusted landlords, and recipients of agricultural
lectures also joined the supply chains to spread improved seeds to ordinary farmers. As
with upland cotton, agricultural technicians played an important role in organizing
lectures and product fairs to inform farmers about the new seeds and to persuade them to
adopt the new varieties. In the case of North Hamgyŏng province, the recipients of
agricultural lectures themselves became part of the distribution chain and were called
upon to distribute seeds to other farmers. By 1919 high-yielding seeds constituted 46.8
percent of the total planted acreage of rice, with a higher concentration of high-yielding
seeds within the southern provinces. Four years later, in 1923, the proportion of highyielding seeds had increased even further, to 67.3 percent of the total planted acreage of

“Kangyō mohanjō no shushi haifu”; “Suitō sōshinriki to zairaishu to no hikaku,” KCNH 3, no. 11 (1909):
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kaeryang ŭi sanghwang,” CNH 6, no. 7 (1911): 18-20: “Suitō sōshinriki no saibai seiseki,” CNH 7, no. 3
(1912): 15-20; “Kairyō ina shushi kōkan seiseki,” CNH 8, no. 10 (1913): 75.
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Table 3.2: Distribution chains for improved seeds, 1916
Province
Kyŏnggi

Original seed
field
Provincial
seed farm

Provincial
North
Ch’ungch’ŏng seed farm

Provincial
South
Ch’ungch’ŏng seed farm
Provincial
North Chŏlla
seed farm

South Chŏlla

Provincial
seed farm

Secondary seed fields

Final users

 County seed selection fields

 General
farmers
 Exemplary
farmers
 General
farmers

 County
seed selection
fields

 Township seed
selection fields
 Village seed selection
fields
 Individual seed
selection fields
 County seed selection fields
 Township seed selection fields
 County
 Township seed
seed selection selection fields
fields
 Village seed selection
fields
 Village school (Ko.
hyanggyo) fields
 Industrious farming
association seed selection
fields
 Large landlords’ and
exemplary farmers’ seed
selection fields
 Special
 Financial association
county
seed selection fields
original seed
 Association for tenants
fields
of state-owned lands seed
selection fields
 Industrious farming
association seed selection
fields
 Agricultural association
Chŏnju branch seed
selection fields
 County
 Township seed
seed selection selection fields
fields
 Financial association
seed selection fields
 State-owned land
tenants’ association seed
selection fields
 Agricultural association
seed selection fields
 Landlord association
seed selection fields
 Large landlord seed
selection fields

 General
farmers
 General
farmers

 Members

 General
farmers
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North
Kyŏngsang

Provincial
seed farm

South
Kyŏngsang
Hwanghae

Provincial
seed farm
Provincial
seed farm

South
P’yŏngan

Provincial
seed farm

North
P’yŏngan

Provincial
seed farm;
Chŏngjucounty seed
farm;
Sŏnch’ŏncounty seed
farm
Provincial
seed farm

Kangwŏn

South
Hamgyŏng
North
Hamgyŏng

 Contracted  Shared seed selection
provincial
fields
seed selection
fields
 Contracted seed selection fields
 County seed selection fields
 Contracted country seed selection fields
 State-owned land tenants’ association
seed selection field
 Landlord seed selection fields
 Seed selection fields

 County
seed farm
seed selection
fields

 Model village
supervised fields

 County
seed selection
fields

 Township seed
selection fields
 Village seed selection
fields
Yet to select improved seed varieties

Sŏngjin Supervised
county
seed selection
industrious
fields
farming
association
Source: Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 186-89.

 Exemplary farmers
 Agricultural lecture
students

 General
farmers
 General
farmers
 General
farmers

 Tenants
 Model farmers
 Model village
residents
 Agricultural
lecture students
 General
farmers
 General
farmers

 General
farmers

 General
farmers

rice.70
Early efforts to promote the usage of fertilizers and irrigation relied upon a
similarly wide range of organizations and institutions. The model farm and provincial
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seed farms carried out research into fertilizer use on behalf of the government, while
financial associations offered loans for fertilizers and in some cases organized fertilizer
improvement groups (Ko. piryo kaeryanggye; Ja. hiryō kairyōkei) among their more
enthusiastic members.71 The financial associations also granted loans for farmers to carry
out small land improvement and irrigation works on their fields, but could not supply the
large amounts of capital required for major construction projects. The irrigation
associations thus proved the chief mechanism for landholders to jointly borrow and invest
in large construction projects, although few farmers actually formed irrigation
associations during the first decade of colonial rule. Supplementing the financial and
irrigation associations, local government offices also focused attention on landlords who
it was hoped would spread improved farming practices, seeds, and fertilizers among their
tenants. Some provinces also organized landlord associations (Ko. chijuhoe; Ja.
jinushikai) in several counties, providing yet another venue for agricultural experts to
give lectures, hold product fairs, and distribute seeds, fertilizers, and tools. By 1920, 124
landlord associations existed with a total of 93,503 members.72
Despite these various initiatives, the first decade of colonial rice policies had a
limited impact on producers. Beyond the distribution of high-yielding seeds, colonial

“Piryo kaeryanggye chojik,” Maeil sinbo, May 11, 1913; Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 214. Based on the
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agricultural schools that paid “particular attention to content appropriate for Korean agriculture” only
dedicated 3 (out of a total 24) chapters to chemical fertilizers, focusing instead on organic fertilizers such as
compost, rice bran, fallen leaves, and animal corpses. Chōsen sōtokufu hensan, Hiryō kyōkasho (Tokyo:
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policies were constrained by the limited reach of the organizations that would implement
them. The small number of irrigation and agricultural associations restricted the influence
of each organization. Though possessing a greater membership, non-members vastly
outweighed the membership of the financial associations. Even among members,
however, directors of the financial associations commented on the difficulties they faced
in encouraging members to participate in their non-financial activities, such as
warehousing and the adoption of new crops.73
The Government-General shared the concerns over the slow pace of change in
rice production. In the face of reports of the weakening productivity of high-yielding
seeds, the central government mobilized provincial governors to institute seed
refreshment programs to renew high-yielding seeds that may have been crosscontaminated with other strains. Of particular concern to those with an eye to the export
market was the creeping infiltration of red rice—a type of wild rice that spread easily
among other rice crops.74 From 1917 onwards, the provinces instituted regular programs
to refresh seeds on a rolling basis. Compared to the initial distribution of seeds, by this
time most provincial governments had established a supply chain that, though still relying
on private farmers and farmers’ organizations, dealt with a narrower range of
intermediaries (see Table 3.3). In most regions, the provincial government distributed
seeds from its own seed farm to contracted farmers and organizations who in turn
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Table 3.3: Distribution chains for seed refreshment programs, 1919
Province

Original seed field

Kyŏnggi

Provincial seed farm

North
Provincial seed farm
Ch’ungch’ŏng
South
Provincial seed farm
Ch’ungch’ŏng
North Chŏlla
Provincial seed farm
South Chŏlla

Provincial seed farm

North
Kyŏngsang
South
Kyŏngsang
Hwanghae

Provincial seed farm

South
P’yŏngan
North
P’yŏngan
Kangwŏn

Provincial seed farm

South
Hamgyŏng
North
Hamgyŏng

Provincial seed farm

Provincial seed farm
Provincial seed farm

Provincial seed farm
Provincial seed farm

Contracted elite
farmers’ fields under
supervision of the
provincial seed farm
Source: Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 186-89.

First seed selection
field
Provincial seed farm
fields
Contracted elite
farmers’ fields
Provincial seed farm
fields
County agricultural
association
Contracted elite
farmers’ fields
County agricultural
association
Contracted elite
farmers’ fields
Contracted elite
farmers’ fields
Contracted elite
farmers’ fields
Provincial seed farm
fields
Provincial seed farm
fields
Contracted elite
farmers’ fields
Contracted elite
farmers’ fields

Second seed selection
field
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields
Contracted elite farmers’
fields

cultivated a larger crop of seeds for secondary and tertiary distribution.75
More serious in the government’s eyes, however, was the slow adoption of
irrigation and fertilizer use, two elements which were crucial to achieving the full
potential of the high-yielding seeds. Although the financial, landlord, and agricultural
associations held promotional activities among their members, by the end of the 1910s
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fertilizer use in Korea lagged far behind Taiwan (12 kg/ha) and Japan (63 kg/ha) at just
1.3 kilograms per hectare, much of which consisted of plant-based fertilizers.76
Meanwhile, by 1916, nearly a decade after the introduction of irrigation associations,
more individuals had begun private irrigation projects than had formed irrigation
associations.77 In 1917, the colonial government issued the Law on Irrigation
Associations in an attempt to clarify procedures for the formation and management of
irrigation associations to encourage the formation of more associations. The following
year, the government also introduced a 15 percent subsidy on construction costs for
qualifying irrigation associations to further encourage their formation.78
These problems only took on new urgency following the 1918 rice riots in Japan,
during which nationwide protests broke out against the rising price of rice—a particular
concern for Japan’s growing population of wage laborers.79 As part of an empire-wide
response to the riots, in 1920 the colonial government initiated the Program to Increase
Rice Production (PIRP) which aimed to increase rice production by 8,995,000 sŏm in
thirty years, little over half of which was planned for export to Japan. To achieve these
goals, the PIRP planned to improve 800,000 chŏngbo of land, either by bringing new
land into rice cultivation or investing in irrigation facilities on existing fields. These land
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improvement projects would only provide a portion of the planned increases in
production, however, and a full 60 percent of the PIRP’s planned increases in rice
production were based on the subsequent increased use of fertilizer and improved
cultivation methods (see Table 3.4).
The PIRP budget reveals how the colonial government attempted to put the
Program into practice (see Table 3.5). Of an initial budget of around 125 million yen, the
majority of PIRP funds were assigned to land improvement projects (62.7 percent of the
total, roughly split between low-interest loans and subsidies) and low-interest loans for
fertilizers (21.7 percent). Progress was slow, however. By 1925, nearly 14 million yen of

Table 3.4: Planned increases in rice production under PIRP, sŏm
Source of
increase

Land
by type
Paddies with
improved irrigation
Reclassified
paddies
New paddies from
cleared and drained
land
Currently irrigated
paddies
Paddies without
irrigation
Upland rice in
current dry fields
Future expansion
of dry field upland
rice
Total increase

Result of
completed
land
improvement

Upland rice
cultivation

Application
of fertilizer

Other
improved
cultivation
methods

1,125,000

-

900,000

337,500*

2,362,500

1,462,500

-

450,000

168,750

2,081,250

900,000

-

360,000

135,000

1,395,000

-

-

1,340,000

502,500

1,842,500

-

-

-

1,231,250

1,231,250

-

-

-

20,625

20,625

-

52,500

-

9,375

61,875

3,487,500
52,500
3,050,000
2,405,000
(38.8%)
(0.5%)
(33.9%)
(26.7%)
Source: Chōsen sanmai zōshoku ni kansuru iken (Tokyo: Takushokukyoku, 1921).
Note: * 337,500 is recorded in error as 337,000 in the original document.

Total
increase

8,995,000
(100%)
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Table 3.5: Initial budget for the PIRP
Source of
Target of spending
funding
Treasury
Construction subsidies for land improvement
funds
projects
Costs to establish a supervisory and promotion
agency for subsidies
Survey costs for land improvement projects
Subsidies for small-scale land improvement
projects
Funds to promote improvements in tilling and
sowing
Costs to establish a special promotion agency
Government- Capital for construction in land improvement
backed lowprojects
interest loans Capital for purchase of fertilizers
Total

Amount, yen (%)
38,550,000 (27.9)
3,000,000 (2.2)
2,000,000 (1.4)
3,000,000 (2.2)
7,460,000 (5.4)
9,000,000 (6.5)
45,000,000 (32.6)
30,000,000 (21.7)
138,010,000 (100)

Source: Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 422.

Table 3.6: Revised budget for the PIRP, 1925
Source of funding
Target of spending
Government subsidy
Land improvement
Industry funds
Land improvement
Government-backed low-interest loans Land improvement
Government-backed low-interest loans Improvements in agriculture
Total

Amount, yen (%)
65,070,000 (20)
22,067,000 (6.8)
198,197,000 (61)
40,000,000 (12.3)
325,000,000 (100)

Source: Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 436.

government spending had resulted in only 90,000 chŏngbo of completed land
improvement projects and an increase of around 450,000 sŏm of rice.80 To remedy the
situation, the colonial government drastically increased the PIRP budget (see Table 3.6)
and introduced several new measures designed to increase the efficiency of the irrigation
projects. Under the revised PIRP, proposed land improvement projects covering an area
greater than 200 chŏngbo were required to contract with the Korean Land Improvement
Corporation (a new government-backed agency) which would oversee the work of land

Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 434; Chōsen sōtokufu tōkei nenpō. The figure for the increase in rice should
be treated with some caution as harvests fluctuate significantly from year to year. But, even keeping this in
mind, the figure is still considerably below the PIRP targets.
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surveying and construction. A Land Improvement Law (1927) also introduced
regulations governing the fundamental principles of land improvement projects for the
first time.81
In both stages of the PIRP the colonial government did not undertake projects
directly but distributed funds through intermediary organizations instead. The Industrial
Bank of Chōsen (which succeeded the AIB in 1918; hereafter IBC), Oriental
Development Company (hereafter ODC), and financial associations each handled roughly
one-third of the government-backed low-interest loans. Where the financial associations
were able to lend directly to farmers for fertilizer purchases or small scale land
improvement projects, as large institutional lenders the IBC and ODC in turn lent a
significant portion of the PIRP funds to irrigation associations, which became one of the
major conduits that put the PIRP into practice.82 Between 1926 and 1931—the second
phase of the PIRP—80 percent of the total funds for land improvement projects (both
subsidies and loans) went to irrigation associations.83
Accordingly, the 1920s saw a jump in the number of irrigation associations
formed. Between 1920 and 1925, 54 new irrigation associations were established—a
significant increase compared to earlier years. Between 1926 and 1931, irrigation
associations increased at an even greater rate, rising by 125 to reach a new total of 191
associations throughout Korea.84 Such a rapid increase in the number of irrigation

“Chōsen tochi kairyō rei no happu,” CNH 2, no. 2 (1928): 83-92; Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 438-41.
“Nongsa kaeryang chagŭm taech’ul pangbŏp,” Maeil sinbo, May 12, 1926; “Nongsa kaeryang chagŭm
kŏch’i o-nyŏn sanghwan isip-nyŏn,” Maeil sinbo, September 26, 1926; “Sanmi chŭngsik o nyŏndo nongsa
kaeryang chŏjaaek,” Tonga ilbo, February 1, 1931. For more on the ODC and IBC, see Moskowitz, “The
Creation of the Oriental Development Company”; Karl Moskowitz, “Current assets: the employees of
Japanese banks in colonial Korea,” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1979.
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associations was not without problems. As the number of associations rose, so too did
protests against their formation. Although landowners within the proposed district of an
irrigation association were eligible to vote on its formation, tenants and agricultural
laborers were not. Farmers also expressed dissatisfaction over the disproportionate
influence of larger landholders within the associations and the tendency for local
government officials, who were often also landholders, to initiate the formation of
irrigation associations.85 At the same time, and as warned by Nishikawa Hikojirō (西川彦
次郎), the government’s use of subsidies and cheap loans to increase the number of large-

scale irrigation projects beyond the natural level of investment created inherent risks.
Debt was an unavoidable feature of the irrigation associations and if projects failed to
deliver the expected increase in yield, or if the price of rice fell, farmers would struggle to
repay the loans (collected as association fees and water charges levied against all farmers
within the irrigation district).86
Irrigation was just one aspect of the PIRP, however. As a representative of the
Department of Industry explained, “to achieve direct increases in rice production, the
improvement of agriculture is an essential task that must also be carried out in those lands
that have completed [irrigation projects].”87 Thus, besides irrigation itself, the PIRP also
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saw the expansion of state initiatives into other areas. As well as outlining regulations
over land improvement projects, the 1927 Land Improvement Law also expanded the
irrigation associations’ remit to include such activities as managing seed selection fields,
demonstrating model farming methods to members, encouraging the use of fertilizer and
improved seeds, and hosting agricultural technicians.88 In this, the newly-reorganized
agricultural associations played a major role alongside the irrigation associations. In
1926, the government established county-level agricultural associations across the
country, one per county, to replace and expand the activities previously managed by
industry-specific associations, such as the cotton or sericulture associations. Although
many of the activities pursued by the agricultural associations were not new—hosting
lectures, providing subsidies, and monitoring the production of particular crops—the
establishment of county-level associations across Korea brought the work of the
associations to a much wider population of farmers in a systematic manner.89
For rice, the agricultural associations followed established patterns to promote
“improved” farming methods, hosting technicians, lectures, and educational events. More
significantly, the agricultural associations also came to play an important role in the
distribution of material resources. Many seed selection fields that provided the highquality seeds for the government’s seed refreshment programs continued to be contracted
out to trusted farmers with the county agricultural associations increasingly playing a role
in selecting the farmers who would undertake this work.90 The agricultural associations
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also occupied a prominent role in the distribution of the seeds and fertilizers that formed
another line of the PIRP. As well as their own activities to promote fertilizer use and
organize joint purchases among members, the agricultural associations mediated with the
IBC, ODC, and the financial associations that distributed PIRP-related low-interest loans.
In order to access loans for fertilizers, farmers without a direct relationship with the
ODC, IBC or financial associations had to first get confirmation from their county office
or county agricultural association which would then transmit the application for a loan to
the financial organization in question.91
By the second half of the 1920s, the semi-governmental organizations promoting
rice production thus came to resemble those supporting cotton production. Although
promotional activities proceeded through a wider range of organizations that dealt with
finance, irrigation, and material aspects of rice cultivation separately, the semigovernmental organizations nonetheless formed and regulated a comprehensive network
that brought farmers into contact with government initiatives. Support from the colonial
government fueled the growth of this network. The law on agricultural associations
established one per county, while under the PIRP the number of irrigation associations
increased to a total of 191. Meanwhile, the steady growth of the financial associations
continued to reach a total of 661 associations with a membership of 684,407 by 1931.92
For those farmers who had the means and the inclination to participate, the irrigation and
financial associations offered government-subsidized loans while the activities of the
“Sanmai zōshoku keikaku ni tomonafu,” 48, 49; “Sanŏp chŏri chagŭm: Taejŏn-gun sŏ changnyŏ,” Maeil
sinbo, February 19, 1929; Doi Hirotsugi, “1920 nendai ni okeru Chōsen sōtokufu no kannō gyōsei kikō:
sanmai zōshoku keikaku to Chōsen nōkai rei,” Chōsen gakuhō 181 (2001): 156, 157. In theory this system
was intended to increase small and medium farmers’ access to loans when, due to a lack of resources, they
were unable to deal directly with the financial associations. How far this succeeded in practice is doubtful.
92
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agricultural associations introduced alternative sources of seeds, fertilizers, and, in some
cases, potentially lucrative government contracts. But, in common with the cotton
associations, insofar as the core purpose of the associations was to bring farmers in Korea
into contact with wider imperial markets, the health of such markets would decide both
the strength and the weakness of the association-based model.
IV.

The Crisis of a Colonial Model (1930s)

Throughout the first two decades of colonial rule, the Government-General’s policies
toward rice and cotton pursued twin objectives. On one side, the colonial government
attempted to increase cultivation of the two crops, issuing specific targets and building a
network of state-sponsored associations that might influence farmers’ production in the
manner desired by the government. At the same time, a fundamental aspect of the
government’s agricultural policies centered on the creation of market networks within the
wider imperial economy. In large part, this was driven by the colonial government’s
desire to establish Korea as a source of raw materials for Japanese industry, for which
exports of rice and upland cotton were strategic goals. Successful policy in Korea
centered around the creation of flows of rice and cotton to Japan, channeled through the
various associations.
The events of the late 1920s severely tested the government’s initial model of a
colonial economy. From the mid-1920s, agricultural commodity prices around the world
began to decline significantly.93 Colonial Korea was not insulated from these trends. The
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practice of setting the price of upland cotton sold through the cotton associations to the
Ŏsaka price constituted a direct mechanism that related global price shocks to producers
in the Korean countryside. Between 1924 and 1930, global cotton prices decreased by 66
percent, causing the average price of raw cotton sold through the cotton associations to
fall from 27 to 7.96 yen per kŭn.94 Global rice prices similarly fell, following major
investment in the production and export of rice across East and Southeast Asia.95 In
Korea rice prices fell from a peak of 19.26 yen per sŏm in 1925 to just 6.61 yen per sŏm
in 1931, resulting in significant rural unrest and mirroring similar discontent in Japan and
Taiwan.96
The collapse in prices prompted two major shifts within the colonial economy. On
an immediate level, governments in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan each tried to minimize the
impact of the falling prices among farming households. At the same time, and in part as a
result of the efforts to mitigate the rural crisis, governments in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
found it necessary to reorder the flows of primary products across the Japanese Empire.
What had once been a marker of successful colonial rice policy in Korea—high
exports—became undesirable as the supply of Korean rice to Japan swiftly became both a
political and an economic problem.
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The severity of the fall in rice prices and the ensuing rural discontent led the
Japanese government to adopt a series of measures designed to stabilize prices. After the
rice riots in 1918, the Japanese government had instituted a Rice Law (Ja. beikokuhō) in
1921 that enabled the government to buy or sell rice at ceiling and floor prices in order to
stabilize the supply and price of rice. In response to falling prices, the government
increased the funds available to the program throughout the 1920s. When this failed to
achieve the desired result the government added measures to limit the importation of
foreign rice to Japan, eventually passing a new Rice Control Law (Ja. beikoku tōsei hō) in
1933 which removed previous limits on the government’s rice purchases.97
As part of the Japanese empire, Korean and Taiwanese rice was exempt from
most of the restrictions placed on rice imported to Japan. Nonetheless, under pressure
from its own farmers, the Japanese government took additional steps to control the flow
of Korean and Taiwanese rice. Amending the Rice Law in 1931, the Japanese
government set itself as the sole authorized importer of Korean and Taiwanese rice. In
this capacity, and under the later Rice Control Law, the Japanese government thus
attempted to regulate the volume and timing of imperial rice imports, limiting imports
during the Japanese rice harvest and managing the flow of rice to ameliorate seasonal
price fluctuations.98
As the government in Japan continued to seek a solution to the economic
problems of its farmers, pressure increased on the colonial government in Korea to follow
97
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suit. Any rice policy would test the limits of colonial rhetoric as it sought a delicate
balance act between the interests of Japan, which wanted to limit Korean rice exports,
and Korean producers, who resisted any attempt to close formerly profitable markets for
Korean rice. Indeed, in 1932, producers and traders of rice in Korea reacted angrily to the
suggestion that Japan might aid its own farmers at the expense of those in Korea, vowing
to prevent the implementation of discriminatory policies that would “push rice production
and the economy to the point of death.”99
Rural discontent within Korea, as well as the tentative extension of Japanese rice
control policies toward the peninsula, prompted the Government-General to introduce its
own measures to deal with falling rice prices. When exports to Japan came under
temporary limitation in 1928, the colonial government in turn limited the import of
foreign rice into Korea, requiring permits from importers and further restricting imports
in 1930.100 As in Japan, the colonial government also began to purchase rice itself in an
attempt to prop up prices and appease large traders and producers. Government purchases
of rice were not entirely successful, however. After the first round of purchases in 1932,
representatives from rice trading associations and the agricultural association criticized
the Government-General for its restrictive implementation (initially the government only
purchased rice from one location in the capital) and for the low price offered.101
At the other end of the spectrum, the colonial government employed a range of
strategies in an attempt to stem the flow of rice onto the market. In 1934, the colonial
government ended the PIRP ahead of schedule after rice prices failed to recover and amid
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several years of record harvests. To deal with surpluses, the government also encouraged
the cultivation of alternative crops, such as cotton, and the use of rice in other industries
such as alcohol production.102 But chief among the colonial government’s efforts to
manage the amount of rice entering the market at any one time was the construction of
warehouses and rice storage facilities. In 1930, the colonial government introduced a
fifteen-year plan for the construction of grain warehouses. The plan offered substantial
subsidies for the construction of warehouses in rural areas and the major trading ports—
up to 70 percent of construction costs for rural warehouses (Ko. nongŏp ch’anggo; Ja.
nōgyō sōko). Under the plan, the government aimed to build 50 rural warehouses in the
space of five years with 150 more to follow in the next ten years. Farmers who stored
grain in the warehouses received a coupon for their rice, which could be exchanged for
low-interest loans against the stored grain. The government also applied subsidies and
fines to farmers who either kept or broke storage contracts to encourage compliance.103
The colonial government did not manage rural warehouses directly and instead it
entrusted the management of the rural warehouses to the agricultural associations.104 To
boost its storage capacity to meet the ambitious targets of the rice storage program, the
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government also mobilized warehouses belonging to other semi-governmental
organizations, including the financial associations and irrigation associations. Among the
grain warehouses and those belonging to financial associations, irrigation associations,
and other groups, in 1930 the colonial government planned to store a total of 2,012,000
sŏm of rice—an amount equivalent to 10 percent of the total harvest that year.105
Warehouses and rice storage were thus a major part of the colonial government’s
response to the collapse in rice prices.
Despite the government’s efforts, rice storage had little immediate impact on the
price of rice. As prices remained low, and the amount of rice in storage grew ever higher,
the colonial government expanded the scope of the original storage plans. In 1933, the
colonial government introduced supplementary storage targets on export grain and
unhulled rice to plan for an additional 4,000,000 sŏm of stored rice. To meet the
expanded targets, local governments and the various associations began to manage the
open-air storage (Ko. yajŏk; Ja. nodumi) of unhulled grain in addition to that stored in
warehouses. Depending on the region and the availability of warehouses, the amount of
rice stored in the open air could be significant. In the spring of 1934, 217,508 sŏm out of
a total 285,233 sŏm of stored grain in South Kyŏngsang province was kept as open-air
storage, with only 67,725 sŏm stored within rural warehouses while the province worked
to complete the construction of 94 county warehouses.106 As shown in Figure 3.3, even
after the construction of warehouses began to have results, the sheer volume of stored
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Figure 3.3: Annual long-term stored rice, 1931–37
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rice meant that open-air storage continued to form a considerable portion of the total
stored grain for much of the 1930s.107
The warehouses and other storage facilities did more than simply store rice.
Regulations on the rural warehouses published in 1931 granted them three separate
functions the storage of rice; the inspection and processing of rice; and the joint sale of
rice. The warehouses stored all farmers’ grain together, thus any rice entering the
warehouse was inspected and sorted by its variety, quality, and year of production. The
inspections also sought to prevent any spoiled rice from contaminating other grain held in
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the warehouse. The colonial government also encouraged the joint sale of stored grain.
Repeating the arguments made in favor of earlier consigned sales programs, official
encouragements of joint sales promised a better price for grain sold in bulk than farmers
might achieve individually.108 All in all, the grain storage system as envisioned by the
colonial government set the rural warehouses and other storage facilities operated by the
semi-governmental organizations into yet one more network that linked farmers to
markets, albeit one with built-in delays.
Just as the other initiatives promoted through the semi-governmental
organizations, the colonial government’s attempt to control the flow and price of rice was
shaped by the organizations which implemented the policies. Where agricultural
associations managed the rural warehouses, the associations were able to include
regulations specifically favoring the storage of members’ rice over that of nonmembers.109 Meanwhile, a combination of warehouse storage fees and the immediacy of
some farmers’ financial needs made it harder for the most impoverished farmers to take
advantage of the rural warehouses, leaving such farmers with little choice but to sell their
rice to brokers who were able to use the storage system themselves. Despite boasting of
an “age of warehouses” after completing its targets for warehouse construction ahead of
schedule, local officials in North Kyŏngsang province noted a disparity in the
background of farmers using the rural warehouses. The vast majority of farmers using the

Ibid; “Chosŏn nongŏp ch’anggoryŏng”; “Beikoku kyōdō hanbai no jisseki kanshō,” CNH 7, no. 1
(1933): 143, 144.
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deposits from non-members with rights to land. Hashū[P’aju]-kun nōkai, “Nōgyō sōko gyōmu kitei” in
“Bunsan [Munsan] nōgyō sōko shinsetsu ninkasho” [1934]. MS CJA0004930, National Archives of Korea,
Taejŏn.
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rural warehouses were large landlords and merchants, while medium- and small-scale
farmers continued to sell their crop to traders regardless of the low prices.110 Farmers
who had to store their crop in the open air faced risks of their own; the stored grain was
vulnerable to damage by weather or by fire, apparently prompting a sudden increase in
applications for insurance against the stored grain.111
The agricultural crisis of the 1920s and 1930s fundamentally changed the colonial
government’s relation to the international rice market. From its earliest efforts to
reinforce the influence of price signals to encourage greater production among farmers, a
period of sustained low prices and the need to coordinate policies with those
implemented in Japan led the colonial government to try and control the market for rice
in the 1930s. Nonetheless, although this represented a reversal of some aspects of earlier
policies, the use of semi-governmental organizations as a means to implement
agricultural policy remained the same. From their earlier work in facilitating the sale of
rice to Japan, the various associations now functioned as a gateway to the colonial
government’s rice storage programs. In this capacity, the association-managed
warehouses gained a stronger presence in the storage, inspection, and sale of rice in
greater quantities than in previous years. Although some agricultural associations had
handled the sale of members’ rice during the 1920s, the warehouse system formalized
their position within a nationwide parallel market network and by 1937 ten percent of all
rice sold in Korea was handled by the agricultural associations.112
“Shukka kumiai de kome hanbai tōsei,” CNH 5, no. 10 (1931):123; “Nōsō jidai shutsugensu,” CNH 5,
no. 11 (1931): 119, 120; “Nōgyō sōko riyōsha no futettei,” CNH 6, no. 2 (1932): 104.
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V.

Pushing at the Margins: Overcoming the Market through Joint
Cultivation

The colonial government’s response to sustained low prices for rice and cotton
demonstrates the importance of imperial politics in crafting policies for Korea. Pressure
from rice farmers in Japan and major producers and traders in Korea led the colonial
government to introduce long-term rice storage programs that, though ultimately
ineffectual in raising prices, insulated certain groups from the worst of the fall in prices.
Not all crops held the same political and economic value as rice, however. Unlike the
surpluses of rice that existed across the empire, the Japanese textile industry continued to
import vast quantities of raw cotton, while the expansion of empire into Manchuria and
nascent industrialization in Korea, including textile manufactures, meant that increased
cotton cultivation remained an important strategic goal for the Government-General of
Korea.113
Cotton cultivation fit within two further imperatives of 1930s colonial policy.
First, cotton was an alternative to rice. As part of its efforts to reduce rice harvests and
relieve the downward pressure on rice prices, the colonial government made efforts to
persuade farmers to divert their land toward cotton cultivation, among other crops.
Second, and cotton fit within the logic of the Rural Revitalization Movement (hereafter
RRM; Ko. nongch’on chinhŭng undong; Ja. nōson shinkō undō)—a nationwide program
to pacify rural unrest through a combination of patriotic campaigns, debt restructuring,
and economic intitiatives. Agricultural technicians and local government officials thus

In the words of one cotton booster, the Japanese textile industry offered “unlimited” demand for Korean
cotton. Chōsen nōkai, Chōsen ni okeru mensaku saibai no genzai oyobi shōrai (n.d.), 1. On the colonial
textile industry, see also Eckert, Offspring of Empire.
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promoted cotton as one of several cash crops that struggling farmers might cultivate as a
way to boost their household income 114
With these ideas in mind, Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige (1868–1956, 宇垣
一成) unveiled a third cotton promotion plan in 1933 that called for an increase in the

acreage of cotton cultivation in Korea to 350,000 chŏngbo within twenty years.
Announced at an advisory meeting of the provincial governors under the slogan of “from
an individuated (Ko. kaebyŏlchŏk; Ja. kobetsuteki) to a controlled economy (Ko. t’ongje
kyŏngje; Ja. tōsei keizai),” Ugaki introduced the cotton production expansion plan as part
of a series of major campaigns, including among them the RRM, industrialization in the
northern regions, and the diversification of agriculture.115 Like earlier cotton promotion
schemes, Ugaki’s plan was based on the achievement of cultivation targets, with national
targets subdivided into targets for each province to achieve through the work of
agricultural technicians and local state-sponsored associations. But, where the price of
cotton remained depressed, colonial officials could no longer rely upon the profitability
of cotton as a sufficient mechanism in itself to encourage its increased production.
To achieve the desired increases in yield and acreage provincial governors
therefore combined familiar methods with several new strategies. County agricultural
associations—the successors to the cotton associations—continued to offer material
support in the form of improved seeds (this time a substrain of upland cotton developed

For more on the RRM, see Gi-Wook Shin and Do-Hyun Han, “Colonial Corporatism: The Rural
Revitalization Campaign, 1932-1940,” in Shin and Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University East Asia Center, 1999), 70-96. On similar programs in Japan, see
Smith, A Time of Crisis; Simon Partner, “Taming the Wilderness: The Lifestyle Improvement Movement in
Rural Japan, 1925-1965,” Monumenta Nipponica 56, no. 4 (2001): 487-520.
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for an increase of 250,000 chŏngbo of cultivation, but was revised upwards after the first year.
Kobayakawa, Chōsen nōgyō, 597-600.
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at the agricultural experiment station in Mokp’o, variety no. 380), credit for fertilizers,
and guidance from agricultural technicians, as well as several new subsidies for cotton. 116
At the same time, colonial officials looked to offset the impact of lower cotton prices
through the promotion of “intensive cultivation” (Ko. chipjung chaebae; Ja. shūchū
saibai), and through a new emphasis on bringing marginal labor and marginal land into
cotton cultivation. Such an effort required more than the expansion or continuation of old
campaigns, as officials targeted new populations of potential cotton farmers.
Women in particular found new attention from colonial administrators as a source
of labor for cotton production. As one representative from North Kyŏngsang province
who called for women to “be sent to the front lines of labor” frankly stated: “behind
advances in cotton cultivation in North Kyŏngsang, the shadows are deeply stained with
the blood and sweat of the labor of rural women.”117 With cotton prices low, appeals to
women made economic sense as female casual labor was significantly cheaper than its
male counterpart. As one study in Chindo, South Chŏlla province, reported, female
agricultural laborers earned around 20 sen per day compared to equivalent male wages of
35 sen, leading local officials to promote cotton as particularly suited to hitherto
“unproductive” female labor. Across Korea, the zeal to make better use of women’s

“Menka daizōsan keikaku shuritsu,” CNH 7, no. 6 (1933): 107, 108; Mitsuyō[Miryang]-kun, Mensaku
shōrei shisetsu oyobi seiseki (Mitsuyō-kun: 1935). On the development of the substrain of upland cotton,
see also “Rikuchimen shushi jikyūsaku,” CNH 5, no. 2 (1931): 110. According to the article, alongside
their high yield, the new seeds were a desirable alternative to imported American seeds as they increased
Korea’s self-sufficiency in upland cotton seeds.
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“Mensaku no yakushin to fujin rōsaku,” CNH 7, no. 8 (1933): 115. This was not the colonial
government’s first appeal to women within cotton promotion policies. In 1923, agricultural technicians
within the cotton associations organized a series of cotton cultivation observation trips to major cotton
growing regions in South Chŏlla province for women from around the country. See, for example,
“Koch’ang puin myŏnjak sich’aldan,” Tonga ilbo, September 10, 1923. The 1930s stands out, however, in
the intensity of colonial appeals to female labor and the government’s effort to use women in all aspects of
cotton cultivation (and not just as a complement to male labor).
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“surplus labor” (Ja. kajō rōryoku) neatly blended the policy imperative to increase cotton
cultivation with cultural and gendered views of Korean women as economically
unproductive, and the RRM’s general goal of rationalizing the household to increase rural
incomes.118
Bringing new sources of land and labor into cotton cultivation presented a new
logistical challenge for officials, however. Whereas prior campaigns implemented
through the cotton and agricultural associations appealed to wealthier farmers who
already owned (or could reliably lay claim to) sufficient farmland and capital to grow
cotton alongside food crops, women and the poorer households who were the target of
the RRM, for the most part, did not. Provincial governors across the major cottongrowing regions thus encouraged the formation of new village-level organizations
dedicated to the joint cultivation of cotton. Where individuals lacked the surplus land and
capital to farm cotton, these village-level groups would allow farmers to jointly lease land
for upland cotton and, where necessary, jointly borrow from the financial associations to
cover the upfront costs of fertilizers and tenancy contracts.119

“Senfujin no gaigyō shōrei,” CNH 4, no. 9 (1930): 118; “Fujin mensaku shūkan no jisshi,” CNH 5, no. 8
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ni tsuite,” CNH 8, no. 7 (1934): 66-75. It should go without saying that to view Korean women as
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Joint cultivation organizations targeted the cultivation of new plots of land.
Though not necessarily representative of the country as a whole, a 1935 report from the
village-level “cotton improvement groups” in Miryang county, South Kyŏngsang
province, suggests the likely nature of such attempts at joint farming. Promoted by the
local government in support of the general cotton promotion plans, by 1935 almost each
village in Miryang county was home to two separate cotton cultivation groups, divided by
gender. Each group borrowed money to pay for land and farming equipment which it
repaid through the joint sale of cotton, with any profits being shared among the members.
The groups managed multiple scattered plots—often obtained through a group loan,
which was repaid through the sale of cotton produced by members—including such
locations as “behind the school” and “along the side of Ch’unbok road” in one village, or
“within the forest” and “in front of Anp’o [a neighboring] village” in another.120
Similar to those detailed in Villages of Cotton, the village-level cotton
organizations formed as part of the third cotton promotion plan fit within the larger
network of semi-governmental organizations. In Miryang, the county magistrate (and
concurrent head of the county agricultural association) oversaw the establishment of each
organization and assigned agricultural technicians to each group to offer dedicated
guidance and oversight. Technicians held product fairs, encouraged the appropriate use of
fertilizer to increase productivity, and managed the joint sale of cotton produced by the
group.121 Unlike earlier years, however, village-level organizations were increasingly part

“Mensaku kairyō hinpyōkai,” CNH 7, no. 7 (1933): 98; Mensaku shōrei shisetsu oyobi seiseki, 3-5. The
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of a wider, systematic effort to expand the reach of the state’s existing agricultural
infrastructure. The organizations found in Miryang were not the spontaneous creation of
residents, or even an enterprising county magistrate looking to distinguish himself, but
were part of the planned establishment of 1,200 joint cultivation groups across South
Kyŏngsang province in support of the third cotton plan.122 No comprehensive data exists
on the nationwide prevalence of village-level joint cotton cultivation groups, but scattered
sources suggest that they were widespread. In South Chŏlla, the provincial government
planned to create a total of 2,660 joint cultivation fields, each at least 4 p’yŏng (Ja. tsubo)
(roughly 13 square meters) in size, while plans to expand cotton cultivation through a
series of smaller organizations operating below the agricultural associations were also
announced in South Ch’ungch’ŏng, North Kyŏngsang, Kangwŏn and North and South
P’yŏngan provinces.123
The scope of village organizations also changed as the RRM provided a rationale
that positioned rural households as the target of colonial campaigns. To the emphasis of
earlier cotton campaigns on improving farming methods and crop quality, the RRM
added the imperative to investigate and reform households’ sources of income and
spending, saving habits, side-jobs, and work ethic. In many places, cotton promotion thus
became intertwined with the RRM’s focus on reforming the household as an economic

“Mensaku shōrei nijū kanen keikaku juritsu.”
Menka zōsan keikaku ni yori nōson”; “Rikuchimen shōrei,” CNH 4, no. 3 (1930): 86; “Mensaku no
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unit. “Guidance” to cotton cultivation groups grew to cover not only advice on fertilizers
and seeds but also the appropriate use of the money earned by the sale of cotton. In South
Ch’ungch’ŏng province, officials set a minimum savings rate of 50 sen per p’yŏng
farmed within its 412 “special cotton villages” and 1 yen per p’yŏng cultivated for its 452
“women’s cotton groups,” claiming that the savings would enable the groups to purchase
their own land in the future.124 Officials in Chindo, South Chŏlla province, similarly
enforced savings among the “women’s joint cotton cultivation groups,” ostensibly to
prevent the squandering of joint sales revenues—either by the women themselves or at
the hands of their husbands.125
The expansion of village-level organizations dedicated to joint farming was not
limited to cotton and joint cultivation came to occupy a central position within the RRM.
In Kyŏnggi province, local officials adopted three slogans for its RRM activities—
reducing consumption, increasing income, and diligence and thrift—introducing new
organizations at the county and township level to oversee their implementation. As part
of this effort, the provincial agricultural association established “joint cultivation
associations” within each village to actively encourage villagers to participate in joint
farming. According to the proposal, the new organizations were intended to serve as a
new side-employment for farmers, thereby increasing their income and providing a
communal pool of capital that might be loaned out to impoverished farmers at favorable
rates, thus reducing the burden of debt within the village.126 In North Kyŏngsang
province, officials similarly planned “rural revitalization organizations” to coordinate
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RRM-related activities between villages, other local government officials, and
representatives of the various associations in areas such as joint cultivation and the
encouragement of female labor.127
Alongside village-level organizations for joint cultivation, colonial officials also
introduced village-level community credit organizations as part of the RRM. The
financial associations had long been criticized, even among colonial bureaucrats, for
failing to include more small- and medium-sized farmers among their members.128 Critics
of the financial associations also accused them of acting too much like banks and
neglecting the responsibility of educating farmers on the most profitable ways to sell their
crops. In the view of scholars such as Kurumada Atsushi (車田篤), a prominent legal
scholar and colonial bureaucrat, the financial associations had directly contributed to the
rural crisis threatening the Korean countryside by failing to offer stronger advice on the
use of loans and techniques to improve agriculture, leaving little option for farmers but to
build up debt after debt.129
In 1935, the colonial government responded to both of these concerns with the
introduction of yet another village-level joint organization—the industrial group (Ko.
siksan’gye; Ja. shokusankei). Announced as the “front line agency of the RRM,” the
industrial group worked as a subsidiary of the financial associations to extend credit to
farmers who did not have sufficient income or assets to meet the membership
requirements of the financial association. Instead of joining as an individual association
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member, groups of five-or-more farmers within the same village were newly able to form
an industrial group which could then apply for financial association loans on a collective
basis. The industrial groups offered more than financial services, however. Financial
association staff bore a responsibility to oversee each industrial group, providing a
mechanism for the agricultural guidance that critics like Kurumada had found lacking in
the original financial associations.130 As the most recent focus of agricultural policy,
agricultural technicians and local government officials promoted the formation of
industrial groups alongside and in support of joint cultivation projects. Within two years,
there were 1,345 industrial groups around the country, bringing 10,408 farmers under the
realm of the financial associations to finance joint farming activities on behalf of the
RRM.131
The promotion of communal village organizations also linked the RRM to rice
storage and price control campaigns. As the colonial government continued its drive to
control and correct for what it perceived to be failures in both the market for agricultural
products and farmers’ behavior, it introduced new organizations to coordinate, and at
times coerce, farmers’ participation in the agricultural association-managed rural
warehouses. After noting that brokers and large landlords dominated the use of rural
warehouses’ rice storage programs, North Kyŏngsang province established roughly 100
“rice forwarding associations” that aimed to “rationalize” farmers’ sales practices and
eliminate brokers by organizing the joint packing and transporting of rice within local
“Shokusankei no naiyō,” CNH 9, no. 1 (1935): 112, 113; “Kŭmil palp’o toen siksan’gye ryŏng
chŏnmun,” Maeil sinbo, August 30, 1935. Technically, industrial groups could also be formed under the
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industrial groups organized under the finanical associations.
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areas. Instead of selling their rice to local traders, farmers within North Kyŏngsang could
deliver their rice to forwarding associations that transported the grain to the rural
warehouses collectively on behalf of the farmers.132 Other provinces followed suit,
establishing forwarding associations and joint farming organizations as an effort to
expand participation in rice storage programs via the network of sales and subsidies
established through the county agricultural associations.133
The 1930s thus saw the expansion of joint farming organizations to cover all
aspects of agricultural production, from finance to cultivation and from sales to savings
and reinvestment. As the colonial government expanded the target of its agricultural
programs to include poorer farmers, it increasingly turned to work through the village as
an economic unit. Village cotton organizations collectively purchased and rented land
that farmers could not afford individually. Industrial groups jointly took out loans for the
purchase of fertilizers and tools on behalf of village residents, while rural revitalization
groups and forwarding associations further promoted joint farming and joint sales
activities within the village. Although Korea had a long history of local, village-level,
economic organizations, the new groups were part of a distinct effort that systematically
linked village organizations to the nationwide economic network established through the
various associations.
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The initial impetus behind the turn toward village-level joint farming
organizations was grounded in the agricultural crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s.
But, as the Japanese empire slid toward war with China and in the Pacific in the late
1930s, the colonial government found new purpose for village organizations within the
system of wartime mobilization. Writing in the Bulletin of the Korean Agricultural
Association, Nomura Jin, (野村稔), a teacher at several agricultural colleges, made a case
for strengthening the role of the agricultural associations under wartime mobilization:
The struggle for survival that became intense in a modern state and society is, I think,
already developing its own semblance of structure in peacetime. Thus, where this
strengthens future advantages, wartime and peacetime are not opposing systems, and
the distinctions between the two are gradually diminishing… Therefore, at this time,
is it not an urgent task to strengthen and expand the Korean agricultural association,
use its power in the surveys and research for a broader agricultural policy, and to
cooperate with the agricultural administrative organizations, experimental
organizations, educational organizations, and agricultural organizations to urge action
and development in the world of agriculture?134

As Nomura, and others, argued, wartime mobilization did not require the creation of a
new economic system as much as a strengthening of central authority over the myriad
agricultural organizations already in existence.135 At the same time, the government made
greater efforts to expand association membership at both poles of the rural economy, both
among wealthy landlords who could avoid the associations to deal directly with banks
and trading corporations and the poorest of tenants not yet reached by the RRM’s
agricultural campaigns.136 Wartime mobilization thus entailed both the expansion of
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village organizations and their continued incorporation into a tightly controlled national
system.
The basic principles behind wartime mobilization were not so different from
earlier agricultural campaigns, albeit on a much stricter, much more coercive level. As
increased demand from the military turned empire-wide surpluses into shortages, the
colonial government implemented a new wave of production campaigns, issuing
production targets and using the network of associations and their subsidiary
organizations to allocate resources such as fertilizers. But, where just three percent of
rural households are estimated to have actively participated in the main activities of the
RRM, wartime mobilization aimed to target every village and every household.137 To that
end, in addition to existing village organizations the colonial government established
patriotic groups (Ko. aegukpan; Ja. aikokuhan) and village leagues (Ko. burak
yŏnmaeng; Ja. buraku renmei) to coordinate labor for and implement the production
campaigns and distribution targets that constituted wartime mobilization. By 1942,
almost ninety percent of rural villages had established at least one mobilization
organization within the village.138
Where village leagues and patriotic groups organized joint cultivation toward
production targets within the villages, industrial groups linked villages to a network that

137

It is estimated that 92.4 percent of rural households participated in wartime mobilization campaigns by
1942. Lee Songsoon, “The Rural Control Policy and Peasant Ruling Strategy of the Government-General
of Chosŏn in the 1930s-1940s,” International Journal of Korean History 15, no. 2 (2010): 16. The figure of
three percent participation in the RRM does not include participation in simultaneous agricultural
campaigns, such as that for cotton production, that were not explicitly named as part of the RRM but that
nonetheless shared many of the RRM’s aims and tactics, such as joint cultivation and the promotion of
savings.
138
Ibid; Yi Kyŏngnan, “Ch’ongdongwŏn ch’ejeha nongch’on t’ongje wa nongmin saenghwal: maŭl sahoe
kwan’gye ŭl chungsim ŭro,” Tongbang hakchi 124 (2004): 785-838.

198

managed the distribution of both financial and material resources. Similar to the village
leagues and patriotic groups, by 1942 around ninety percent of households were a
member of either a financial association or an industrial group.139 More so than in any
other agricultural campaign, wartime mobilization sought to control the flow of resources
and direct agricultural products through government-managed networks. To that end, the
colonial government consolidated existing forwarding associations under the direct
control of the agricultural associations and took steps to limit the sale of agricultural
products outside of government-controlled sales networks. The colonial government
issued regulations banning the private sale of crops, directing farmers to participate in
industrial-group-managed joint sale programs instead. Within joint sales programs, the
government also instituted set prices for crops as a measure to control inflation. At the
peak of wartime mobilization, the associations and village organizations that were
initially established as a complement to commercial market networks thus came to
eclipse them. Within the vastly expanded alternative economic sphere of the associationmanaged economy, joint sales and joint cultivation formed the new norm of the rural
production organized through the village-level industrial and patriotic groups.140
VI.

Conclusion

By 1945, agriculture was still the largest industry in Korea by employment, but much had
changed since 1910. Not all of these changes were readily apparent. Fields of rice still
dominated the landscape, and the uneven distribution of colonial economic development
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kept landlords and tenants in place as a social fixture for all too many farmers. But,
beneath the surface, agricultural production was vastly different. The rice that many
farmers grew now came from high-yielding seeds, developed at agricultural experiment
stations in Korea and Japan and distributed through a network of agricultural
associations. The cotton that farmers sold no longer headed for local traders, but found its
way through the association-managed system of grading and pricing as a raw material for
industry. Although landlords maintained a social and economic status above tenants,
neither could farm without relying in some measure on the range of semi-governmental
organizations established under the colonial state. Wartime mobilization pushed the
state’s presence in the economy to the extreme, but the pattern of state involvement in the
wartime economy built on trends established years earlier in the colonial government’s
zeal to foster new agricultural markets in Korea and its social and economic responses to
the agricultural crisis of the late-1920s.
Previous research into the colonial rural economy has made much of the
confluence of interests among the landlord class, capital, and the Japanese empire.
According to such arguments:
Japan created a legal and institutional apparatuses to protect land ownership and
accumulation by the landlord and capitalist class, and it placed no restrictions on land
ownership or accumulation by Koreans, allowing the existing situation to continue. It
adopted these policies because the Japanese needed a social class that would
collaborate with them politically and socially in order to rule the Korean people and
to turn Korea into a major food supplier.141
The colonial government not only protected the interests of large landlords in the land
survey and in the estimation of land tax, but also provided many subsidies to those
landlords who faithfully followed government agricultural policies. The GovernmentGeneral fortified the economic position of the landlords who eagerly introduced new
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rice hybrids, organized water irrigation associations, and tried to enhance agricultural
productivity.142

Such descriptions are not entirely inaccurate. The colonial government indeed
adopted policies that supported the development of commercial agriculture, often
designing its policies with the interests of landowners in mind. Still, this long-held view
overlooks a key feature of the colonial rural economy—namely, the ever-present hand of
the colonial state in creating, shaping, and regulating the market for agricultural products
so as to redirect flows of resources and to prompt farmers to adopt new methods of
production. When colonial policies achieved their targets, this was neither the result of
spontaneous cooperation from farmers, nor was it the product of a natural alliance
between capital and empire. Government policies, as implemented by the various
associations, created new incentives to which farmers responded both positively and
negatively.
The associations created under colonial rule were neither the handmaidens of
landlords nor the colonial government, but were a site of interaction between the two sets
of competing interests. At times, the colonial government actively promoted commercial
agriculture. At other times, it channeled subsidies and targets through the associations to
fight the currents of the global economy. In both cases, the form and function of the
associations themselves defined in no small part the effect of colonial policy on the
ground. Where farmers did not respond in the way envisioned by the colonial
government, it introduced new regulations and organizations in an ongoing struggle to
beget the desired response. Regardless of the particulars of each individual campaign, in
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using the associations to build and regulate new market networks the colonial
government reset the foundations of the rural economy. State intervention in the rural
economy became a norm, not just in the heavy-handed extraction of wartime
mobilization but in the mundane practices that turned crops into products, in the
processing, grading, and distribution of particular types of rice and cotton. Most
importantly, after the excesses of wartime mobilization—even after liberation and land
reform swept away the immediate pressures of colonial rule and rural inequality—state
intervention in the rural economy through semi-governmental organizations would
endure. How the introduction of such associations fit within farmers’ established patterns
of production will be examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4:
THE CHANGING PLACE OF THE STATE IN EVERYDAY LIFE

To the extent that institutions appear to “work,” it is because they have been
made to work by being implicated in ongoing practices or projects, by the
selective erosion and elaboration of time. Yet, even against this modest claim for
the surface efficacy of political institutions, many aspects of American political
institutions constitute a challenge. Our arrangements of governance appear
infused not with the spirit of the Enlightenment but with the humor of Rube
Goldberg; after releasing a marble that tips a lever that lifts a plug, a stream of
water moves a pingpong ball from A to B. Unlike the clean geometry of checks
and balances in constitutional design, the facts on the ground are an immensely
complex tangle of indirect incentives, cross-cutting regulations, overlapping
jurisdictions, delegated responsibilities, and diffuse accountability…the
twentieth-century state was constructed in a field already thickly populated by
voluntary associations, political parties, and other organizational actors—a land
already “full of governance.”
—Elizabeth S. Clemens, “Lineages of the Rube Goldberg
State,” 2006143
Do you know the meaning of what olden people called a kye?...A kye is when
several people agree in spirit, as if making an accord with one another. When
famines and fortunes alternate, if there were no kye then we could not establish
the duty of mutual aid; when wealth and poverty are uneven, if there were no kye
we could not attain the joy of banqueting.
—Preface to a kye ledger, seventeenth century144

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Korean and colonial
governments alike reshaped government offices to suit their needs. As explored in
Chapters One and Three, this was not always a simple task. Even within the central
government, the implementation of policies frequently relied upon a host of tangentially
related phenomena; the relatively simple goal of raising tax income prompted a cascade
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of reforms in land registration and currency issuance; the ability to establish Korea as a
source of cotton and rice for the wider demands of empire rested upon the work of a
string of associations and initiatives, each vulnerable in turn to global price fluctuations
and the logistical challenges of partner organizations. Yet, despite these complications,
the view from central government maintains a semblance of internal consistency. Even
amid attempts at avoidance or redirection, tax receipts lay within the purview of the
Ministry of Finance. When the colonial government wanted to increase the cultivation of
a certain crop, it turned to its hierarchy of organizations to promote the item in question
from the model industrial farm through to an array of associations.
The moment that one moves away from the perspective of central government,
however, claims of comprehensive and effective government policies become even
fainter to the point of illusion. The financial associations may have been the colonial
government’s main channel for lending to farmers, but, as shown in Chapter Two, when
it came to borrowing money Sim Wŏn’gwŏn already had a host of options for rural
credit, from family and friends, to well-connected local elites. To paraphrase the epigraph
from Elizabeth Clemens, colonial economic policy was implemented in a field already
thickly populated by markets, lenders, and other economic actors—a land already full of
agricultural production. When the colonial government introduced new seeds or rural
finance, it did so against a backdrop of existing practice and in parallel to numerous
personal networks, charitable groups and commercial businesses that also engaged in the
distribution of seeds and credit. This chapter examines the semi-governmental
organizations introduced by the colonial government within the milieu of alternative
organizations and established practices followed by Korean farmers. It looks at three

204

farmers in turn—Sim Wŏn’gwŏn (1850–1933), Yu Yŏnghŭi (1890–1960), and Chŏng
Kwanhae (1873–1948)—to detail the practices, organizations, and institutions that
supported their agricultural activities over the years. Based on the perspective and
everyday life of farmers themselves, this chapter thus re-assesses the changing place of
the state among rural organizations.
I.

Sim Wŏn’gwŏn and Sources of Agricultural Finance

Long before the colonial government established semi-governmental organizations within
Korea, farmers relied upon a host of organizations, commonly known as kye, to
coordinate activities between and within villages. First recorded in the Koryŏ period
(918–1392) as a form of voluntary association, kye brought their members together in
pursuit of a range of common goals, be it the payment of taxes, support for education, or
to gather funds to maintain a family member’s gravesite.145 Although early records on kye
are scarce, by the seventeenth century several distinct types of kye organizations had
emerged across Korea, including well-known forms such as the village kye (tonggye),
organized to maintain the social order and fulfil common projects within a single village,
and lineage kye (chokkye, mun’gye), which coordinated familial obligations such as
ancestral rites among the extended families of elite yangban households.146 By the
nineteenth century different kye organizations existed for a wide range of specialized
activities, including education, mutual aid and insurance, the management of forest
resources, village administration, as a vehicle to seek profits for kye members, or even for
the appreciation of poetry or music. Depending on their purpose, kye might be formed
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within a single village, between members of the same lineage or descent group, or simply
among a group with a common goal. Although the size varied among different
organizations, surveys produced by the colonial government estimate that the average kye
had around forty members, with the largest stretching into the hundreds.147
Although the precise activities of individual kye organizations differed according
to their purpose, most shared several common features. Members of kye organizations
paid contributions toward the work of the kye, either as an initial payment or at agreed
intervals, with payments made in cash, cloth, grain, or some combination thereof.
Depending on the activities and financial health of the individual kye, members might
also be asked to make supplementary contributions as necessary.148 To avoid recurring
contributions, most kye engaged in profit-seeking activities to earn extra income through
loaning rice for interest or renting fields owned by the kye. For example, one pine kye
(songgye) in South Ch’ungch’ŏng province required all members to pay one mal of rice
upon joining the organization, while supplementing its finances by charging nonmembers a fee for using the kye’s forest resources.149 In another case, an educational kye
(hakkye) in Suwŏn collected fees from members as they joined the group but made the
vast majority of its income (upwards of eighty percent) through rental income from
paddy fields owned by the kye.150 Kye organizations appointed their own management
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from among members and held regular meetings (typically once or twice a year) at which
members discussed kye finances, regulations, and membership queries, among other
topics.
The membership of kye organizations differed from group to group, although
some general patterns may be identified. On the whole, kye organizations tended to cater
to the interest of wealthier and elite families. In the above example of the Suwŏn
educational kye, the kye was explicitly formed to promote the education of the founder
and his future descendants, all members of an elite yangban lineage.151 In this case, as
with lineage kye, membership was defined by one’s status within a particular elite descent
group.152 Other types of kye organization were open to a wider range of members,
although high membership fees still presented a barrier to entry for poorer farmers. Even
in village kye that purported to include all residents of a village, wealthy or socially elite
families could often dominate the management of the kye and its activities.153
Kye organizations thus combined several social and economic aspects of lateChosŏn Korea. Kye organizations both reflected the existing social order and created
social and economic advantages for their members through their activities. Where kye
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made loans for interest or rented fields, members who borrowed from their own kye could
expect more favorable terms than non-members typically received.154 In cases where kye
were organized for the sole purpose of making a profit (singnigye), members received a
share of the kye’s assets at the conclusion of the kye’s activities. Meanwhile, other types
of kye provided access to resources—both material (in the form of funding for education)
and social (fostering a connection with other local elites)—that helped members to
establish and maintain their status within the local region. Despite their elitist tendencies,
kye organizations flourished throughout the latter half of the Chosŏn dynasty as new
forms of kye emerged over the years and the practice of forming and participating in kye
spread to include more non-elites, especially during the late-eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.155
For Sim Wŏn’gwŏn, kye organizations were an integral part of everyday life. In
1870, Sim’s father returned home late one evening with 30 yang. When asked about the
money, he explained to Sim that it came from a p’agye—a kye organized among
likeminded men—and was the proceeds of group’s activities in selling wood and loaning
rice.156 Following his father’s example, Sim was a member of multiple kye organizations
throughout his life; his diary references at last fifty different kye (see Appendix).157 Sim’s
kye organizations spanned a range of activities, from those dedicated to specific activities
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such as education or a “three-person-kye for raising fish” (yangŏ samin’gye), to those
organized around Sim’s own lineage or local villages (such as the Sŏnam-gye and the
Tŏksan-gye). Whatever the type of kye, Sim attended regular meetings with other kye
members and contributed money as an obligation to fund the group’s activities, be it
raising fish, providing mutual insurance against the cost of funerals, or contributing
toward the costs of education.
Sim’s participation in kye can be seen as an extension of his attempts to diversify
his agricultural production. In some instances, kye organizations offered Sim the
opportunity to increase the range of his own farming by jointly acquiring assets with
other kye members which were used to generate revenue. The Tŏksan-gye, for example,
held 28 turak of paddy which it rented out to farmers. Whether Sim received a portion of
the rental income, or whether kye funds were diverted instead toward taxes or other local
expenses that Sim would have otherwise had to pay himself, Sim benefitted from the
income derived from the Tŏksan-gye’s fields. In another case, Sim received 33 bundles
of rushes as his share in a three-person-kye in 1880.158 Again, membership of a kye
organization helped Sim to maintain the breadth of his farming activities, in this case by
providing Sim with the materials that he used to weave mats. By extending his
agricultural activities through kye organizations, Sim thus bolstered his efforts to balance
the cycles of propitious and unpropitious fortune through the cultivation (both direct and
indirect) of additional crops and fields.
In addition to expanding the diversity of his agriculture, kye organizations
fulfilled several important financial functions for Sim Wŏn’gwŏn. Sim was a member of
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a funeral kye (sanggye) that provided a form of insurance against the high costs
associated with funeral ceremonies. With each member contributing toward other
members’ funeral expenses, the funeral kye protected Sim from sudden large costs that he
may otherwise have struggled to cover from his seasonal income alone. Kye
organizations also enabled Sim to jointly store and accumulate wealth in the long term.
By 1930, one lineage kye in which Sim was a member, the Sŏnam mun’gye, had
accumulated some 2,300 yang, while Sim also received a share of the combined assets
(worth 3,700 yang) of another similar lineage organization (munhoe) in 1901.159 Sim also
borrowed money from various kye organizations when necessary, alongside his other
loans from friends and acquaintances. Of course, lending money was one of the main
mechanisms for kye to increase their own assets. But, when faced with temporary
financial shortfalls, kye were an important additional option to which Sim turned for
credit.
By participating in several kye organizations at any one time, Sim was able to
build a social and economic network that extended beyond individual kye that catered to
one town or one lineage. In the same year, Sim both rented fields from a kye to farm
himself and belonged to kye that rented fields to others, a pattern that was surely repeated
in loans as well. Especially when members engaged in repeated transactions with one
another over the years, kye organizations formed a dense network that supported
members’ economic activity. In 1878, for example, when the Tŏksan-gye allocated its 28
turak of paddy, it rented the land to four of Sim’s acquaintances: Yi Myŏngjin, Pak
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Ch’undan, Kim Sunjin, and Sŏnwŏl.160 Sim, Yi, and Pak were in other kye together.
Several years later, Yi Myŏngjin, Sim, and his lineage grandson (chokson) attended a kye
meeting together in Taeil, while in 1883 Sim divided the property from yet another kye
with Pak Ch’undan.161 Prior to the allocation of the Tŏksan-gye paddy, Sim rented a
different kye’s paddy from a Mr. Kim, paying the rent to his lineage grandson who had
his own economic relationship with Mr. Kim.162
In all of these activities, kye organizations were more than a simple conduit for
lending money or renting fields; kye provided the very foundation for transactions to take
place between members. Not only did kye allow members to share the risk of a bad loan
or land investment among one another, but over time the pattern of regular meetings and
repeated interaction within kye organizations helped members to establish patterns of
trust and reciprocity that promoted transactions. In his diary, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn noted the
significance of fulfilling regular obligations at kye meetings in his assessments of the
trustworthiness of fellow members. As he wrote in 1876, “today it is the day of the kye
meeting. Nine people came, and truly these gentlemen are trustworthy.”163 Conversely,
when a fellow member failed to attend a meeting of the funeral kye, Sim noted that both
he and the meeting’s host subsequently doubted the reliability of the missing member.164
For his own part Sim made sure to uphold his obligations to kye organizations, even
sending his contributions when he could not personally attend the kye meeting.165 Within
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Sim’s community, kye thus facilitated economic activities in several ways at once,
providing a means by which members shared information and risk, and established the
trust that enabled members to undertake transactions with one another. In some instances,
the increased trust among kye members translated into additional economic benefits
through more favorable rates of interest offered to members than non-members.166
As Japan began to strengthen its political and economic interests in Korea in the
1900s, bureaucrats were quick to recognize the prevalence of kye. Before long, a series of
reports detailed the distinct features of kye organizations and their historical development
to satisfy the curiosity of colonial officials and other interested parties.167 Though the
reports were thorough, the colonial interest in kye was strictly utilitarian, however, and
the reports frequently returned to the theme of how the new government might use the
popularity of kye to further colonial policies. Thus, after outlining six types of kye
organization (taxes, mutual aid, credit, production, purchasing, and lottery), Kawai
Hirotami (1872–1918, 河合弘民), a school teacher with an interest in Korean history and
society residing in Seoul, concluded that kye might complement the work of the new
financial associations by granting loans to approved kye to undertake various commercial
and industrial activities.168
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While some imagined ways for kye to co-exist within colonial Korea’s new
economic infrastructure, others sought to replace kye entirely. Indeed, even Kawai’s
proposal stripped kye’s independent financial functions, relegating them to a form of
licensed business or contractor. The financial associations thus emerged as one of the
main challengers to kye’s role in rural finance, as Megata Tanetarō (1853–1926, 目賀田種
太郎), financial advisor to the Protectorate administration, and other bureaucrats planned

a new financial system for colonial Korea where financial associations would bridge the
gap between large banks and the rural population. In particular, the architects of the
financial associations charged kye with “fostering a spirit of dependency” and
“weakening individual activity,” contributing to a general Korean economic weakness.
By replacing kye with financial associations, the administrators hoped to usher in a new
era of agricultural productivity thanks to the associations’ lower interest rates and the
provision of agricultural guidance.169
In Ulsan, colonial ambitions were put into practice with the opening of a financial
association in 1908. Founded under the leadership of Endō Yoshichirō (1881–n.d. 遠藤與
七郎) a graduate of Tokyo Imperial University and the director of multiple financial

associations throughout his career, the Ulsan financial association was one of the earliest
to open in Korea. The association’s first task centered on recruiting members. Without a
pre-existing membership or prior knowledge of the local area, the Ulsan association
relied upon a founding committee composed of township heads and other low-level
government employees to advertise the association in the local area and vet new
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members. By the time of the association’s inauguration, the committee had recruited 317
“diligent and thrifty” members, 273 of which attended the opening ceremony.170
The township heads would continue to play an important role within the financial
associations. The financial association directors were overwhelmingly young graduates of
Japanese technical schools, with little to no prior knowledge of Korea or the Korean
language.171 Granted roles as councilors (Ko. p’yŏngwiwŏn; Ja. hyōgiin) within the
associations, the township heads therefore performed multiple essential tasks on behalf of
the financial associations, checking the background of prospective members and
assessing loan applicants’ creditworthiness.172 However, even as the township heads
helped the financial associations to function in this way, they illustrated the limits of the
initial ambitions of the associations. Despite a stated preference to recruit “middle- and
lower-class farmers” (Ja. chūsan ika no mono) as members, this goal stood in potential
contrast to the associations’ concurrent desire to enlist reliable, diligent, and trustworthy
members. Though not impossible to satisfy both criteria, whether or not such conditions
were kept depended heavily on the actions of the township heads who gathered and
liaised with the members of the Ulsan financial association.
Delegating tasks to township heads was just one strategy that the Ulsan
association adopted to mitigate the risks of lending to unfamiliar clients. At a 1915
meeting of the finanical association directors, Endō reported that the thorough knowledge
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(Ja. jukuchi) of each association member was the most important factor when allocating
loans. The association investigated loan applications in great detail—in the case of cow
loans, the association even went so far as to inspect the cow before deciding whether to
grant the loan. For members who lived far from central Ulsan and whose credit
worthiness was hard to ascertain, association staff made dedicated trips once or twice a
year to survey members’ financial status.173
Over the years, as membership increased, the Ulsan association moved away from
a reliance on personal knowledge. From an initial membership of around 300 in 1908, the
association recorded an attendance of 600 members at the annual general meeting in 1924
and 900 members in 1927, increasing the burden of attaining “thorough knowledge” of
each member substantially.174 Already in 1915, the association had begun to experiment
with methods of assessing members’ credit worthiness suitable for a larger organization.
In particular, the association assigned each member a credit score (Ja. shinyō no tensū)
based on the value of their assets (recorded in land and livestock registers) and their
behavior and general standing within the association (assessed by staff and fellow
members).175 The credit score system relieved the Ulsan association of some of the more
onerous investigations required by the previous case-by-case assessment of loan
applications and reliance on personal knowledge, while also setting new criteria that
favored the formal ownership claims based on documentary evidence.
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The financial associations thus operated within certain constraints that shaped
their form and function. Decisions over whether to delegate tasks to township heads or to
adopt a credit-score based system shaped the membership of the association as well as the
preference for certain loan applications over others. On top of such practical issues,
colonial policy could also introduce challenges. Despite the desire that financial
associations would compete against, and even replace, kye organizations, central
decisions on the number and location of financial associations created a natural limit on
total membership. Even as membership grew to over 900 in 1927, and additional
associations opened in the neighboring districts of Yangsan (1910) and Ŏnyang (1917),
association membership represented only a small fraction of the total population of Ulsan
county (recorded as 130,000 in 1922).176 Indeed, in the late 1920s some Ulsan residents
even petitioned, unsuccessfully, to open a second financial association at the former
military command post.177 Unlike kye organizations, which members could form
relatively freely, the formal organization of the financial associations proved a barrier to
their growing influence.
Given the above, for farmers like Sim Wŏn’gwŏn the financial association was
likely not as attractive as the colonial government may have hoped. On paper, Sim
possessed many of the qualities that the financial associations in theory desired. He was a
lower-to-middle class farmer, directly engaged in agriculture with a diligent and
enterprising work ethic. As Sim’s diary proves on multiple occasions, Sim was quite
willing to borrow funds to invest in new enterprises and side-employments. What is
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more, Sim was educated and frequently visited the markets in central Ulsan where he
could be reasonably expected to encounter information about the financial association
and its activities. Yet, not only was Sim not a member of the financial association but he
did not even mention it within his diary, relying instead upon kye organizations to serve
his financial needs throughout his life.
Several factors may have influenced Sim’s lack of involvement with the financial
associations. On the side of the financial associations, a limited membership capacity and
recruitment channels that ran through the township heads may well have prevented Sim
from joining the association in its early stages. But, Sim’s own choices and lifestyle may
have equally contributed toward his non-membership. For one thing, Sim was nearly
sixty years old when the first financial association opened in Ulsan. By this time, Sim had
already covered many of his major life expenses, including building a house (1898) and
establishing relatively secure claims to farmland over many years. Although Sim
continued to farm well into the colonial period, he no longer undertook any significant
investment for which membership in the financial associations may have been useful.
Most importantly, based on his diary entries, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn did not perceive a
lack of affordable credit within his everyday life. When Sim looked to borrow and lend
money, kye organizations were sufficient for his needs. What is more, after decades of
reciprocal lending through friends and family, kye organizations did not require the
burdensome proofs of income and assets demanded by the Ulsan financial association.178
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Tellingly, Sim did not complain of being denied membership to the financial associations
within his diary, nor even mention them as a desirable option. Despite the efforts of the
colonial state to establish influence over the financial habits of the population, the state’s
main vehicle for doing so—the financial associations—failed to elicit Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s
attention.
At least within the realm of agricultural finance, the colonial state was notably
absent in Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s daily life. This was not for a lack of effort. The colonial
government invested millions of yen into the financial associations, with the goal of
competing against kye lending. Of course, the fact that Sim Wŏn’gwŏn did not personally
participate in the financial associations does not negate significant impact of the financial
associations elsewhere in the rural economy. It does, however, draw attention to the
constraints faced by the colonial state, and the existence of alternative sources of finance
that many others could, and did, continue to use throughout the colonial period. Even
recognizing the structural advantages that favored the financial associations, they could
not bypass competition with the kye organizations that they sought to replace. And, as
long as farmers like Sim retained the authority to make financial decisions, there was no
guarantee that their preferences would align with those of colonial officials.
II.

Silk, the State, and Yu Yŏnghŭi

The bounds of personal relationships and entrenched daily habits may have kept Sim
Wŏn’gwŏn from participating in the financial associations, however, in a different setting
the very same factors could equally draw farmers deeper into the sphere of the colonial
semi-governmental organizations. Some seventy miles north of Ulsan, another farmer,
Yu Yŏnghŭi, wrote his own diary detailing his life in Andong, North Kyŏngsang
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province. Like Sim, Yu claimed an elite yangban status while engaging in varying
degrees of agricultural production throughout his life. But, wheras Sim’s personal
acquaintances provided an alternative financial and economic network to that promoted
by the colonial state, Yu’s close relationships with minor government officials and local
notables worked to introduce him to a number of the colonial state’s new agricultural
programs.
Yu Yŏnghŭi was a member of the Chŏnju Yu descent group. Born in Andong to
Yu Hyosik (1856–1924), Yu was the eldest son among two brothers, Hŭiyun (1898–
1953), who was adopted into the family, and Hŭich’ŏl (1906–1987) and two sisters.179
Unlike Sim Wŏn’gwŏn, whose family’s claim to the Ch’ŏngsong Sim descent group was
contested, Yu Yŏnghŭi actively maintained his ties to the Chŏnju Yu descent group
through such activities as compiling and publishing the literary compilations (munjip) of
other notable Yu’s, including those of Yu Hak (1607–1688) and Yu Hongwŏn (1716–
1781).180 Yu started his diary in 1909 and continued it for most of his life.181
In keeping with Yu’s more established claims to elite status, he was less directly
involved in the daily work of agricultural production than was Sim Wŏn’gwŏn. Yu rarely
mentioned visits to individual fields or markets within his diary, nor did he comment
regularly on the minutiae of agricultural prices or seasonal farming activities. Instead, Yu
placed greater emphasis on his wide-ranging social interactions as he attended numerous
commemorative rites (chesa) for his ancestors throughout the year and met frequently
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with acquaintances, including among them several low-ranking officials such as
overseers (chusa), district heads (kujang), village heads (tongjang), and even township
heads. On several occasions, fellow villagers—and even the village head—turned to Yu
to request his help in drafting letters and reports, indicating that Yu was well-known as a
scholar within his local area.182 Thanks to the time he spared away from the fields, and
his social connections, Yu was thus well-informed about current events and he frequently
commented in his diary on issues such as the establishment of new schools, the expansion
of the telegraph line, and the local activities of Japanese migrants and, early on, patriotic
resistance groups (ŭibyŏng, literally “righteous armies”).
Like Sim, Yu Yŏnghŭi was an active member of numerous kye organizations,
with educational kye (hakkye), various village kye (ch’on’gye), reading kye (tokkye), and
kye for the promotion of Confucian morals (yugye) referenced throughout his diary.
Where Sim frequently commented on the economic function of kye organizations,
however, for Yu participation in kye appears to have been equally important for its social
benefits. As someone invested in maintaining his status as a yangban household and an
active member of lineage descent group, by the late Chosŏn period Yu would have been
expected to participate in a range of activities to demonstrate his social status, including
among them the performance of ancestral rituals to commemorate a common ancestor,
maintenance of lineage grave sites, publication of, and inclusion within, lineage
geneaologies, and maintaining the status of the lineage through marriage and social

Yu Yŏnghŭi, Sumunnok, 1910.9.12; Yu Yŏnghŭi, Kusillok, 1911.6.18; 1911.9.22; 1911.9.23; Yu
Yŏnghŭi, Kusimnok, 1913.3.13.
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interaction with other lineages of similar or higher social status.183 Thus, for Yu,
participation in the right kye contributed toward the maintenance of his social status—
from kye directly concerned with Yu’s own descent group (mun’gye) to those that gave
Yu the opportunity to interact with other prominent local families.
Nonetheless, agriculture was still an important topic within Yu Yŏnghŭi’s diary.
Even as a social elite, Yu did not ignore the demands of the agricultural seasons as he
commented daily on the weather, hired additional labor during the agricultural busy
seasons, considered the state of his landholdings, sent nongju—the alcohol traditionally
consumed by farmers—to the workers in his fields, and listened for news on weather
patterns, price changes or insect infestations that might affect his agricultural interests.
Even though Yu was removed from the day-to-day cultivation work within his fields,
over time he increasingly participated in secondary agricultural enterprises such as the
cultivation of silkworms, for which he personally obtained silkworm eggs and mulberry
leaves to feed the growing worms. Indeed, Yu adopted the penname “nongp’o,” or
“cultivated field,” for himself, indicating that even as he engaged in literary pursuits Yu
did not distance himself from his rural lifestyle.
Yu rarely discussed the politics of colonization directly within his diary,
preferring instead to comment on his immediate circumstances. This does not mean that
Yu was indifferent to colonial rule. On the contrary, on hearing the news of annexation,
he lamented in his diary:
I heard that our country has been annexed to Japan, and the Korean Yunghŭi-era year
numbers are no more. Everyone says to use the equivalent Meiji year numbers. It
183
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hurts! It has already been three or four years since our country’s taxes and household
registration introduced the Japanese system, and the appointment as a so-called
protectorate nation has likewise been some years. It has indeed been a long time that
our nation in the East has no leader and no government. Yet, the country name and
the year name were still one thread of our laws and ways. Now, I cannot think. It
hurts! The people of our eastern nation will not pardon traitorous officials, will
they?184

Yu’s diary, however, largely continued as it had before. Every day, Yu recorded the
weather, his comings and goings, and the conversations he had with his acquaintances.
From time to time Yu mentioned secondhand accounts of anti-Japanese resistance, as
when eighteen ŭibyŏng members entered a nearby school and killed two teachers and one
pupil, or of Japanese traders and migrants purchasing rice and land without regard to the
harvest or price increases.185 But, these accounts were few and far between, with most
entries focusing on Yu’s own daily activities.
Where Yu did notice the impact of the new colonial government, it generally took
the form of increased surveys and inspections. Surveyors appeared in the village and left.
In 1911, the village and township heads held meetings where they announced new
regulations concerning hygiene and road maintenance, for which inspectors would be
sent regularly. In the same year, several village heads passed on the order (hullyŏng) that
each village should report its best female weavers, leaving Yu with mixed emotions
ranging from fear and suspicion to bewilderment and laughter.186 Yu was under no
illusion of the origin of these new initiatives. When the military police offered financial
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awards to elders, Yu surmised that the “island barbarians” (toi) were attempting to utilize
people’s goodness, while he judged the new regulations on hygiene to be “exceedingly
severe.”187
In most cases, however, the gradual expansion of the colonial state into Yu
Yŏnghŭi’s everyday life was more subtle. Perhaps the best example of this can be seen in
Yu’s experiences with sericulture. As with many other industries, early twentieth century
Korea witnessed a surge of interest in innovations related to silk production, including
new strains of silkworms, breeding programs, and scientific worm-rearing procedures.
Among the trending sericulture projects, the promotion of tussar silkworms (Ko.
chakjam; Ja. sakusan), “wild” silkworms fed on oak rather than mulberry leaves,
emerged as a popular venture among commercial and government interests alike, both
Korean and Japanese. In the final years of the 1900s, a flurry of newspaper articles
detailed the recent success of the tussar silk industry in Manchuria, various business
efforts to replicate tussar silk profits within Korea, and the Ministry of Agriculture,
Commerce, and Industry’s own projects to import and develop new silkworms, as well as
numerous advertisements for lectures and books on tussar silk production, the sale of
silkworm eggs, and opportunities to join tussar silk cultivation tests overseen by various
entities including the Suwŏn model farm.188
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Following annexation, the colonial government continued to support tussar silk
production as part of its general sericulture promotion policies. Like cotton and rice, the
government designated silk as a favored industry. Early in 1912, Governor-General
Terauchi published an edict on the promotion of sericulture affirming the importance of
improving the quality and volume of silk production through the import and
standardization of silkworm eggs, the promotion of sericulture as a secondary
employment (especially among women and girls who were “best suited” to the
meticulous and delicate work), the establishment of regional facilities to educate
producers and supply silkworm eggs, and by mediating cocoon sales to ensure that prices
reflected quality.189 Just as with cotton, the government also promoted dedicated countylevel sericulture associations (Ko. yangjam chohap; Ja. yōsan kumiai) within each
province which provided the organizational support for sericulture promotion
activities.190 Sericulture was also a major target of colonial grants and subsidies. In
particular, the Imperial Donation Fund classified sericulture as a suitable industry for
yangban and offered grants to raise their productivity through the establishment of
sericulture training stations, lectures, and the distribution of equipment.191
In Andong, Yu Yŏnghŭi encountered the budding silk industry not through an
official government representative, but through his normal stream of acquaintances and
information. In the spring of 1911, after hearing a rumor of tussar silkworms in nearby
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Pongjŏng, Yu personally went to investigate. Later the same month, Han Sugyo, a
resident of neighboring Yech’ŏn county, brought envelopes of the Pongjŏng silkworm
eggs to Yu’s house, at which time he purchased several packets to test for himself and for
members of his extended family.192 Thereafter, Yu regularly raised silkworms each
spring, and often in the autumn as well. Although his first experience was with tussar
silkworms, raised on oak leaves, Yu quickly switched to cultivating the more common
mulberry-fed silkworms. Yu was not alone in this regard; by the spring of 1915,
mulberry-based sericulture was sufficiently widespread that, after a poor mulberry
harvest, Yu and others in the area struggled to find enough mulberries to support the
silkworms. That year, the price of mulberry leaves rose rapidly in local markets, even
prompting fighting among those competing to buy the leaves.193 Shortly afterwards Yu
made a concerted effort to secure his own supply of mulberries, and from 1917 Yu often
noted his efforts in buying, planting, and grafting mulberry seedlings as a complement to
his annual silkworm rearing.
Although Yu’s initial foray into sericulture grew out of his existing social
network, over time the colonial government played an increasing role in supporting and
directing a range of sericulture activities. Indeed, even though Yu did not openly
acknowledge a connection within his diary, it is conceivable that even his first experience
with the tussar silkworms might have been a product of the government’s promotional
efforts. Any such ambiguities would soon disappear, however, as a state infrastructure
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developed piece by piece around the sericulture industry. Late in 1911, the village head
contacted Yu to gather requests for silkworm eggs, passing any names on to an industrial
research group.194 Lectures on sericulture and the handling of “improved” silkworm eggs
were also held through the region, with one 1915 meeting reaching some 2,000 people by
Yu’s estimate.195 By 1917, Yu was buying his silkworm eggs from the local township
office—a pattern which would continue for the rest of the colonial period. When he
began planting his own mulberries, the village head and representatives from the
township office even visited Yu to inspect the growth of the mulberry shoots.196
Yu Yŏnghŭi’s interpretation of the expansion of the colonial state into sericulture
is not clear-cut. On the one hand, Yu was not comfortable with the colonial government’s
efforts to compile data on households and villages, and he described an early request for a
detailed report on the availability and price of a range of agricultural products within the
village as “strange and suspicious.”197 Yet, Yu’s wariness of colonial projects did not
always extend to the individuals who held government posts. Particularly in the case of
Yi Ŭngguk, who Yu knew as an acquaintance both during and after his appointment as
the village head of Naedong. When Yi visited to inspect Yu’s mulberry seedlings, or to
share information on new appointments within the local government, he was more than
just a representative of the colonial government but a social acquaintance as well.198
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A similar ambiguity can be found in Yu’s approach to sericulture as an industry
promoted by the colonial government. Yu’s interest in sericulture, though encouraged
through colonial policy, was not coerced. Yu decided to begin rearing silkworms on the
recommendation of his friends and acquaintances. Even after the township office
emerged as the source of silkworm eggs and other materials, Yu still rushed to buy
additional eggs when the opportunity arose.199 For Yu, sericulture was a source of
income, not just an example of colonial policy. While Yu certainly opposed Japanese
colonial rule and the loss of Korean sovereignty, where the township and village offices
offered support for his agriculture—through lectures, direct instruction and advice, and
access to the latest breed of silkworms—Yu apparently felt few qualms in using such
services.
In Yu’s other farming activities as well, local government offices became a focal
point for a wide range of agricultural promotion. Yu regularly met representatives of the
township and village office who carried out inspections and lectures on behalf of colonial
agricultural campaigns. Oversight from government officials was not always welcome. In
the spring of 1918, Yu complained of the township’s petty supervision after an official
arrived to inspect Yu’s cotton before he had completed sowing his fields, subsequently
returning the next day to watch him complete the task.200 Such frustrations
notwithstanding, however, local township offices gradually became an important part of
Yu’s economic life, as they provided access to seeds and equipment for cotton, tobacco,
and pine cultivation that Yu would not otherwise have been able to procure. In addition to
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programs in support of specialized crops, the local government became a regular
presence in Yu’s life as he participated in agricultural fairs and crop inspections,201 as he
paid his taxes at the township office and waited to listen for the latest news to trickle
down to Andong,202 and as a point of organization for social campaigns ranging from
government-sponsored abstinence drives to nationalist-inspired “buy Korean” drives (as
in the Korean products promotion movement; Ko. Chosŏn mulsan changnyŏ undong).203
Of course, the closer that local government offices became entwined in Yu’s dayto-day economic affairs, the easier it was for the central government to enact agricultural
controls and mobilization campaigns during the 1930s and the war effort. From bristling
at the rigid timetable and methods of cotton inspections in the 1910s, by 1935 the same
infrastructure of county and township advisors were visiting Yu directly to compel the
conversion of more of his land to the cultivation of upland cotton for the war.204 Local
government officials intervened in other areas as well, from holding obligatory national
defense meetings where officials demanded financial contributions from residents, to
recruiting potential migrants to settle in Manchuria with a combination of carrots (free
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transport and 200 yen) and sticks (volunteers who changed their minds were punished
with labor).205 Yet, even if he wanted to avoid the harshness of the later years of the
colonial government, Yu remained bound to its programs of economic and agricultural
support. As well as the source of materials and destination for sales, local government
offices also provided much-needed subsidies for crops following the prolonged collapse
of agricultural prices in the early 1930s, as well as payments in support of disaster relief
after floods damaged crops in 1934.206
In Ulsan, Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s habits and personal connections largely insulated him
from the colonial government’s direct attempts to influence rural production. In Andong,
the same channels brought Yu Yŏnghŭi into much closer contact with colonial schemes:
Yu began to cultivate silkworms based on the recommendation of acquaintances; where
his social network included village and township heads, Yu heard of government projects
of which he might avail himself. To be clear, Yu was in no way sympathetic to the
colonial government. Even as he complied with colonial surveys and regulations, Yu
remained skeptical and grumbled at the imposition. Yet, where colonial campaigns
wound their way through the lowest levels of local government, staffed with Koreans
with their own friendships and interests, Yu’s decisions on whether or not to grow cotton
or raise silkworms were no longer framed in terms of colonial policy but fit within the
existing local social dynamics.
Nonetheless, even if Yu did not dwell on the implications of growing cotton or
raising silkworms, his actions still had consequences. Even if Yu did not see the
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connection to government programs when he purchased his first silkworm eggs from an
acquaintance in a nearby town, the colonial government was gradually creating a state
infrastructure that Yu would ultimately depend upon to continue to engage in sericulture.
For better or for worse, Yu relied upon the local village and township offices for a supply
of eggs each year, for advice on the cultivation of mulberry trees, and even as a buyer for
his cocoons. On one hand, this was the product of the massive expansion of the colonial
state into the rural economy, a process which reached its peak under wartime
mobilization. The same process of expansion, however, also complicated and diluted the
interaction between farmers and the colonial government. Yu was not loyal to the
Japanese empire as much as he was beholden to a market network structured through
government agencies. As long as Yu continued to produce silk, or any of the other crops
sponsored by colonial projects, he had few alternatives but to turn to the village and
township office. While Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s personal connections provided several
alternatives to colonial schemes, Yu Yŏnghŭi’s greater familiarity with low-level
government employees and local notables did not.
III.

Chŏng Kwanhae, Organizations, and Agricultural Innovation

As Yu Yŏnghŭi was incorporating the township office into his new regime of sericulture,
on the other side of Korea another farmer, Chŏng Kwanhae, faced similar decisions in
whether and how best to adopt the agricultural technologies that emerged under colonial
rule. Like Yu, Chŏng benefitted from a relatively elite social status matched with
declining economic prospects, prompting Chŏng to actively engage with the latest
developments in agriculture and industry. Thanks in part to his social standing, Chŏng
also found favorable access to a variety of agricultural initiatives through his network of
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acquaintances, personal reputation, and level of education. But, as Chŏng’s diary reveals,
even if access to material resources could be achieved on relatively favorable terms,
adopting new technologies was not just a question of approving of agricultural
innovations but also involved consideration of the terms which accompanied extra credit,
or improved seeds.
Born in 1873, Chŏng Kwanhae was a member of the Kyŏngju Chŏng descent
group. Like Yu, Chŏng’s elite family background was reflected in his social network,
which included several local landlords (including the O family—the largest landlord in
the local area), and holders of low-level positions such as district heads. Chŏng received a
classical education and served as a tutor in the local school, although as the colonial
period progressed he increasingly depended on agriculture for his income as student
demand shifted to favor a modern education. Chŏng had two sons who shared in the
family’s farming activities. Like Sim and Yu, Chŏng kept a diary, in which he recorded
numerous details about his everyday life, including the weather, his day-to-day activities,
and his reflections on current events. Although portions are missing, Chŏng’s diary offers
a near-daily insight into his life during the years 1912, 1918, 1920, 1923–41, and 1944–
48.
Chŏng Kwanhae lived in Yongin, a rural county in Kyŏnggi province, some 25
miles to the south of the Korean capital. Thanks to its proximity to both Seoul and
Suwŏn, the neighboring county, Yongin was well-positioned to receive the attention of
agricultural reformers. As a resident of Yongin, Chŏng did not struggle to hear the latest
news from the capital and often mentioned current events in his diary entries. Chŏng’s
acquaintances appeared equally well-connected. Chŏng’s sons travelled widely
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throughout the local region, on several occasions spending time in Seoul as well.
Meanwhile, O Sŏngsŏn (1872–n.d.), a local landlord and agricultural entrepreneur,
devoted considerable energy to the promotion of agricultural technologies he reportedly
encountered on a trip to Japan. In this endeavor, O was aided by technicians from the
Suwŏn model farm who regularly visited a kye organization he founded to encourage new
farming methods within Yongin (Chŏng was a member).207
It was therefore not hard for Chŏng to encounter groups espousing agricultural
innovations. Like Yu, Chŏng was familiar with the township office as a location for
meetings and as a source of mulberries, for example.208 At the same time, Chŏng was also
a member of multiple voluntary groups. By 1921, if not earlier, Chŏng was a member of
the O Sŏngsŏn’s Yongsu farming kye, while throughout his diary he also mentioned
membership in other local forestry associations, financial associations, and the
agricultural association. Beyond such organized advocates of agricultural technologies,
Chŏng’s social network was, by all appearances, well-informed and supportive of the
latest farming methods, likely due in part to his peers’ own participation in the
agricultural association and similar organizations.209 One day, in 1925, after Chŏng
lamented his difficulties in obtaining mulberry seeds to a Mr. Kim, his acquaintance
explained in detail to Chŏng how he could order many different types of seeds directly
from Japan through what appears to have been an agricultural catalogue, which Kim
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offered to lend to Chŏng. In no more than ten days after placing his order at the post
office, Kim promised, Chŏng could have his chosen seeds delivered to his door.210
As much as he appreciated new agricultural technologies in their own right,
Chŏng’s interest in mulberries and fertilizers was not independent of the other changes to
the rural economy taking place around him. For one thing, Chŏng’s work as a tutor
diminished over time new schools gradually opened and students turned toward a
different curriculum than the classical education taught by Chŏng Kwanhae.211 At the
same time, the mainstays of Korean agriculture—that is, the cultivation of rice and other
grains—became an increasingly precarious source of income due to the same price
volatility noted by Sim Wŏn’gwŏn. In 1918, Chŏng recorded how rice prices in local
markets had halved in recent memory.212 Five years later grain prices were still unstable,
to the extent that everyone around Chŏng seemed indebted.213 Although prices rose the
following year, providing the opportunity for Chŏng and others to gladly discharge their
debts, Chŏng no longer placed faith in mainstream agriculture as a stable livelihood,
writing: “These days life is gradually becoming difficult. Simply working in agriculture
is not sufficient. Beyond the main industry, one must also have a secondary employment.
I aspire to [have] a mulberry sapling field.”214 In additional to sericulture, Chŏng also
experimented with raising tobacco, chickens, cows, cotton, and pine trees, as an attempt
to supplement to his general farming income.
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In cultivating his crops, both new and old, Chŏng Kwanhae drew on the support
of a range of organizations. As with Yu Yŏnghŭi, Chŏng’s decision to pursue sericulture,
cotton, and other crops favored by colonial policy provided an inroad for closer
interaction with direct and indirect government offices. Once again, the township office
quickly became a regular fixture in Chŏng’s farming routine as a source of information
on potential crops, seeds and other materials, supplemented with a steady stream of field
inspections by township office employees and agricultural specialists. Chŏng also joined
several semi-governmental agricultural organizations, including the local finance,
forestry, agricultural, and, later, tobacco associations. At the same time, Chŏng was also a
member of multiple kye organizations, including those covering funeral expenses, lineage
matters, finance, and agriculture, as well as the Yongsu farming kye dedicated to
agricultural improvements. In 1929 and 1932, Chŏng’s village also acquired a mutual aid
society (Ko. kongjohoe; Ja. kyōjokai) and a revitalization society (Ko. chinhŭnghoe; Ja.
shinkōkai) respectively, both of which were promoted by the colonial government as part
of its response to the rural crisis in the late 1920s and 1930s. Though not dedicated to any
single activity, colonial policies set each organization within the agricultural life of the
village through such activities as encouraging savings, hosting village meetings and
lectures, and even as a site to use and share such farming machinery as a straw bag
machine.215 While the specific activities of each organization differed from one to the
next, taken together they nonetheless provided crucial sources of the finance,
information, and materials that enabled Chŏng’s economic activities.
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As Chŏng adapted his farming over the years, trying to make a profit amid a
volatile rural economy, his production gradually became beholden to the expanded
colonial state. In some cases, the impact was minimal. The obligation to pay annual
association fees, though a financial burden, did not impede Chŏng’s major farming
decisions. Similarly, the subsidies that Chŏng occasionally received from the same
associations augmented, rather than drastically altered, Chŏng’s agricultural production.
In other cases, Chŏng felt the stronger influence of the underlying presence of the
colonial state. The financial associations, for example, lay claim to far greater economic
resources than financial kye could organize within the village. While Chŏng generally
avoided borrowing from the financial associations, preferring to turn to smaller, more
familiar, kye organizations first, on more than one occasion Chŏng found himself
borrowing from the financial association when he needed a larger than usual sum of
money.216 In a similar vein, Chŏng praised new forms of life insurance as an
improvement upon funeral kye, thanks to the larger sums available through the colonial
financial system:
I just opened life insurance and the fee was 1 yen…in the future if we make a claim,
then we will receive 449 yen. This actually is a form of the funeral kye of earlier days
but an especially profitable one. Of course, this is not for my own purposes. I only
want to provide a foundation for my offspring’s industry. 217

In a less positive light, the more that Chŏng relied upon organizations linked to the
colonial state, the greater the impact of price and sales controls on Chŏng’s household
income. Where Chŏng relied upon government networks to produce and sell new crops
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such as silk, cotton, and tobacco, he was increasingly vulnerable to the increase in
product restrictions and regulations that characterized the rural economy of the late-1930s
and 1940s.
At first glance, the distinction between government- and non-government-related
organizations would appear an appropriate point to begin an analysis of Chŏng’s
participation in agricultural organizations. Indeed, a connection to the colonial
government often introduced varying degrees of obligation on Chŏng’s behavior. Even
while Chŏng’s decision to engage in sericulture was voluntary, albeit in the face of
certain economic pressures, his subsequent participation in the sericulture association and
interaction with the township office was not. Especially toward the 1930s and 40s, as
economic controls intensified, government-related organizations were essential in the
work of limiting the sale of crops in local markets and instituting price controls and
production targets. Like many other farmers, Chŏng experienced colonial economic
policy through the local agricultural association, the township office, and the tobacco
association, which directed all aspects of his farming, from what to produce and how, to
when and where to sell, or store, his harvested crops.218
Yet, the question of whether an organization had a formal connection to the
colonial government or not was not the only criteria by which Chŏng Kwanhae assessed
the various agricultural organizations. Although membership in some associations was,
for all intents and purposes, obligatory, membership in other associations was not. Chŏng
automatically became a member of the sericulture association (and later agricultural
association) by virtue of his farming activities, while Chŏng’s sudden participation in the
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tobacco association from 1940s also suggests an element of coercion under wartime
mobilization. However, membership within forestry associations remained voluntary
(Ko. imŭi; Ja. nin’i) for much of the colonial period (Chŏng was a member of the local
forestry association as early as 1923).219 Meanwhile, the Yongsu farming kye, while an
example of a private local organization established by a Korean, arguably held stronger
ties to the Suwŏn agricultural experiment station than did some of the governmentsponsored organizations, thanks to the kye’s efforts to work with Suwŏn agricultural
technicians and explicit focus in promoting many of the same agricultural technologies
favored by the colonial government.
Rather than focusing on the conditions of their genesis, Chŏng Kwanhae instead
assessed each organization according to its activities. Thus, Chŏng held decidedly mixed
views of many agricultural organizations—even for those linked to colonial rural
campaigns, such as the mutual aid society and the revitalization society. On the
establishment of the mutual aid society, for example, Chŏng compared it favorably to
existing types of marriage or funeral kye: “If there is a wedding each [mutual aid society]
member will pay ten chŏn to help toward the meal expenses, and this is no different than
a marriage kye. This is our sincere intention and may even be considered an enterprise
(saŏp). I can see that this will be a good thing.”220 Similarly, notwithstanding its role in
hosting numerous lectures and meetings organized by colonial officials during the 1930s
and wartime mobilization, the revitalization society hall was, to Chŏng, first and foremost
a hall, equally capable of hosting evening classes for women and children, and home to
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the telegraph which conveyed urgent news to the village.221 Even when recognizing the
less-savory activities of colonial organizations, Chŏng could not always avoid them
entirely. Despite decrying what he saw as the colonial government’s plan to entice
farmers with low-interest loans only to foreclose on their properties and gain their land
titles, he nonetheless continued to rely upon the same set of associations that facilitated
such practices for access to fertilizers and seeds for his own farming.222
Intergenerational differences further complicated Chŏng’s participation with
agricultural organizations. Chŏng Kwanhae, while not averse to new technologies or
modes of agriculture, was extremely wary of debt. As he recounted in painstaking detail,
Chŏng endured periodic episodes of indebtedness throughout the 1920s as his expenses
rose above his income. When he finally escaped his debt burdens in the early 1930s,
Chŏng turned to Daoist imagery to describe his elation—“what kind of place the Peach
Blossom Land must be? Escaping debt—it’s like being an Immortal”—while
endeavoring to avoid further debts.223 While Chŏng actively attempted to avoid debt and,
by extension, participation in potentially risky financial organizations, Chŏng’s two sons
did not share his qualms. In one instance, Chŏng warned his sons against participating in
an “industrious farming kye” (Ko. kwŏnnonggye) on the grounds of financial prudence.
Chŏng’s warnings were in vain, however, and despite his sons’ protestations to the
contrary, within the year the farming kye was in disarray after the manager, Yi Ŭnjik,
mismanaged the funds.224 Later, to Chŏng’s dismay, he learned that his sons had taken on
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huge debts, prompting him great stress as he feared the extent to which the Yongsu
farming kye might go to recover its principle.225
Chŏng Kwanhae’s view of the colonial state and its gradual expansion into
multiple organizations and agricultural innovation was complex. Although, in the
examples given above, Chŏng’s appreciation for life insurance might appear at odds with
his distrust of the wider colonial financial system and his warnings against taking on
farming kye debts, in fact there was a logic to Chŏng’s piecemeal acceptance of
innovations in finance. In fact, Chŏng’s warnings to his sons grew out of his own
experiences with poorly-run kye. On one occasion, early in 1924, an acquaintance of
Chŏng’s, Cho Pyŏngok, used his name to get ten mal of rice from a kye which he used to
repay his own drinking debts, leaving Chŏng to angrily threaten Cho with infinite
dishonor.226 Based on this experience, Chŏng’s appreciation of his life insurance arguably
stemmed from its apparent security as much as its generous terms, even as Chŏng bitterly
opposed what he saw as the colonial government’s systemic manipulation of debt and the
financial system.
In many cases, the financial pressures that Chŏng faced led him to adopt a pragmatic
view of the changes to the rural economy. Though often connected to colonial policies,
Chŏng judged agricultural innovations and the new rural organizations on the merits of
their activities rather than the existence of any governmental connection. In many ways,
this was a logical extension of the colonial government’s own efforts to increase its
influence in everyday life. While Chŏng held disdain for colonialism in general, as the
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government expanded into the realm of the rural economy under the guise of agricultural
policy, the colonial state’s actions were no longer judgable in the abstract, but on the
terms of everyday life. In this way, Chŏng developed his own opinions about agricultural
and financial innovation, independent from the government’s interest in agricultural
policy.
IV.

The Everyday Life of the Colonial State

As evidenced in the daily life of each farmer examined thus far, the colonial period saw
the significant expansion of the colonial state into a wide range of economic and
agricultural affairs. In particular, the state’s presence in rural Korea was felt through
township offices, a branch of local government, as well as the activities of the various
associations which acted as semi-governmental organizations in implementing colonial
policy.
That colonial Korea can be characterized as a period of state expansion highlights
the importance of looking at the colonial state not as a preformed bureaucracy but as an
ongoing exercise in the projection of the central government’s power. The ambition of
senior officials’ agricultural policies required existing local government offices to be
used in new ways alongside the creation of new agencies—the semi-governmental
organizations—to supplement and support the capacity of the colonial state. On this level,
it becomes possible to examine not just the impact of an expanding colonial state on
farmers and agricultural production, but also the government’s attempts to increase its
own presence within local communities. As previous studies have demonstrated, the state
does not simply exist but has to reproduce itself, spatially and culturally, through various
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practices and procedures, in order to create and naturalize its own authority.227 By
examining how similar processes unfolded in colonial Korea, it is possible to see not only
how the colonial state approached farmers like Sim, Yu, and Chŏng, but also the potential
limits and constraints that the government itself faced.
While the ongoing nature of the colonial state building project means that
examples could be drawn from almost any period of colonial rule, the 1926
reorganization of the agricultural associations offers one of the clearest views of the
processes involved. Initially, the agricultural association maintained a simple
organizational structure, with one central association supplemented with thirteen branch
associations.228 Under this structure, industry-specific associations, such as the sericulture
or cotton associations, bore the brunt of implementing the government’s promotional
activities, including hiring technicians, organizing lectures and product fairs, distributing
seeds and fertilizers, and managing the sale and inspection of crops. By the 1920s,
however, criticisms arose over the burden posed by the multiplicity of organizations.
Farmers who cultivated a range of crops often found themselves paying multiple
membership fees to the separate cotton, sericulture, livestock, and agricultural
associations, while each association struggled to operate efficiently within its area. In
1926, the colonial government announced the Korean Agricultural Association Law
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which merged most of the existing industry-specific associations into a new “systematic”
(Ko. kyet’ong; Ja. keitō) agricultural association structure, similar to that adopted in
Japan. Under the new law the government replaced the multiple industry-specific
associations with county-level agricultural associations, organized within a nationwide
hierarchical model of provincial associations and one central association. While
membership of the agricultural association had previously been voluntary, under the new
structure agricultural association membership became compulsory for all landowners and
people engaged in agriculture (that is, some tenants) who farmed over three tanbo
(approximately three-tenths of a hectare), as was also the case in Japan.229
At a stroke, the agricultural association became the primary semi-governmental
organization related to agricultural policy. Not only did the new structure grant the
agricultural association a comprehensive, nationwide presence, gaining hundreds of new
county-level organizations across Korea, but the scope of the agricultural association’s
activities also increased. While the former agricultural associations provided mostly
indirect support to its members through the organization of lectures and the publication of
the Bulletin, the newly-reorganized associations inherited the crop-specific associations’
previous responsibilities for direct promotional activities within their district. Thanks in
part to the change in membership, however, the county-level agricultural associations did
not limit themselves to the work of the former associations (i.e., a focus on sericulture
and cotton), but expanded promotional activities to cover a much wider range of crops,
including rice, barley, millet, sugar beet, and alfalfa, to name just a few.
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The rapid expansion of the county-level agricultural associations in 1926 thus
posed several logistical challenges. First, was the question of personnel. While some
agricultural technicians and association staff could be hired from the former crop-specific
associations, the greater geographic scope of the county-level agricultural associations,
along with their responsibility for a wider range of crops, required the recruitment of
hundreds of new association staff throughout the country. Second, was the question of
meaningful interaction with the new association members. Though a significant
expansion beyond the former provincial branches, county-level branch associations were
still relatively remote from much of the population.230 In order to be effective, the countylevel associations would have to establish their own procedures to maintain contact with
the farmers within their district. Third, was the question of the management of the
county-level associations themselves. In order to fit within the new, systematic hierarchy
of the wider agricultural association, the colonial government would have to find some
way of monitoring and disciplining each individual county-level association.
Regarding the hiring of new association workers, a report from the South
Ch’ungch’ŏng provincial agricultural association hints at the scale of the challenge
involved. Overall, the county-level agricultural associations maintained 269 employees,
between 10 to 25 per association, of which just 21 were Japanese.231 Drawing on the
example of Yŏn’gi and Asan counties, the majority of the technicians employed by the
associations had little to no prior experience within local government. In Yŏn’gi county,
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only 3 of a total 18 technicians were previously employed as agricultural technicians
within either the provincial or county government, while one more technician was
employed in a local school. In Asan county, none of the 17 association technicians are
listed as having prior employment within the government, although 4 of the technicians
would go on to work as township heads or agricultural technicians employed in the
county government in the 1930s and 1940s.232
The South Ch’ungch’ŏng agricultural associations therefore invested heavily in
the education and training of their new agricultural technicians, based on the
understanding that “each and every action of the association technicians, especially those
stationed within the townships, directly influences the prosperity or decline of the work
of the county agricultural associations.”233 Mirroring the educational lectures held in
villages, in 1926 the South Ch’ungch’ŏng agricultural association designed a three-year
program to educate county-level agricultural technicians. Held in August 1926, the first
educational session spanned a period of 10 days and invited 69 technicians from across
the province. During the training event, technicians received lectures on the laws relating
to agriculture, fertilizer use, land improvements, grain inspections, agricultural statistics,
and general administration, among other topics, in classes from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.234
As well as training the new association employees, the county-level associations
had to establish their relationship toward the farmers within their districts, both in terms
of creating an authority and maintaining a regular influence that would last beyond an
annual inspection or single lecture. Some of the methods adopted by the county
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associations followed a by-then familiar pattern. Writing for the Bulletin of the
Agricultural Association in 1929, Yi Minnyŏng, head of the Sŏsan county association in
South Ch’ungch’ŏng province, offered his own experiences in trying to increase and
improve rice production among isolated villages. In particular, he encouraged readers to
institute thorough surveys of villages before holding talks, offering subsidies for
equipment, and assigning individual advisors to the village to ensure that residents follow
recommended methods.235 To the stick of surveillance, associations also added financial
incentives offered through competitive agricultural fairs for the farmers who adopted
desired crops and methods. At one such fair in South Ch’ungch’ŏng, the provincial
agricultural association advertised a total of 6,280 yen in cash prizes for farmers with the
greatest increase in rice harvest, the best village oversight of fertilizer use, the best
compost, cotton, and sericulture (judged against mulberry cultivation, silkworm eggs, and
cocoons).236
Beyond such tactics, however, the county agricultural associations also built their
own connections with local villages, establishing and entrenching the expansion of the
state through additional institutional arrangements. In establishing seed exchange
programs, for example, where the county associations had limited direct impact they
often contracted township offices, and even sometimes trusted individual farmers, to
operate seed fields to provide a stable supply of high-yielding seeds.237 Many agricultural
associations established subsidiary organizations to coordinate projects within individual
villages or districts. For example, the Chunghwa county agricultural association, in South
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P’yŏngan province, established two rice improvement associations (Ko. sanmi kaeryang
chohap; Ja. sanmai kairyō kumiai) within two villages, assigning an advisor to each to
provide intensive “guidance” (Ko. sido: Jap. jidō) to residents in matters such as selecting
seeds, transplanting seedlings, and applying fertilizer. All residents within the villages
who either owned paddy land or farmed rice were asked to sign their names to a list of
the associations’ regulations, pledging to increase fertilizer use, harvest their crops at a
particular time, and remove grit from their rice after harvesting, among other activities. In
addition to the rules over individual farming practices, the associations also required
members to support various communal facilities such as shared seed selection fields, the
joint purchase and sale of agricultural equipment and crops, and village lectures and
competitive fairs. Farmers who fulfilled the regulations faithfully were awarded subsidies
while those who did not were liable for fines.238 In all of these activities, the social
structures of villages were actively incorporated into the government’s implementation of
agricultural policies.
Despite these efforts, however, just as the associations found it necessary to
monitor farmers’ actions, so too did the provincial agricultural associations need to
oversee and control the activities of the county-level associations. As Sonoda Hiroshi (園
田寛), provincial governor of South P’yŏngan, explained in the introduction to a 1929
report, the county agricultural associations were a unique agency for the promotion of
industry but the propriety of each associations’ methods was deeply related to the success
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or failure of their work.239 With this in mind, Sonoda organized a competitive fair to
judge the quality of the county agricultural associations within South P’yŏngan. Early in
1929, over a 60-day period, a team from the provincial government visited each
association in turn to assess the results of their first three years’ activities, scoring the
associations for their level of internal organization and their promotion of agriculture
(judged by the distribution of high-yielding seeds, improving farming methods,
equipment, village guidance, etc.), sericulture, and livestock. The associations with the
highest scores received cash prizes (100 yen for the first-ranked, 50 yen each for two
second-ranked, and 30 yen each for three third-ranked associations), and detailed notes on
the results of each association were produced in order that the county associations might
“learn from the past [onkochishin]” to enable further progress in the promotion of
agriculture.240 In both of these examples, the agricultural associations became drawn into
the same pattern of regulation and surveillance, punishment and reward that characterized
the colonial government’s push to get farmers to alter their own behavior. In this,
programs such as the PIRP, or cotton campaigns, were not only programs to increase rice
or cotton production, but also an impetus for the expansion of the colonial state through
semi-governmental organizations that, by design, blurred the line between the
government and farmers.
V.

Conclusion

The drafting of colonial agricultural policies and even the creation of a network of semigovernmental organizations were just one aspect of the colonial rural economy. Korea’s
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long history of rural organizations meant that the colonial government had to compete
with existing institutions and organizations in order to establish its ability to influence
farmers. As Sim Wŏn’gwŏn’s diary and the early history of the Ulsan financial
association show, such a process was not always straightforward. For all of the
associations’ ambitions to replace kye lending, the very networks that the associations
relied upon to reach out to the local population—that is, using the township heads as
intermediaries—enabled Sim to continue his existing habits relatively unaffected by
changes to the colonial financial system. A similar dynamic brought both Yu Yŏnghŭi
and Chŏng Kwanhae within closer reach of colonial projects, however, as their social
circles included local notables and low-level government employees.
How each farmer navigated the tangled web of colonial agricultural policies
demonstrates yet further the complexities of the colonial state’s expansion into the rural
economy. While both Yu and Chŏng participated to a greater or lesser degree within
colonial programs, their motivations for doing so were far removed from the colonial
bureaucrats who planned the initial policies. This was no coincidence, however. The very
extension of the colonial state into the rural economy, through the expansion of the
agricultural association, the recruitment and training of new employees, and the contracts
and agreements that tied villages to colonial policy, both facilitated the implementation of
agricultural policy at the same time as it relied upon farmers to bring their own
interpretations of rural development and agricultural innovation. This chapter has
examined the messy processes which saw different organizations and institutions bring
farmers into contact with the colonial state. How their understanding of rural
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development differed from the colonial government, and changed over time, will the
subject of the next.
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CHAPTER 5:
DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF EMPIRE: IDEAS AND
INSTITUTIONS IN CONFLICT

Between 1910 and 1940, agricultural productivity in Korea increased. The widespread
adoption of high-yielding seed varieties, investment in irrigation, and increasing fertilizer
use contributed toward rising rice yields per hectare, with increases becoming especially
apparent from the 1930s.1 Cotton productivity also increased. Not only had the acreage
devoted to cotton production increased nearly five-fold by 1940, but the use of fertilizers
and new seed varieties more than doubled yield per hectare over the same period.2 Output
of tobacco, sericulture, and livestock—also targets of colonial campaigns—increased as
well, providing further evidence for what some have described as an “agricultural
revolution.”3
Beyond the most statistically-focused economic analysis of colonial agriculture,
the question of how to account for such changes in production has raised important
debates over the historical significance of agricultural development. Debates over who
benefitted from increased the rice production, and how, have highlighted struggles over
inequality within colonial society, while analysis of the uneven distribution of
productivity gains among different crops draws attention to the partiality of the
mechanisms that promoted growth—not all credit was granted equally.4 Frequently

Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural Development, 198-210; Kang, “Essays on the Economic Development,”
90-126; U Taehyŏng, “Ilcheha migok saengsansŏng ŭi ch’ui.”
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3
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4
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debates have centered over the interpretation of the term “development,” with several
scholars concluding that colonial-era economic development was inherently limited,
given the unevenness of the distribution of its benefits and the lack of a sincere intent to
benefit Koreans. Thus, some have adopted the phrase “growth without development” or
“development without development” to qualify discussion of the changes to agricultural
production that took place under colonial rule.
This chapter builds on prior discussions over colonial “development” by asking,
what how did the colonial itself define development, and how did it envision agricultural
development within its own plans and policies for the rural economy? Although
historians have attempted to move away from purely numerical interpretations of
“development,” so too did the colonial government build a broader conception of
“development” that encompassed both quantitative gains in productivity and a series of
institutional and cultural reforms reforms that government officials considered a
necessary precursor to increases in economic output. This chapter will therefore examine
the view of development promoted by the colonial government, the implications of such
ideas for the rural economy, and the ways in which colonial interpretations of
development conflicted with alternative views held by some Koreans. In particular, this
chapter will focus on the significance of the market within colonial policy, as both a
target of development and in terms of the practical implications created by policies. In
this way, a deeper understanding of the historical claims made in the name of
“development” can help to further untangle the context in which colonial policies took on
meaning in the rural economy, and the institutional factors which shaped colonial
economic activity.
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I.

The Idea of Development in the Japanese Empire

Despite its mainly positive connotations, the term “development” has a loaded history in
the context of economics. Generally encompassing a wider scope than numerically
determined measures of economic growth, development as a goal implies improvements
in living standards and the welfare of a population concurrent to increases in (national)
wealth. Indeed, Gi-Wook Shin and Hŏ Suyŏl’s critiques over the usage of “development”
to refer to Korea’s colonial economic change stem precisely from the broader expectation
of social welfare implicit in the term. Yet, controversies over development are not limited
to after-the-fact evaluations of colonial economic performance. As far as it can be seen as
a goal in its own right, economic planners have readily harnessed the notion of
development as a justification for a wide range of political, social, and economic policies,
both domestically and internationally. In all cases, plans for development necessarily
introduce subjective judgements of what constitutes a desirable economic outcome. But,
international development programs in particular have been vulnerable to criticism over
who the beneficiaries of development actually are, whose definition of development
becomes accepted as standard, and even for replicating “colonial” hierarchies of authority
between (mainly Western) economic advisors and the (non-Western, poorer) recipients of
development planning.5
The idea of development carries a long association with colonialism. Building on
existing notions of racial and cultural superiority, during the nineteenth century Western
imperial powers increasingly adopted the discourse of a civilizing mission as justification

5
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for the continuation of empire. In the wake of anti-slavery movements, proponents of
empire constructed new claims of their ability to transform local populations through the
diffusion of European religion, science, or modes of political and economic
organization.6 According to such claims, economic growth and industrialization were the
product of particular Western practices and attributes—the Protestant work ethic, free
trade, or a legally-enshrined appreciation for property rights, for example. As assertions
of cultural superiority became tied to a narrative of economic progress, colonizers
increasingly held the promise of “development” as justification for the continuation of
colonial rule, maintaining the fiction that under their tutelage the colonized population
might also experience development.
In Meiji Japan, such theories of civilizational progress found a receptive audience
among reformers eager to prove Japan’s international standing in the modern world.
Influential thinkers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901, 福澤諭吉) not only
introduced Western ideas to new audiences, but promoted the idea that Japan should
“leave Asia” and follow the example of European nations. Following Fukuzawa’s lead,
and in pursuit of parity with Western imperial powers, Japanese thinkers combined
programs of domestic reforms with efforts to reimagine China and Korea as “backward”
sites of Confucian-bound cultural and economic stagnation, thus establishing Japan’s
supposedly unique position in East Asia.7
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While Fukuzawa tied the re-conception of Japan’s position within Asia to
domestic concerns, other thinkers adapted similar theories in support of Japanese imperial
conquests. In Korea, Japanese claims of economic superiority became a crucial element
in establishing political control over the peninsula. Scholars such as Fukuda Tokuzō
(1874–1930, 福田徳三) referenced German theories of economic stages to argue that, due
to a lack of a feudal stage, Korea had failed to develop beyond the self-sufficient
household economy. Only under active Japanese guidance, Fukuda argued, would Korea
finally achieve a sufficient foundation for economic growth, unleashing the value of land
through property rights and awakening a sense of individualism among the population
which could lead to the mobilization of capital and economic and social development.8
During the transformation of Korea into a protectorate, and later colony, of Japan,
numerous officials seized upon the opportunities presented in Fukuda’s theory of Korean
stagnation. In the name of “reform and progress,” Japan appointed numerous advisors to
the Korean government to oversee wide-ranging reforms “in pursuance of a national
policy leading to reform and progress…in order to promote the country’s welfare.”9 In
this capacity, Megata Tanetarō (1853–1926, 目賀田種太郎), financial advisor to the
protectorate administration and one of the most prolific proponents of reform in Korea,
thoroughly restructured the Korean currency and financial system, by removing debased
nickel coins from circulation and placing Korea on the yen standard; establishing a new
central bank, the Bank of Chōsen (formerly the private Dai-ichi Bank), and a hierarchy of
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other government-supported banks for both commercial traders and farming households;
reorganizing the tax system to direct all revenues toward the Ministry of Finance and
increase government income through a combination of new taxes and increased
enforcement; and laying the groundwork for a national cadastral survey which would
rationalize the collection of taxes and promote economic development through improved
protection of property rights.10 In Megata’s reforms, the need to bring development to
Korea became a major premise for colonial intervention. As one official history
recounted: “One of the chief causes which led Korea to ruin was her financial
disorganization, so, after the Russo-Japanese War, when Japan came to interfere more
actively with the internal affairs of the country, it was from the fiscal side that she first
undertook to reform them.”11
Of course, Japanese claims of reform where Korea had failed to govern itself in
large part served as an external justification of imperial activity. Indeed, that many of the
reports heralding Japanese activities in Korea were published in English demonstrates the
perceived significance of an international audience for Japan’s developmental rhetoric.
Yet, acknowledging the superficial nature of some colonial claims to development does
not automatically discount the content of such claims. The very fact that the colonial
government attempted to justify its rule in Korea according to the criteria of development
itself reveals the symbolic importance of development within colonial discourse. What is
more, notwithstanding the publications that were produced for an international audience,

On Megata’s reforms, see Schiltz, The Money Doctors from Japan, 59-120; David A. Fedman,
“Triangulating Chōsen: Maps, Mapmaking, and the Land Survey in Colonial Korea,” Cross-Currents: East
Asian History and Culture Review 1, no. 1 (2012): 205-34.
11
Bank of Chosen, Economic History of Chosen (Seoul: 1920), 37.
10

255

most publications on the topic of development in Korea were produced by and for
colonial officials who discussed theories of development among themselves in relation to
colonial policy. This is especially so when considering Korea’s status after annexation as
part of the Japanese naichi, or domestic territory. Claims of development were not just a
passive excuse, constructed after the fact, but were part of an ongoing effort to persuade
the population in both Korea and Japan that not only did the colonial government deserve
to rule Korea, but that Koreans should accept its rule and follow its decrees. While by no
means undertaken with the interests of Korea and the Korean population in mind, the idea
of development was an important trope within the maintenance of Korea as a colony.
The example of the nationwide cadastral survey demonstrates the multiple uses of
development claims to the colonial government. Planned by Megata in 1907 and
undertaken between 1910 and 1918, the reorganization of Korean land records fulfilled
several simultaneous objectives. The survey was a tool of empire, providing the colonial
government with valuable knowledge of land ownership, the extent of state-owned lands,
and the potential taxes which would underwrite subsequent colonial policy, facilitating
both day-to-day governance and the pursuit of narrower goals such as encouraging
Japanese migration. At the same time, by using the most up-to-date mapping and
surveying technologies Japan also established itself at the forefront of international
expertise in mapping, further legitimating Japan as a competent colonial power in the
eyes of foreign observers.12 In addition to such instrumental purposes, the cadastral
survey also aligned with Fukuda’s theory of economic growth, which considered a lack
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of property rights to be one of the chief causes of Korea’s supposed stagnation.13
Through the cadastral survey, the colonial government established a mechanism to
implement its own view of property rights, bolstering not only the activities of the
colonial regime but also a range of private economic activity that would fulfil the
government’s definition of “development,” further validating colonial rule.
Colonial officials envisioned themselves as bringing a particular type of
development to Korea, namely, the promotion of capitalist markets and values.
Throughout colonial rule, officials within all levels of the government frequently
referenced such goals as they incorporated Fukuda’s theory as a basic premise of
economic policies. Even policies designed to explicitly benefit Japanese producers and
consumers stressed the importance of inculcating capitalist values and improving the
function of markets as a means to achieve such ends. Such a perspective is clear in the
writing of Kagami Yasunosuke (1868–1931, 鏡保之助), an agricultural technician at the
model industrial farm in Suwŏn. Writing in 1914, Kagami argued that the key to
achieving desired increases in agricultural production lay in the proper development of
exchange-oriented economic institutions (Ja. kōkan wo shugi to seru keizai soshiki):
If we want to increase the welfare of the farmers and open the eternal fount of
national wealth, then along with the goal of decreasing costs and increasing harvests
through improved agriculture and cultivation we must always make goods profitable.
To put it in other words, we must get farmers to think constantly about the point,
“How can I increase the price of this product?”14

In Kagami’s view, technical improvements in agriculture would only achieve their
maximum effect if farmers could be made to appreciate the value of production for the
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market. Profits were therefore an essential feedback mechanism to encourage farmers to
adopt better farming methods and to produce and sell an ever-greater proportion of their
crops.
The colonial government therefore pursued two interrelated goals in its plans for
agricultural development. On one side, the government sought numerical increases in
production and exports. Not only would such increases provide raw materials for an
expanding empire, but higher exports supported the financial health of Korea as a colony
and served as a testament to the supposed benefits of Japanese rule. To this end, the
colonial government introduced new, high-yielding crop varieties to Korea and promoted
investments in irrigation and other agricultural technologies, the results of which were
prominently cited in reports of Korea’s “extraordinary strides” in agriculture.15
At the same time, and as a means to achieve the first goal as well as an objective
in its own right, the colonial government attempted to change farmers’ interaction with
the rural economy, encouraging them to adopt profit-maximizing behaviors and to
rationalize their production for the market. The profitability (Ja. yūrisei) of various
products became a recurring theme within colonial agricultural policy, as both an
aspiration to be instilled among Korean farmers and as a mechanism to achieve broader
policy goals. Colonial officials regularly touted the profitability of the new crops and
farming methods they sought to popularize among farmers, from new strains of cotton to
barley, sugar beet, and even woven straw bags.16 In these efforts, profitability was neither
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empty rhetoric nor an expression of colonial benevolence, but an incentive that officials
sought to harness to increase the production of favored crops, stemming in part from
officials’ own belief in narratives of market-led economic development.
Colonial agricultural policies therefore often included explicit measures designed
to shape rural markets and incentivize farmers, even at the expense of some of the typical
beneficiaries of colonial rule. In 1913, for example, as part of the colonial government’s
larger campaign to increase the commercial production of cotton, the governor of South
Chŏlla, Korea’s most important cotton-growing region, announced regulations
concerning the sale of upland cotton within the province and limiting the cotton trade to
only official channels (that is, through the cotton associations). As one official recalled
the decision, “because traders manipulated the prices and farmers had barely any profits,
Governor Kudō [decided that], as a global crop, it was unreasonable to let cotton be
controlled by traders and we must take the Ōsaka market as a base.”17 In this case, Kudō
restricted the activities of private traders—both Japanese and Korean alike—in order to
create a market that, he hoped, would make cotton a more attractive crop to farmers,
ultimately achieving the wider goal of increasing its production, sale, and export through
the newly regulated channels.
That colonial officials attempted to use price incentives to increase production of
favored crops complicates understandings of colonial agricultural policy as a binary of
either exploitation or growth. Indeed, while recounting the success of Kudō’s cotton
policies several years later, colonial officials congratulated themselves for moving away
from more coercive methods of cotton promotion. Officials described their earliest
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attempts to persuade Koreans to farm upland cotton through bribery, beatings, and the
destruction of non-upland cotton as “unimaginable” in contrast to the system of
incentives and supports established through the cotton associations.18 But, even as it
attempted to avoid the harshest measures of previous years, the colonial government’s
market-based regulations were both more and less intrusive than its efforts to expand the
cultivation of upland cotton. While colonial officials avoided coercion and violence as
standard practice, they nonetheless maintained the ultimate goal of changing farmers’
behavior. After all, if farmers could be induced to produce and sell more cotton or rice of
their own accord, then the colonial government would have no need to compel
cultivation.
Of course, there were limits to colonial rhetoric. Despite constructing a narrative
of the self-evident, self-sustaining benefits of market-led economic growth, in reality the
colonial government had to take concrete steps to support its view of development. In the
above example of Kudō’s cotton policies, the profitability of upland cotton to farmers
was only achieved through the creation of a physical infrastructure capable of overseeing
cultivation within each district (the cotton associations), the enactment and enforcement
of provincial regulations controlling traders’ activities, and the establishment of an
alternative sales network through the cotton associations which took over the work of
calculating prices and arranging finances. In this way, the colonial government’s view of
development can only truly be assessed against the measures it used to implement it.
II.
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As examined in Chapter Three, semi-governmental organizations—the network of cotton,
agricultural, financial, and irrigation associations—provided the basic framework for
colonial interventions in the rural economy. These associations supplied the materials and
hosted agricultural technicians across the country that the government relied upon to
implement all aspects of its agricultural policies, from distributing new seed varieties, to
channeling investment for irrigation projects, and even mobilizing resources for wartime
campaigns. The utility of the semi-governmental organizations was not limited to
material tasks, however, and through the drafting of laws and regulations, the colonial
government also attempted to use the semi-governmental organizations to reinforce its
view of agricultural development through the creation of new economic institutions, such
as regulations and new standard practices within the associations.
Government intervention through the semi-governmental organizations took
many forms. At one end of the spectrum, individual associations directly created local
organizational and institutional models to encourage desirable behavior and activities. In
Miryang county, South Kyŏngsang province, for example, the local financial association
organized a barley cultivation group (Ko. taemaek kyŏngjak nonggye; Ja. ōmugi kōsaku
nōkei) in order to promote the cultivation of a new strain of barley—golden melon
barley—among association members. This fit within the colonial government’s wider
project to promote the cultivation of improved crop varieties within Korea, with golden
melon barley having been selected for promotion by the Ministry of Agriculture,
Commerce and Industry for its robust quality, large harvests, and high sale price.
The barley cultivation group did more than simply provide seeds to association
members, however. After a trial cultivation, the financial association sent a sample of the
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crop to a beer factory in Meguro, Tokyo. The factory liked the barley, and made a
contract with the group to continue as a supplier. In response, the financial association
drew up a series of internal regulations for the barley cultivation group in order to
enhance their cultivation of barley as a commercial product. In particular, the barley
cultivation group committed to plan for the uniformity of the crop among all forty-five
group members. To that end, each member was required to send two toe of their crop to
the financial association each June for a quality inspection, while members would also
receive regular inspections from the group leader and representatives of the financial
associations during the growing season.19 In this way, the financial association not only
attempted to increase production among its members, but directly promoted the idea of
commercial production and established a series of procedures to maintain the quality and
uniformity of members’ harvests as required by the brewery.
At the other end of the spectrum, the colonial government also attempted to
influence farmers through national regulations. To take the example of rice—Korea’s
most important export crop and one of the major targets of colonial policy—the
government implemented a number of measures designed to create an institutional
context supportive of its wider goals to increase exports and production, which can be
traced through even the colonial government’s earliest rice policies. Terauchi’s 1912
directive on rice production, for example, contained measures aiming to both increase the
volume of production (through the promotion of new seeds, fertilizers, and irrigation) as
well as to increase the quality of rice entering the market (through improvements to the
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drying and processing of harvested rice).20 The latter was of particular concern as the
colonial government had identified improperly dried rice (which tended to spoil quicker)
or the presence of impurities, such as dirt, stones, and discolored, broken, or low quality
grains, as major factors that drove down prices.
Rice policies thus closely followed the colonial government’s market-centered
view of development in which prices could serve as a means to both educate and
incentivize farmers. Even as colonial officials developed plans to increase the export of
rice to Japan, they emphasized the concurrent need to improve the quality of Korean rice
and raise its price as a natural complement to policies concerned with the expansion of
sales routes. In this vein, officials such as Nakamura Gen (1868–n.d., 中村彦), an
employee within the Department of Agriculture, and Kagami Yasunosuke, among others,
wrote extensively on the development of the rice market between Japan and Korea,
detailing plans to enhance the reputation of Korean rice in Japan, opening new markets
for exporters, raising demand and prices, and ultimately encouraging farmers to grow and
sell more of their crop.21
Shortly after the publication of the initial directive, Governor-General Terauchi
introduced subsequent legislation to promote the desired improvements in the drying and
processing of rice. In particular, in 1915 the colonial government announced new
regulations concerning the inspection of grain at the major rice export ports. As Terauchi
described the measures:
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Rice occupies the leading position among Korea’s agricultural products, and as a
result of the efforts we have made to date to improve and increase its [production]
there is sufficient to also supply Japan. Seeing large amounts exported each year, we
have the opportunity to make [rice] a major item of trade in the future. However, it is
deeply regrettable that transactions are interrupted and it is impossible to maintain
appropriate prices due to its crude processing, many impurities, and insufficient
drying. Hereafter, we will expand the sales routes of Korean rice and plan to increase
its export all the more. To this end, we plan for the careful selection of export rice,
the removal of impurities such as stones, unhulled rice, broken grains, and millet. The
reason for the enactment of these regulations on grain is the removal of these
obstacles to transactions as a matter of urgency. 22

According to the regulations, all unpolished (Ko. hyŏnmi; Ja. genmai) “brown” rice
destined for export would be newly subject to inspection and graded according to
standard criteria for its dryness and presence of impurities. Any rice that failed to meet a
minimum standard would be stamped accordingly and potentially prohibited from export,
while the inspection stations would also recognize higher quality rice.23 As explained by
Nakamura Gen, although the careful selection of rice for the market should be a matter of
course for farmers, the introduction of formal inspections at the major ports was a
necessary immediate measure in order to bring about rapid improvements in the quality
of Korean exports in order to expand sales routes within Japan.24
In mandating a system of grain inspections for exports, the colonial government
not only introduced incentives for farmers to improve the post-harvest processing of rice
but also encouraged the emergence of a distinct market for export rice. By the time of
annexation, the burgeoning rice trade with Japan had already made a significant impact
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upon the circulation and price of rice within Korea as the open ports emerged as
important new grain trading centers.25 The introduction of the grain inspection
regulations only added to this trend by enhancing the development of export rice as a
distinct product. In addition to Japanese consumers’ preference for unpolished rice, the
grain inspection regulations further differentiated export rice through the requirement of
higher quality standards as verified by the grain inspection stations and authenticated
through official seals. Even the external appearance of export rice became distinct
through the new inspection system, as the grain inspections required rice to be packaged
in straw bags of a set size and weight, and bound in a uniform manner.26
The requirement that export rice pass through the grain inspection stations
compounded the growth of new market networks catering to the export grain trade. In
this, the grain inspection stations complemented the development of new transport
routes—in particular the railways—designed to link the major agricultural regions with
urban areas and the ports.27 In North Kyŏngsang, for example, the provincial government
authorized grain inspection at nine railway stations exclusively located along the Seoul
(Keijō)-Pusan railway line, reinforcing the connection between the export grain trade and
the railways.28 Similarly, in South Kyŏngsang, the grain inspection stations were located
almost entirely along the southern coast, rather than spread evenly throughout the
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province.29 Elsewhere too, growing markets in the port regions and along the railway
lines increasingly challenged the primacy of the existing five-day markets with regard to
the grain trade. In Kyŏnggi province, P’yŏngt’aek grew to rival the traditional market
centers of Ansŏng and Asan, especially as an intermediary center linking Ansŏng to both
the export and import trade, due to P’yŏngt’aek’s strategic location which combined
access to both water transport and the new railway lines.30 Once again, the establishment
of a grain inspection station tied important market functions to P’yŏngt’aek’s location as
a rice trading center. Although Ansŏng and Asan remained important markets in their
own right, the lucrative business surrounding the export grain trade shifted to favor
P’yŏngt’aek and its convenient access to transport links and the newly-mandated grain
inspection stations.31
If the physical location of grain inspection stations gave a geographic order to the
export trade, then so too did the technical requirements of rice processing mark the
production of export rice as a discrete industry. This contradicted much of the
government’s rhetoric surrounding grain inspections, which placed emphasis on the
actions of farmers to improve the quality of their rice in response to market prices. As the
prevailing logic assumed, “if we want to increase the price of Korean rice and expand its
sales routes, we must pay attention to its processing and improve its handling after the
harvest…it is clear that the price of agricultural products will rise once farmers are able
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to put this into practice well [emphasis added].”32 As early as 1916, however, it was clear
to some within the industry that grain inspection regulations were not having their desired
effect upon farmers’ behavior. As Tennichi Tsunejirō (1863–n.d., 天日常次郎), a member
of the Keijō chamber of commerce, noted, although rice inspections had generally made a
positive impact on the quality of exported rice, as long as Korean farmers sold their rice
to domestic traders “as is” (Ja. sono mama), the regulations did little more than encourage
the emergence of a new rice processing industry in which traders bought unhulled rice at
comparatively cheap prices before processing it themselves to earn higher profits.33
Comprehensive figures showing the extent of the secondary processing industry
are scarce, but data from the accounts of one rice mill in the capital (est. 1910) show that
by 1919 purchasing and processing rice formed the bulk of the mill’s income. In one
year, the rice mill earned 19,431 yen from the purchase, processing and sale of rice (as
unpolished rice), compared to just 3,387 yen earned in fees from processing rice on
behalf of landlords and other rice-owners. As analyzed by Hong Sŏngch’an, the Tongil
Rice Mill invested heavily in the rice processing industry, purchasing engine-powered
mill equipment and converting the firm’s commercial capital to industrial capital
throughout the 1910s.34 Though only one mill, the example of the Tongil Rice Mill
nonetheless demonstrates how rice processing became a viable industry in its own right.
What is more, as the Tongil example also shows, a large proportion of rice processing
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transactions took place away from the hands of the landlords and farmers who initially
produced the rice and sold it unprocessed. While Tennichi, a rice trader and president of a
(different) rice mill himself, undoubtedly profited from this trend, he nonetheless
lamented that as long as rice processing remained a separate industry there would be little
improvement among farmers’ production methods.35
If colonial officials shared Tennichi’s concerns, they struggled to find an effective
solution to the problem. On the whole, officials ascribed the tendency to sell unprocessed
rice to Korean custom and a lack of knowledge among farmers, to combat which the
government planned regional lectures on the benefits of rice processing and
demonstrations of recommended techniques and machines.36 Supplementing these
measures, semi-governmental organizations once again provided an organizational and
institutional channel to buttress attempts to expand the practice of rice processing among
farmers. In Sach’ŏn county, South Kyŏngsang province, the local agricultural association
carried out an awareness campaign on the additional benefits of selling processed rice as
part of an effort to redirect a greater share of the profits from the rice trade toward
farmers. Meanwhile, the Andong county agricultural association in North Kyŏngsang
province began its own program to jointly process and sell members’ rice for profit from
1923 onwards. Like the Miryang financial association barley cultivation group, the
Andong agricultural association carried out its own quality inspections of participating
members’ rice. As the association proudly reported, these measures helped it to achieve a
higher price than members could have achieved in the nearby Taegu market, satisfying
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both participating members and the colonial government’s vision of price incentives as a
spur to agricultural improvement.37
As evidenced in the colonial government’s struggle to expand the practice of rice
processing, the rural population did not automatically share the colonial government’s
interpretation of market incentives and commercial production. Rather, particular
processes acquired significance within the colonial logic of development and were put
into practice through a specific infrastructure of regulations and semi-governmental
organizations. The colonial government’s was not the only view of development within
rural Korea. Where the colonial government created new institutions to emphasize the
profitability of certain crops, this was just one potential avenue for farmers and one
which might present significant obstacles to farmers, whether through geographic
constraints or a lack of necessary capital. How colonial plans for development compared
to alternative views and institutions provides essential context to understand its impact
within the rural economy.
III.

Multiple Views of Development

For all the confidence with which it projected its vision of development onto the Korean
rural economy, the colonial government’s interpretation of desirable market institutions
did not command universal acceptance. Among the general population there existed a full
range of opinions concerning the rural economy, some of which corresponded to the
colonial perspective and some which did not. Perspectives on colonial policies ranged
from farmers like Sim Wŏn’gwŏn—who were elderly enough or sufficiently insulated
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from colonial initiatives to receive much influence on long-held views—to farmers such
as Yu Yŏnghŭi or Chŏng Kwanhae, whose daily lives brought them into contact with
colonial agricultural programs, albeit for different reasons than those imagined by the
colonial government. Critics of colonial agricultural policies at the time were equally
diverse, ranging from Marxist intellectuals, to nationalist campaigns to develop sources
of capital that could compete with Japan, to agrarian critics of capitalism who advocated
self-sufficiency and traditional values over the governments’ promotion of an
increasingly specialized and scientific commercial agriculture.38 Even those who shared
with the colonial government a desire to improve Korean agricultural production through
the adoption of new technologies and methods might disagree with certain aspects of
colonial policy or the institutional mechanisms used to implement them.
Of course, within colonial society, not all views of development garnered equal
respect. Whether due to arrogance, ignorance, or a combination of the two, colonial
officials often overlooked existing Korean practices and ideas and condemned them as
backward customs. Where the colonial government endorsed one set of institutions over
another—by extending credit through financial associations in direct competition with
merchants who customarily made loans against farmers’ future harvests, for example—it
often created new obstacles for existing practices, if not outright preventing them. How
colonial development policies appeared in relation to the alternatives, then, is an
inseparable task when assessing colonial views of development.
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Colonial officials were not the only ones to take an interest in Korean rural development.
The Yongsu farming kye (Ko. nonggye; Ja. nōkei) was among the many agricultural
organizations established in the early years of colonial rule. Founded by O Sŏngsŏn
(1871–1950), a local landlord, the Yongsu kye included members from both Yongin and
Suwŏn counties in Kyŏnggi province. O launched the Yongsu kye in February 1909 and
successfully gathered 226 attendees for its opening ceremony the following year. By
1913, the kye claimed a membership of 557 local farmers drawn across four townships,
comprising both landlords and landless tenants alike (see Table 5.1). Intended to foster
and improve the agriculture of its members, the Yongsu kye supported a number of
activities, including livestock rearing (particularly cows and chickens), moneylending,
savings, sericulture, promoting high-yielding seeds, fertilizers, and general knowledge of
new agricultural techniques, as well as promising mutual aid and grain loans to its
members in times of need.39
The Yongsu farming kye drew early praise from colonial officials. Although the
Yongsu kye was not formally a part of colonial projects, as were the various semigovernmental organizations or government-run projects such as the model industrial
farm, it garnered the attention and support of colonial officials due to the similarity of
many of its objectives. Agricultural technicians from the nearby Suwŏn model farm
visited the Yongsu kye and consulted with O to educate members through lectures and
offer advice on how to improve agriculture. Government technicians complimented the
kye, calling its establishment, “the most gratifying affair in achieving the goal of
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Table 5.1: Yongsu farming kye membership and landholdings, 1913
Township
No. of
Total land held by
Average land, turak Proportion
members members, turak
per household
landless (%)
Kigok township,
399
3,000
8
60
Yongin
Kuhŭng township,
53
300
6
47
Yongin
Taech’on
45
360*
8
33
township, Suwŏn
Changju
60
540*
9
66
township, Suwŏn
Source: “Ryūsui[Yongsu] nōkei (ue),” CNH 8, no. 7 (1913): 44.
Note: Total landholdings marked by asterisk have been calculated from the average data. Averages are
calculated to include landless households, as they are assumed to be tenant farmers.

developing regional industry.”40 The Yongsu kye maintained a favorable reputation
among officials throughout its operation, earning a bronze medal for its work at both the
1915 Chōsen Industrial Exposition and the 1922 Tokyo Peace Exposition.41
In their praise for the Yongsu farming kye, colonial officials highlighted the areas
in which the kye’s activities overlapped with the goals of colonial policy. In a 1925
tribute to the kye, a representative of the Kyŏnggi provincial office listed its many
accomplishments since its founding, offering descriptions that closely resembled several
agricultural policy directives. In order, the kye was lauded for improving and
popularizing the selection of improved seeds, establishing an improved nursery for rice
seedlings, removing weeds and millet from rice paddies, promoting fertilizer use,
encouraging the cultivation of sugar beet, increasing and improving livestock rearing,
improving sericulture, supplying agricultural credit, encouraging savings, storing and
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lending grain, and offering agricultural guidance.42 Each of these activities mirrored
current agricultural policy within the colonial government’s broader agenda of promoting
rural development. Removing weeds and millet from paddy fields was a basic element
within the government’s rice improvement campaigns, as was the adoption of highyielding rice varieties, the application of fertilizers, and the use of seedling nurseries to
improve the quantity and quality of the harvest. The cultivation of sugar beet and
silkworms was also encouraged by the colonial government for their commercial
potential; as well as supplying Japan with important raw materials, agricultural
technicians stressed the potential profitability of the two as cash crops that households
could use to supplement their income and further develop industrious habits.
In many ways, the activities of the Yongsu farming kye did align with the
priorities of colonial agricultural policy. O, the founder, reportedly left a government
position in 1907 to return to his village and focus on improving agriculture. As a
committee member for the Oriental Development Company (ODC)—a semigovernmental Japanese corporation dedicated to the development of agriculture in Korea,
largely, though not exclusively, through the facilitation of Japanese emigration43—O
visited Japan for one month in 1908 in order to inspect the most recent developments in
Japanese agriculture. Upon his return to Korea, O established a society to study
agriculture and the Yongsu farming kye, the latter of which became O’s main vehicle for
promoting improvements in agricultural production for the benefit of local farmers.44 The
account of O’s revelation about the potential of Japanese agricultural methods to develop
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rural villages in Korea, published repeatedly as it was in the Bulletin of the Agricultural
Association, may be somewhat exaggerated to suit colonial narratives. Nonetheless, to the
extent that, through his actions in partnering with technicians from the Suwŏn model
farm and facilitating the spread of high-yielding seeds and fertilizers, he appears to have
believed in the benefits of the new agricultural methods promoted within the kye, O and
the Yongsu farming kye shared a perspective that aligned with several aspects of colonial
agricultural policy.
Nonetheless, despite positive portrayals within the Bulletin, not all of the Yongsu
farming kye’s activities corresponded perfectly with the colonial view of development.
As explored above, property rights were both an important goal and mechanism within
colonial agricultural policy; as well as defining and protecting property rights by law, the
colonial government relied upon the profit motive as a major incentive for several of its
policies, hoping that properly guaranteed returns would motivate farmers to invest in
their land and improve their cultivation methods. For all its promotion of agricultural
technologies, the Yongsu farming kye did not simply replicate the colonial view that
placed profits and property rights as key foundations for agricultural development.
Although the Yongsu kye upheld the explicit goal of improving agriculture, it also looked
to support farmers—both landlords and tenants alike—through practices such as mutual
aid and the extension of grain loans to impoverished households. What is more, where the
kye offered loans to its poorer members, it did so in consultation with village
representatives and not just with regard to the individual assets of the potential lender, as
was the practice among the financial associations.45
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Conflicting views over the importance of property rights came into even sharper
focus regarding the Yongsu kye’s efforts to promote livestock. On a basic level, the views
of most farmers and colonial officials aligned in seeing cows as a positive asset for rural
households. Agricultural technicians therefore praised the Yongsu kye’s early plans to
increase the number of livestock among its members, and technicians from the Suwŏn
model farm even offered to lend the kye some of the model farm’s “improved” breeds, so
that the kye might enhance its cows’ physical characteristics rather than leaving them
“entirely to nature.” However, where the Yongsu farming kye planned a program based
on joint cow ownership, agricultural technicians objected that such a system provided
greater benefits to non-owners, thus weakening the incentives to own (and improve)
cows.46
At the heart of the disagreement was a practice known as yet’ak (Ja. yotaku), or
deposit feeding. Owning a cow was an expensive and uncertain prospect. On top of the
purchase price of the cow itself, the owner had to ensure the cows’ food supply. What is
more, the owner would lose their entire investment if the cow became sick, died, escaped,
or was stolen. Customarily, farmers in the Yongsu region therefore used the practice of
“deposit feeding” to mitigate some of these risks. In exchange for contributing toward the
costs of raising a cow—typically somewhere between seven mal to one sŏm of rice per
year—other farmers could share some of the risk of cow ownership in exchange for a
right to one of the cow’s future calves. Despite the popularity of the system within the
local area—over 70 percent of the Yongsu farming kye cows raised in this manner—the
agricultural technicians feared that the practice undermined returns to cow ownership and
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could decrease the number of calves that owners might wish to breed, hampering colonial
schemes to increase the number of improved livestock in Korea.47
In the end, the agricultural technicians reached an agreement with O to modify
cow ownership practices within the Yongsu kye. The system of deposit feeding would
continue, although with some modifications. Under the new system, feeders would offer
lower annual contributions to the upkeep of cows (now limited to between five to seven
mal), while the Yongsu kye would also reduce the total number of calves per cow that
could be claimed in return. Although the technicians acknowledged that this measure was
little more than a drop in the ocean, they nonetheless credited the slight strengthening of
cow ownership rights with an uptick in the total number of livestock between 1910 and
1913 (increasing from 70 animals at a ratio of 1 bull to 2 heifers, to around 300 animals
at a ratio of 2 bulls to 3 heifers).48
Based on only a few reports authored by agricultural technicians, it is hard to
assess the impact of the modifications to the Yongsu kye’s cow ownership system.
Although the technicians asserted the strengthening of cow ownership rights as the prime
factor behind the kye’s increased cow population, it is equally plausible that the numbers
simply reflected the initial enthusiasm of kye members to participate in one of the Yongsu
kye’s first major projects. But even in the absence of conclusive evidence to validate one
claim over the other, it is clear that the employees of the model farm and the organizers
of the Yongsu farming kye held quite different assumptions about what it would take to
improve livestock ownership.
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Ultimately, however, neither view prevailed. The Yongsu farming kye’s formal
program to increase livestock was dissolved in 1916 at the mutual agreement of the kye
members.49 Meanwhile, for its part, the colonial government also found it necessary to
temper its simple faith in ownership rights as sufficient to encourage increases in cow
ownership and investment in improved cattle breeds. Although cows were generally a
popular investment among Korean farmers, they were also a flexible asset which farmers
easily bought and sold when harvests and incomes rose and fell. Yet, despite such
behavior aligning with the colonial government’s professed concern for rational
economic decision making, farmers’ proclivities to freely buy and sell cows in fact
contradicted the colonial government’s wish to establish secure, long-run programs
where improved cow breeds could be systematically cross-bred with native livestock in a
controlled manner. Thus, from 1916, the colonial government introduced its own series
of subsidies and regulations on cattle ownership in order to prevent farmers from treating
cows as “solely a financial asset.”50
The provision of agricultural credit also became an arena in which the Yongsu
farming kye’s view of development differed from that of the colonial government. Credit
was an essential element in colonial development plans. Almost every major agricultural
policy—from upland cotton promotion to investments in irrigation and high-yielding
seeds—received financial support in the form of loans offered through a combination of
the financial associations, irrigation associations, and other government-backed financial
institutions such as the ODC, AIB, and IBC. For colonial officials, however, the credit
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offered through such organizations was more than a practical necessity of ambitious
agricultural policies. Colonial officials intended the financial associations, in practice the
gateway to the wider financial system for many small and medium farmers, to be as
educational as they were financial. Thus, the associations engaged in activities to support
the broader project of agricultural development. Where associations offered credit for
seeds and fertilizers, they also hosted lectures and promoted favored varieties aimed at
increasing productivity.51 Where associations acted to facilitate members’ transactions,
they did so as part of efforts to bypass merchants and boost members’ appreciation for
profits.52 Despite frequent reference to the civilizing mission of the associations,
however, they were not conceived of as charity. Rather, officials saw their benefit to
farmers in the associations’ status as a people’s banks (Ja. shomin ginkō), operating on
business principles and remedying a “broken” system of agricultural credit.53
Credit and finance also featured prominently in the activities of the Yongsu
farming kye. To the kye’s early objective of “loaning grain to poor farmers,” over the
years the kye established dedicated savings programs (see Figure 5.1) and mechanisms
for wealthier members to purchase shares in the kye in return for dividends, voting
privileges, and other favorable treatment.54 On the whole, colonial officials praised the
Yongsu kye’s financial activities, in particular its commitment to low-interest lending and
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Figure 5.1: A Yongsu farming kye savings certificate, 1924

Image from: http://www.emuseum.go.kr/relic.do?action=view_d&mcwebmno=39605 (accessed April
22, 2016)

poverty relief.55 The kye’s approach to agricultural credit, however, differed from that of
the financial associations in several ways. Where the financial associations placed a
heavy emphasis on loans for what it considered to be productive uses such land
improvement or investment in a large purchase, such as a cow, the Yongsu farming kye
held fewer ambitions for its loans. Intended as short-term loans, to be repaid within the
year, the main regulations of the kye stipulated three types of loans, each related to the
agricultural seasons: cutting grass and making fertilizer, planting, and ploughing.56 Also,
where the financial associations lent to individual members based on their personal
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financial status, the Yongsu kye relied to a greater extent on villages to communally
guarantee and decide the allocation of grain loans for poverty relief. In both of these
ways, the Yongsu kye’s conception of debt differed from that of the financial
associations. For the Yongsu kye, debt was not a tool to be used to progress toward
wealth, but was simply a feature of everyday life to be mitigated. In this way, the Yongsu
kye’s grain loans were not designed to provide a long-term solution for the recipients, as
the loans for agriculture were a means of covering regular expenses rather than intended
to boost farmers’ incomes through dedicated investments.
The Yongsu kye’s approach to savings also differed from the financial
associations. From the beginning, the financial associations were established with the
goal to build capital within each association. Although the central bank granted each
association an initial fund of 10,000 yen, this was considered a temporary measure. The
financial associations therefore kept detailed records of the returns on their loans and the
speed with which they were repaid, planning for the gradual increase in the associations’
capital. Savings were therefore one more means for the associations to expand their
operating capital, and the associations both promoted savings among their members and
established mechanisms to transfer capital from one association to another to seek
additional returns. In contrast, the Yongsu kye gained most of its capital from its wealthy
members who bought into the kye in the form of shares and membership fees. Without
the financial backing of the colonial government, which continued to support the
financial associations by offering them additional funds for policy-related loans, such as
with the PIRP, the Yongsu kye was almost always short of capital and any new venture
required additional requests for investment from among the kye members. The Yongsu
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kye first experimented with a savings program in order to alleviate some of these
financial pressures, from 1912. While this worked to some extent, the kye also structured
its savings program as a means for poorer members to gradually accumulate shares in the
kye through gradual accumulation of assets (see Figure 5.2). Because the kye paid
dividends to its shareholders, savings were therefore an unsustainable source of cash in
the long run and did not help the kye to achieve financial stability in the way that the
financial associations did.
Ultimately, both were actively engaged in the business of debt and savings, but
with important differences. Where financial associations viewed debt as a means for their
members to increase their wealth, the Yongsu kye followed a more conservative model in
emphasizing savings and gradual (non-speculative) investment. Ironically, for all of the
talk of avoiding a spirit of dependency, both the financial associations and Yongsu kye
were committed to offering debt and loans to their members as an essential part of their
business. Indeed, more than even the financial associations, the one with the greatest
interest in avoiding debt seems to have been Chŏng Kwanhae, a member of both the
financial association and the Yongsu farming kye. Chŏng repeatedly lamented his debts
within his diary and expressed relief when he finally cleared his debts and a desire to
avoid future financial stress.57
As explored above, agricultural “development” during the colonial period
generated a range of interpretations. Even among those who had ostensibly similar
purposes and goals—to increase the number of cows, for example, or to extend more
credit to farming households—the choice of methods and institutions in pursuit of the
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Figure 5.2: A Yongsu farming kye savings certificate showing the accumulation of
shares in the kye, 1929–1935

Image from: http://www.emuseum.go.kr/relic.do?action=view_d&mcwebmno=110775 (accessed
April 22, 2016)

goal could lead to quite different outcomes. These differences were not coincidental but
were the product of differing interpretations of development itself, of the underlying
priorities of improving agricultural production, and the institutions which proponents
prioritized within the rural economy. Different conceptions of development did not
simply coexist, however, and nor did they remain in the intellectual realm. Different
views of the market and development came up against not just one another but also
against practical constraints and the limits of advocates to control the world around them.
IV.

Conflict and Failure in Rural Development
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Among the colonial government’s development goals, making new markets for rice was
one of its highest priorities. This was also one of its most ambitious tasks. To foster new
markets between Japan and Korea involved many aspects, including encouraging
commercial production—changing the type of rice grown, and its post-harvest
processing—as well as building a transport and inspection infrastructure capable of
supporting new sales. What is more, in line with the colonial government’s view of
development, it sought to use regulations to enhance producers’ incentives to engage with
the rice market, by ensuring higher prices for higher quality grain, raising the quality and
uniformity of the crop to expand demand, and, at least in theory, attempting to secure rice
as a source of profits for farmers.
All the same, many of the colonial government’s assumptions about rice
regulations and their expected impact within the rural economy rested upon a limited
understanding of the rural economy. By assuming that Korean farmers simply lacked a
proper appreciation for profits, colonial officials not only overlooked the potential source
of problems in the rural economy but colonial policies that aimed to raise an awareness
for profits were also more likely to produce different effects than anticipated. Thus,
regulations that mandated rice inspections did not encourage widespread, small-scale rice
processing, but instead fueled the emergence of a distinct rice cleaning industry.
In Kyŏnggi province, Chŏng Kwanhae and his family were keenly aware of the
profitability and commercial potential of rice. Not only did Chŏng sell his rice in local
markets, but his family would travel to seek out the best prices for their own crop and to
take advantage of favorable trading possibilities. In 1912, Chŏng’s elder brother went all
the way to Chinch’ŏn county, in North Ch’ungch’ŏng province, some 40 miles away, to

283

buy rice after he heard that prices were significantly cheaper there.58 When Terauchi
introduced policies to promote the market in rice, the result was therefore not so much to
introduce a new motivation to a blank slate of farmer opinion as to alter the options
available to them.
For Chŏng Kwanhae, the new regulations were less than welcome as he saw them
as undermining the existing market for rice. As he complained in 1918, “since the new
law was issued, the grain price fell,” noting a near 50 percent decline from what he
considered to be the customary prices in the local Paekam market. This caused great
consternation not just to Chŏng but to his sons and neighbors as well. Even though the
crop was still too green to harvest prices were already falling, leaving farmers to
anxiously decide whether to harvest their crop early or risk increasing the scale of their
losses should prices fall even further. Chŏng did not describe the new law in full; he
cared little whether or not it was working as intended by Terauchi. Rather, it was simply
an unwelcome source of disruption in the local market, and one that came with stiff
penalties at that.59
Despite the colonial government’s faith in the potential for market incentives to
inspire development throughout rural Korea, actually producing the desired effects was a
harder task. Not only did the colonial government fail to understand the existing market
awareness among Korean farmers, but it also struggled to bring its own plans into reality.
The key foundation of many colonial development plans—achieving higher prices for
higher quality rice—may have been possible in small, incremental measures, as in the
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premiums found for export rice, or for processed rice. For many farmers, however, rising
prices appeared as little but a temporary reprieve among dramatic periods of decline,
during which time the threat of debt and famine loomed large. Most years, Chŏng
Kwanhae complained of debts and falling rice prices. Even though in the years 1924 and
1925 prices rose to a sufficient degree that Chŏng was able to repay all of his outstanding
debts, these years were the exception in a longer period of decline. From the mid-1920s,
Chŏng’s pessimism about rice prices only seemed justified as global prices fell over a
sustained period. In this context, Chŏng, rather than spend additional energy seeking
marginal increases in rice through processing his crop tended to look at alternative
ventures instead, investing in non-agricultural businesses as well as taking an interest in
sericulture. As Chŏng and his friends remarked, among those they knew who sought
profit in rice, all were poor, whereas among others who sought money in its own right,
some had become rich.60
The colonial government recognized the obstacles to its idealized model of
development, and amended its plans over the years. Where officials perceived Korean
farmers to be unresponsive to market incentives, it attempted to raise awareness in ever
more direct measures, as through grain inspection regulations and the various initiatives
to promote rice processing. At the same time, colonial officials also recognized flaws in
the international rice market itself. Government representatives and traders studied the
underlying causes of low Korean rice prices in Japan, only to find persistent and
unexplainable discrepancies. The director of the Korean Rice Society (Ko. Sŏnmi
hyŏphoe; Ja. Senmai kyōkai), for example, was dismayed to find that rice from North
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Chŏlla province traded at a discount compared to rice from South Chŏlla and North
Kyŏngsang provinces, even in the absence of any discernable differences in quality. 61
Likewise, Okazaki Tetsurō, (1885–n.d., 岡崎哲郎), head of the Department of Commerce
and Industry within the Government General of Korea, studied the price of Korean rice in
Ōsaka, which consumed 80 percent of Korean exports, only to find that Korean rice was
persistently underpriced, and sold for substantially higher margins when mixed with
Japanese rice or repackaged in department stores.62
Faced with the limitations of its prior assumptions, the colonial government
responded with an even greater vision for itself and its role in supporting agricultural
development. In addition to changing agricultural production and behavior among
Koreans, it began to target the functioning of the market itself. In 1926, when the colonial
government reorganized and expanded the agricultural association, it also altered the
emphasis of their activities. The initial agricultural association had claimed a role in (1)
surveying agricultural conditions as a basis for future policy; (2) educating and guiding
farmers on agriculture, forestry, and livestock; and (3) promoting the interests of
individual farmers, whether Japanese settlers or local Koreans.63 In contrast, the 1926
amendment to the agricultural association regulations altered its functions to include a
greater role for the government in its new priorities of: (1) working in tandem with the
authorities to encourage and guide agriculture; (2) to supply the facilities to increase the
welfare of those engaged in agriculture; (3) to conduct surveys and research into
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agriculture; (4) to mediate dissent relating to agriculture; and (5) to make proposals to
government administration and the answer questions from the administration related to
agriculture.64
Although the stronger governmental role applied mostly to farmers, as problems
emerged in the international rice market, colonial officials increasingly saw a role for the
government to promote development by improving the market itself. Thus, in 1928,
Tomita Gisaku (1858–1930, 富田儀作), a consultant with experience across a range of
colonial agricultural projects, argued that the agricultural association should play a
central role in the rural economy. As he saw it, despite some progress, Korea still lacked
sufficient commercial and financial institutions to efficiently match Korean farmers with
the profits to be found in Japanese markets. Thus, for the future development of Korean
agriculture and industry, the agricultural association should play a central role in
mediating commercial transactions.65 The colonial government had initially hoped to use
the agricultural associations to bring market incentives to farmers to spur development.
However, when this policy failed to produce the desired effects, the colonial government
maintained its rhetoric of commerce and development and merely shifted its focus to
apply government programs toward the market itself.
Tomita’s vision for the agricultural associations was not an idle thought
experiment. Just one year earlier, a delegation from the South Ch’ungch’ŏng provincial
agricultural association travelled to Fukuoka, Japan, to participate in the East Asia
Industrial Exposition (Ja. Tōa kangyō hakurankai). While at the expo, the delegation
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hosted a “Ch’ungnam rice day” event, which introduced information about the rice grown
in the province in conjunction with special rice tastings offered through the Korea Hall’s
canteen. Throughout the trip, representatives of the agricultural association promoted
their local rice to Fukuoka reporters, consumers, traders, and manufacturers, with the goal
of earning favorable sales contracts.66 Here, the agricultural association directly marketed
its rice in Japan in an effort to improve perceptions of the quality of the crop and
establish a new sales route. South Ch’ungch’ŏng agricultural association was not alone in
these endeavors. In a similar manner, in 1928 the governor of South Hamgyŏng province
travelled to Tokyo to publicize South Hamgyŏng rice. In particular, the trip aimed to
overcome negative impressions of South Hamgyŏng rice that saw it trading at a discount
to similar rice from North P’yŏngan province by announcing South Hamgyŏng’s new
grading standards to some two hundred local government officials and notable industrial
leaders.67
As the rural crisis unfolded and rice prices remained low in the 1930s, colonial
officials’ goal of improving the market was quickly replaced with the intent to control it.
Abandoning their theories, economists and agricultural technicians studied the rural
economy to find a solution to the seemingly intractable problem of falling prices.
Deeming August as the most profitable time to sell rice, one study duly planned a series
of financial measures that might make it possible to support a model of August sales.
Whereas previous development strategies had simply used regulations to try and create
the right incentives, colonial officials increasingly began to imagine a more active role
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for the state in the rural economy to supplement economic institutions. As the author
summarized the problem, “in the current situation where village finance is inadequate,
and where there is no development of financial institutions to match the agricultural
warehouses that securitize rice, it is absolutely impossible for ordinary farmers to [sell
rice profitably in August].” Faced with this situation, the study recommended introducing
more organizations to facilitate the storage of rice, joint sales, and financial mechanisms
that could manage both farmers’ behavior and market prices.68 With the advent of laws
restricting rice imports to Japan and the colonial government’s grain warehousing
program, the list of items to be controlled only increased, from the timing of transactions,
to sales routes and brokers.69
For farmers such as Chŏng Kwanhae, the new model of colonial agricultural was
almost unrecognizable from a mere decade previously. Where Chŏng complained in 1918
of the new laws which enforced free transactions, by 1930 he was hearing rumors of the
government buying grain, salt, and alcohol in mass quantities and rice storage programs
at Inch’ŏn and even within Chŏng’s local township:
The grain sellers within the township, gathered at a warehouse, and using first their
money, and for one sŏm of rice 10 yen, stopping there, a discount of 2 yen, and in
later days if the price rises then sell the grain and return the advance payment, then
add 7 ri of interest.” This is the [noble plan] of the ever-normal granary from China,
and especially clever.70

As in the above passage, Chŏng compared the government’s grain storage schemes to the
traditional price stabilization granaries that operated in China and in Chosŏn Korea.
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Based on Chŏng’s reaction to the rumors of government storage programs, he did not
consider additional involvement in the rice market a bad thing. After suffering debts and
losses for years Chŏng was not automatically opposed to a scheme that might raise
prices, especially as Chŏng was already finding it impossible to sell his rice in local
markets due to its extreme low price.71 As well as the warehouses, the township office
also ordered the creation of a rice stockpile (Ko. yajŏk; Ja. nodumi), which would gather
150 kŭn of rice to be sold at the county magistrate’s command.72
Despite Chŏng’s assessment, however, the warehouse and rice stockpile programs
were not identical to the typical ever-normal granary. Established as part of an effort to
control the rice market, rather than as a supplement to stabilize market prices, the colonial
government’s rice storage programs came with greater restrictions over farmers’ rice
trading activities. Once farmers entered into the scheme, they were prevented from
accessing their rice freely, as Chŏng found in 1934 when he tried to sell some of his rice
that was being held in a local stockpile. Although by that time the rice had been stored for
the agreed amount of time, when Chŏng approached the local agricultural association to
request the release of his crop, the association representative reported that he would not
be allowed his rice for the purpose of a private sale.73
By 1935, the colonial government’s initial theory of market-centered development
was almost completely eclipsed. Instead of the market, discussions of development
centered almost entirely on the performance of the semi-governmental organizations and
their capacity to control trends within the rural economy. Epitomizing this trend, Yamane
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Kei (1885–n.d., 山根譓), a long-time financial association employee, published an article
linking the fate of Korean villages with the fate of the financial associations. As he
summarized, “the rehabilitation of rural villages lies in the elevation of the work of the
financial associations, and the development of the financial associations’ work will be the
thing that speaks of the promotion of the rural economy.”74 Others expressed similar
sentiments about the agricultural associations, equating them ever-closer to the project of
development itself—in contrast to their previous imagined role as enhancing market
incentives.75
V.

Conclusion

The notion of development, especially when taken in the context of an economic plan,
resists easy classification. In any context, questions may be raised about the subjective
definition of development, as well as different criteria against which the achievement of
development may be judged. Assessing development becomes even more complicated in
the context of colonial Korea, where numerical increases in output stand in stark contrast
to accounts of rural poverty.
The difficulty in defining development provides an entry to examine a more
nuanced picture of colonial agricultural policy, based on the realization that the colonial
government never held a single view of development. From the beginning of colonial
rule, officials within the government tied their desired numerical increases in output to
the promotion of what were considered to be desirable institutional and cultural factors,
such as a particular scheme of property rights, for example, or an appreciation of
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profitability and market values. Understanding this, it becomes possible to trace the
colonial government’s wider developmental project within Korea, its efforts to alter the
mundane institutions that underpinned the rural economy, and the ways in which these
efforts conflicted with existing practices and values. To the colonial government,
development was not just about increasing output, nor was it even a matter of increasing
standards of living, but it was equally a question of institutional and behavioral change.
Acknowledging the colonial government’s own view of development provides a
new perspective onto colonial policy and the changes in the rural economy. Where
colonial officials attached significance to property rights and the profitability of crops as
an incentive for their increased cultivation, this fed through into the design of colonial
policies and, eventually, the ways in which the population might receive such policies.
Where Korean ideas of development overlapped with those of colonial officials, farmers
could find space to pursue their own interests within the colonial agenda. However, even
with broad goals in common, a different appreciation for, for example, the application of
property rights to cow ownership, could prompt quite different interpretations of a
desirable livestock promotion program. For farmers such as Chŏng Kwanhae, the limits
of colonial agricultural policy were most apparent where policies conflicted with his own
views of the rural economy. For this reason, understanding the different perspectives held
by both the colonial government and individual farmers, like Chŏng, can further
understandings of when and why conflict arose in the rural economy. At the same time,
by analyzing colonial officials’ own underlying biases and assumptions in planning for
agricultural “development,” it also becomes possible to build a clearer picture of where,
the agenda of the colonial state and actual economic practice diverged.
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CONCLUSION
After a break from 1936, Yu Yŏnghŭi resumed his diary in 1949. Presumably suffering
from a shortage of materials in the aftermath of liberation, Yu turned to whatever paper
he had to hand to continue his diary, writing over both a 1936 guide to the laws and
regulations concerning the Autonomous Rice Control Law (Ja. Beikoku jichi kanrihō) and
the 1937 April edition of the North Kyŏngsang Provincial Agricultural Association
Bulletin (see Figure 6.1).
Yu’s 1949 diary serves as an apt metaphor for the complex legacies of colonial
agricultural policy. After thirty-five years of rule, the colonial government could not help
but to leave a footprint in Korea—in the materials and physical infrastructure left behind,
but also in the knowledge, practices, norms, and organizations that farmers had learned to
structure their agriculture around. Those who maintained an improved cow, or a guide to
fertilizer, did not abandon entirely the innovations to agricultural production that
accompanied colonial rule.
Yet, at the same time, any legacies needed to be maintained actively. Without the
ongoing support of the central government, there was no guarantee that the agricultural
associations would continue their former role in printing journals, offering subsidies for
favored crops, and employing agricultural technicians to inspect fields and hold lectures.
Without the conscious decision to maintain aspects of the colonial agricultural system, its
legacy would be little more than a memory. Above all, Yu’s makeshift diary reminds us
that, as the principal agents involved in agriculture, whether or not the new government
would maintain the state infrastructure surrounding the rural economy, farmers would
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Figure 6.1: Pages from Yu Yŏnghŭi’s 1949 diary, written over the North Kyŏngsang
Provincial Agricultural Association Bulletin (April 1937 edition)

Source: www.ugyo.net (Accessed May 25, 2017)
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continue to form their own opinions on the state of Korean agriculture. Although Yu was
not able to shape the system within which he lived and worked, he nonetheless evaluated
the world around him through his diary.
One of the greatest shifts in history of the modern Korean economy has been the
expansion of the state into the economy. Beginning under the rule of King Kojong, the
Korean government adopted many new roles and responsibilities, not least among them
the assumption that the state should intervene in the economy to promote national wealth.
To this end, the government undertook a series of drastic reforms to both the
administrative organization of government and the financial system. The reforms may not
have secured political independence for Korea, nor did they necessarily improve the
financial standing of the Korean government, but they did change the basis on which the
state interacted with the population, and within the government itself.
The transformation of the state continued apace under colonial rule, as the
Government-General established a range of new semi-governmental organizations in
support of its ambitious agricultural policies. These organizations represented an
expedient growth in the role of the state in response to increasing the complexity of both
agricultural technologies and economic planning. Korea was not the only country to
experiment with semi-governmental organizations at this time, but similar iterations
emerged around the world as governments and ordinary citizens alike searched for ways
to manage their livelihoods within an increasingly complex global economy. In Korea,
the colonial government dominated agricultural policy and restricted many avenues for
the semi-governmental organizations. But, their functions were still intimately connected
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to questions of production and exchange within the rural economy, factors which were
not lost on the farmers who used the associations.
Indeed, as this dissertation has demonstrated throughout, one cannot judge the
colonial economy by the superficial claims of the colonial government alone. Even
apparently straightforward colonial goals, such as increasing the number of livestock or
the export of rice, rested upon a set of values and assumptions that inflected the shape of
colonial policy. For farmers engaged in the day to day work of agricultural production,
colonial policies and the work of the semi-governmental organizations were not just
questions of national allegiance, nor of class sympathies, but raised a host of tangential
concerns, be it preexisting attitudes toward debt or a desire for security, whether found
through new insurance products or in the tried and tested cultivation of a diverse range of
crops. Where the semi-governmental organizations performed important functions within
the rural economy, farmers judged them by their ability to perform such tasks relative to
the available alternatives, as much as they did by any overarching sense of colonial
politics. This is not to say that the associations found wide-ranging and enthusiastic
support throughout the countryside. The short-sightedness of officials within the colonial
government could often hamper a potentially useful organization with unrealistic
expectations, while a bias toward wealthier farmers kept many of the functions of the
associations out of the practical reach of most farmers. Yet, the overlap between the
productive work of the associations and their governmental role meant that the
significance of the new state infrastructure would be felt long beyond the limits of
colonial rule.
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Indeed, one of the defining features of the (South) Korean economy throughout
the twentieth century has been the active role of the state, fueled in the postwar period by
the politics of national division and the Cold War. Many studies of the 1950s and 1960s
have argued against the view that would see a strong postwar state as an unthinking
replication of colonial-era patterns. If only indirectly, this dissertation would add to such
studies, through its assertion that the organizations that epitomized state intervention in
the colonial economy—the associations—were bound to international trends in
agricultural technology and the global trade in agricultural products as much as they were
characteristic of colonial politics (although with the potential to have their outcomes
influenced by colonial politics). Any replication of the state’s role in the rural economy
following liberation must therefore be equally judged according to the productive
function that the semi-governmental organizations would fulfill—just as Sim Wŏn’gwŏn,
Yu Yŏnghŭi, and Chŏng Kwanhae did in their diaries.
Although agriculture’s contribution to the overall economy decreased following
South Korea’s rapid industrialization and urbanization in the 1960s and 1970s, its
significance remains as the major industry in which the central government first
attempted widespread intervention into the economy. Even in the 1970s, as heavy
industries and factory production became more widespread, it is notable that one of Park
Chung Hee’s most iconic economic and social campaigns, the Saemaeul (New Village)
Movement, began in rural areas before extending to factories and cities. Understanding
the earliest expansion of the state into the rural economy thus takes on additional
significance, particularly as campaigns in the postwar period borrowed the symbols and
tactics from colonial-era rural programs—in the nomination of model villages, the
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awarding of prizes, and even the encouragement of womens’ groups to carry out smallscale savings one handful of rice at a time. Where such similarities do arise, credit cannot
be assumed to belong to the long-gone colonial government; rather connections must be
examined and questioned. If Park Chung Hee and others sought to maintain a role for the
state within the economy, then such ideas might fruitfully be examined against the similar
set of negotiations and considerations that characterized earlier farmers’ thoughts about
the same.
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APPENDIX
Kye referenced in Sim Wŏn’gwŏn ilgi
Type of kye
Village kye
(tonggye)
Kye named by
location

Educational kye
(hakkye)

Date mentioned
Tonggye (1881.3) (1909.11)
Sŏnam kye (1870.7) (1871.10) (1871.12) (1891.1) (1891.4) (1893.7)
[Sŏnam kye (1872.2)]
Songho kye (1871.11) (1902.9) (1903.3)
Myŏngdong kye (1872.5) (1874.1) (1874.3) (1874.5) (1874.10)
(1877.4) (1893.2)
[Myŏngdong kye (1873.10)]
Myŏngdong ch’o kye (1874.5)
Songgok kye (1873.12)
[Songgok kye (1873.11)]
Hwajang kye (1873.10)
Yŏch’ŏn kye (1875.3)
Hajŏng kye (1875.7)
Sangjŏng kye (1876.1) (1876.3) (1876.6)
Yŏmbup’o kye (1877.5)
Tŏksan kye (1878.2)
Mansu kye (1878.12)
Taeil kye (1882.3)
Ya’am kye (1883.8) (1886.9) (1897.10) (1917.1) (1921.3) (1930.3)
Ya’am Usan t’aek kye (1925.3)
Ya’am chungni t’aek kye (1925.3)
Yongyŏn kye (1891.11)
Kosa kye (1892.3) (1893.3)
Taera kye (1897.3) (1917.5)
Tamil kye (1912.8) (1922.6)
Myŏngdong hakkye (1870.6) (1872.6)
[Myŏngdong hakkye (1873.3)]
Sŏdang kye (1870.8), (1870.9)
Ŏnyang sŏdang kye (1870.11)
Songho hakkye (1871.8) (1874.3) (1875.6) (1876.1) (1876.2)
(1887.11)
Ya’am hakkye (1874.1)
Mansu hakkye (1877.11) (1877.12)
Hakkye (unnamed): (1870.2) (1870.12) (1872.3) (1872.7) (1875.2)
(1875.4) (1887.12)
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Lineage kye
(mun’gye)

Other

Sŏdang mun’gye (1872.4)
Sŏnam mun’gye (1891.5) (1892.7) (1917.7) (1927.9) (1929.3)
(1930.9)
Sŏnam pomunt’aek mun’gye (1930.3)
Songho mun’gye (1891.9)
Taera mun’gye (1897.8) (1916.10)
Myŏngdong mun’gye (1917.6) (1926.9)
Ya’am mun’gye (1926.3) (1926.9) (1928.9) (1931.9)
Ya’am Tŏksant’aek mun’gye (1922.3)
Usan mun’gye (1931.3)
Kokyŏnt’aek mun’gye (1931.3)
Mun’gye (unnamed): (1891.7) (1892.4) (1897.9) (1929.9)
P’agye (1870.3) (1873.6*) (1926.9) (1927.9)
Sa’andang kye (1873.4)
Hyogye (1881.4)
Sam’in’gye (1888.11)
Yangch’on t’aek kye (1888.5) (1902.4)
Mukchŏng Hong saengwŏn t’aek kye (1894.2)
Naegae kyoja kye (1891.10)
Manin’gye (1900.2)
Kama kye (1902.2)
Hyomunsa kye (1907.1)
Min’gye (1911.9)
Samch’ŏn kye (1915.7)
Kŭmran’gye (1921.10)
Ya’am chungni t’aek p’agye (1928.10)
Sŏnam dong t’aek p’agye (1930.3)
Yangŏ samin’gye (1930.11)

Kye (unnamed): (1870.5) (1870.10) (1875.5) (1876.5) (1879.5)
(1881.2) (1883.11) (1892.2) (1919.3) (1931.2)
Note: 1) Entries in parentheses () indicate the year and (lunar) month that Sim attended
a kye meeting or participated in other kye activities. * denotes an intercalary
month within the lunar calendar.
2) Entries in brackets [] indicate that the location of the kye has been inferred
from the context of the diary and was not explicitly mentioned by Sim Wŏn’gwŏn
himself, as in the following example of a Myŏngdong kye: 食後往于鳴洞, 契會後,
往于孝洞李生員家, 留宿矣. (1873.10.10)
3) Not included here are: (a) passing references to kye in which it is clear that Sim
was not a member (such as Sim’s first description of a ten-thousand member
gambling kye (manin’gye)) (1900.1); or (b) incidental references to kye when
meeting fellow kye members at non-kye occasions or visiting kye fields for
reasons not related to the work of the kye.
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